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Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the 
following simple idea:  the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms 
due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs.  If this notion is even 
possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not 
veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are 
merely evolutionarily advantageous).  
 Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus 
called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s 
cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition 
of what one is trying to prove).  The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this, 
realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties, 
and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in 
naturalism).   So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current 
evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e., 
irrational) position.  It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical 
naturalism. 
 Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one.  His ultimate goal is to 
persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism 
instead.  EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for 
some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism. 
 In this paper, I attempt to: 
(1)  explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement; 
(2)  examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN 
(along with some of Plantinga’s responses); 
(3)  put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form; 
(4)  comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the 
premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN; 
and, 
(5)  conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain 
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In 1993, Alvin Plantinga published the first two books of his eventual trilogy on 
epistemic warrant.
1
  The first book, Warrant: The Current Debate,
2
 was a survey of many 
important contemporary accounts of warrant.
3
  Plantinga found all of these accounts 
unsatisfactory for various reasons.  In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function,
4
 
he explicated his own version of warrant, defined there briefly by him as that “… elusive 
quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for 
knowledge …”.
5
  In the last chapter of WPF there appeared an argument where Plantinga 
maintained that the holding of metaphysical naturalism and current evolutionary theory
6
  
is epistemically faulty in an important sense.  This argument, dubbed by him the 
Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (hereafter EAAN) was refined in the third 
book of his trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief,
7
 and in later articles.
8
 
                                                 
1
 The third and final book of the trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief, was published seven years later, in 
2000. 
2
 Hereafter WCD.  
3
 Warrant being defined here as “that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the 
difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3. 
4
 Hereafter WPF. 
5
 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) v. 
6
 I.e., holding these two beliefs together at the same time. 
7
 Hereafter WCB;  Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
8
 See principally Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell,  
 2008); Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alvin 
Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in James Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated?  Essays on Plantinga’s 
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) 204-275; and Alvin Plantinga, 
“Respondeo” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of 
Knowledge, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) 307-378.  For an 
extensive list of articles responding early on to EAAN, see Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in 
Beilby, 204, footnote 1.  
2 
 
 Plantinga argued in EAAN that it is irrational for a reflective person to accept the 
conjoining of naturalism with current evolutionary theory (roughly understood).
9
  He has 
summed up his argument as follows: 
… naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory are at serious odds with one 
another – and this despite the fact that the latter is ordinarily thought to be one of 
the main pillars supporting the edifice of the former … I am not attacking the 
theory of evolution … I am instead attacking the conjunction of naturalism with 
the view that human beings have evolved in that way … I have argued that the 
conjunction of naturalism with the belief that we human beings have evolved in 
conformity with current evolutionary doctrine … is in a certain interesting way 
self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent.  Still more particularly, I argued 
that naturalism and evolution – ‘N&E’ for short – furnishes one who accepts it 
with a defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable – a defeater 
that can’t be defeated.  But then this conjunction also furnishes a defeater for any 
belief produced by our cognitive faculties, including, in the case of one who 




     Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism begins with the following 
simple idea:  the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms due to 
adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs.  If this notion is even possibly 
true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not veridical and 
that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are merely 
evolutionarily advantageous).  
                                                 
9
 Plantinga’s argument has many affinities with a line of thinking in the philosophy of religion sometimes 
called the Argument from Reason.  The Argument from Reason has often been presented as an argument 
for the existence of God, positing that theism provides a better grounding for our reasoning capacities than 
does naturalism (or something close to that). James Beilby notes that Plantinga’s argument (although much 
more developed) has affinities to arguments put forth by Richard Taylor (in chapter 10 of his book 
Metaphysics) and C. S. Lewis (in chapters 3 and 13 of the second edition of Miracles).  James Beilby, 
“Preface” in Naturalism Defeated?  Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. 
James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) ix.   
10
 Alvin Plantinga, “Introduction” in Naturalism Defeated?  Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument 
Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby, (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) 1-2. 
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 Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus 
called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s 
cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition 
of what one is trying to prove).  The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this, 
realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties, 
and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in 
naturalism).   So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current 
evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e., 
irrational) position.  It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical 
naturalism. 
 Although EAAN is about questioning the reliability of our noetic structures,
11
 
Plantinga’s purpose in wielding it is not for global skeptical ends.  His ultimate goal is to 
persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism 
instead.  EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for 
some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism. 
 In this paper, I attempt to: 
(1)  explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement; 
(2)  examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN  
       (along with some of Plantinga’s responses); 
(3)  put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form; 
(4)  comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing each  
                                                 
11
“Noetic structures” is here a rough synonym for “cognitive faculties” (i.e., noetic is not operating in a 
technical Husserlian way). 
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       premise, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of  
       EAAN; and, 
(5)  conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain  
       why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.   
 
A Preliminary Issue:  The Definition of “Naturalism” 
 What does “naturalism” mean in Plantinga’s argument?  Historically, the term 
“naturalism” (in the philosophical sense) has had a very wide semantic range.  Perhaps 
this quick overview by Dallas Willard will provide a helpful starting point, surveying 
some of the important variations: 
 … What might be called “generic naturalism” has a long history that includes: 
 classical naturalism, with figures such as Democritus, Epicurus, Aristotle and 
 Lucretius; Renaissance naturalism, with Bruno, Campanella, and Telesio, and – 
 born too late – Spinoza; empiricist/nominalist naturalism, with Hobbes, Hume, 
 D’Holbach and most of the French Encylopedists and Comte; nineteenth-century 
 materialistic naturalism, with Jakob Moleschott, Karl Vogt, Ernst Haeckel, 
 Ludwig Büchner, Herbert Spencer, and, it is often presumed, Charles Darwin; 
 mid-twentieth century (largely anti-materialistic) naturalism, with Santayana, 
 Dewey, and others; and late-twentieth century (“identity thesis”) naturalism, 
 which wavers between scientism and physicalism, with Quine, David Armstrong, 




 Arthur Danto has stated that recent usage in philosophy of the term “naturalism” 
has referred to:  
 … a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or 
 happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through 
 methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are 
 continuous from domain to domain of objects and events.  Hence, naturalism is 
 polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any 
                                                 
12
 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, ed. William Lane Craig 
and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000) 44-45. 
5 
 





 Robert Audi gives the following overview:  naturalism is “… in rough terms … 
the view that nature is all there is and all basic truths are truths of nature.”
14
  (However, 
this disposes one to immediately ask:  (1) what nature is, (2) what kind of identity with 
all there is does the “is” signify, and (3) what basic truths are.)
15
  Audi asserts that 
naturalism is, perhaps, “more often presumed than stated [or argued for]”; that might 
account for at least some of the differences in positions held.
16
 
 Paul Moser and David Yandell distinguish between ontological naturalism and 
methodological naturalism.  They also believe that most contemporary adherents of 
naturalism can be helpfully further subdivided into three subtypes:  eliminative 
ontological (or methodological) naturalists, non-eliminative reductive ontological (or 
methodological) naturalists, and non-eliminative non-reductive ontological (or 
methodological) naturalists.
17
     
Eliminative ontological naturalism (EON) is defined by Moser and Yandell as 
follows:   
 [EON:] … every real entity is capturable by the ontology of the hypothetically 
 completed empirical sciences, and language independent of those sciences is 
 eliminable from discourse without cognitive loss.
18
   
 
                                                 
13
 Arthur C. Danto, “Naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volumes 5-6, ed. Paul Edwards (New 
York: Simon & Shuster Macmillan, 1996) 448. 
14
 Robert Audi, “Naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, ed. Paul Edwards (New 
York: Simon & Shuster Macmillan, 1996) 372.  Emphasis mine. 
15
 Audi, 372. 
16
 Audi, 372. 
17
 Paul K. Moser and David Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism” in Naturalism: A Critical 
Analysis, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000) 8-9. 
18
 Examples given of adherents of EON are W. V. Quine, Paul Churchland, and Daniel Dennett.  Moser and 
Yandell, 8.   
6 
 
Non-eliminative reductive ontological naturalism (NERON) is defined as:   
 [NERON:] … every real entity either is capturable by the ontology of the 





Non-eliminative non-reductive ontological naturalism (NENRON) is defined as:  
 [NENRON:] … some real entities neither are capturable by the ontology of the 
 hypothetically completed empirical sciences nor are reducible to anything 
 capturable by that ontology, but all such entities supervene on entities capturable 




In contrast to the ontological categories, “methodological naturalism” is taken to 
refer to various views about “the range of legitimate inquiry”.
21
  Although there are 
methodological analogues for each of the above ontological categories, they might all 
share a certain core thought, namely:  “every legitimate method of acquiring knowledge 
consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical 
sciences (that is, in natural methods).”
22
 
 Assuming that these groupings of Moser and Yandell are helpful and that they 
describe most contemporary metaphysical naturalists, one is struck with the remarkable 
plasticity of the terms “naturalism” and “naturalist”.  Plantinga knows that the word 
“naturalism” is used in many different ways and that it would be extremely difficult to 
come up with a precise definition.  He writes: 
 … naturalism is not at all easy to characterize … Indeed, some who think about 
 naturalism believe that it isn’t a doctrine at all; it isn’t a belief, or a proposition.  
 According to Bas van Fraassen,
[23]
 for example, … to be a naturalist is to adopt a 
                                                 
19
 A proponent of NERON would be J.J.C. Smart.  Moser and Yandell, 8. 
20
 Examples of adherents of NENRON would be Donald Davidson and David Papineau.  Moser and 
Yandell, 8. 
21
 Moser and Yandell, 9. 
22
 Moser and Yandell, 9. 
23
 See Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) 49ff.  Plantinga 
and Tooley, KOG, 18, note 20.  Also, and especially, see Bas van Fraassen, “Science, Materialism, and 
7 
 
 certain attitude, an attitude involving among other things an exclusive 
 commitment to science in guiding one’s opinions … I’d like to think of it, for 
 present purposes, as fundamentally a way of looking at the world, a high-level 
 belief about the world … I’ll use the term ‘philosophical naturalism’ to refer to 




 Plantinga then quotes a passage from Bertrand Russell that helps in focusing upon 
the kind of position he is opposing with his EAAN: 
 … That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were 
 achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs 
 are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, 
 no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the 
 grave, that all labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the 
 noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death 
 of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must 
 inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all of these things, 
 if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which 
 rejects  them can hope to stand.  Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only 
 on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation 
 henceforth be safely built.
25
         
                                         Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (1917)                        
 
 Plantinga thinks that, although Russell’s statement may be a bit extravagant, “it 
does serve to give the flavor of the view I mean to attack.”
26
   Additionally, Plantinga 
thinks that perhaps the best way to understand the kind of naturalism that he is opposing 
is to contrast it with theism:  
 … The basic idea of philosophical naturalism (which from now on I’ll just call 
 ‘naturalism’) is that there is no such person as God, or anything at all like him … 
 If you are a naturalist, you don’t believe in God, but you also don’t believe in the 
 Stoic’s Mind, or Fichte’s Absolute I, or Plato’s Idea of the Good, or Aristotle’s 
 Unmoved Mover, or Hegel’s Absolute.  This account of naturalism suffers a 
                                                                                                                                                 
False Consciousness” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory 
of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) 149-181. 
24
 Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 18. 
25
 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1917) 47-8.  Quoted in Plantinga 
and Tooley, KOG, 18. 
26
 Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 18. 
8 
 
 certain vagueness (nothing at all similar to God, but just how similar?), but in 




Similarly, Dallas Willard suggests:  
 “… the single unifying theme of all Naturalisms is anti-transcendentalism. Their 
 steady point of reference is … “nature” in extension … [although what] “nature” 
 is in intension has never been agreed upon among naturalists.”
28
   
 
 Hopefully, most readers will have a sufficient feel for what Plantinga is attacking.  
As crucial as it initially seems to have a detailed definition of naturalism for EAAN to get 
off the ground, there isn’t very much in the literature critical of EAAN that aims to give 
Plantinga a hard time concerning the precise definition of naturalism.  So, perhaps he is 
correct in assuming that this definitional tangle is not necessarily an obstacle.  At any 
rate, it looks to me like Plantinga’s argument will apply to all of the Moser/Yandell 
categories of contemporary naturalists (eliminative ontological naturalists, non-
eliminative reductive naturalists, and non-eliminative non-reductive naturalists, along 
with their respective methodological analogues).
29
  
 One can imagine that EAAN has generated a lot of critical fire.  Many 
philosophers have attacked EAAN by disallowing one of the main premises of the 
argument – that natural selection is only “interested” in the adaptive behavior of an 
organism, not necessarily true beliefs.  A few mathematically-minded philosophers have 
criticized Plantinga regarding his calculations of the probabilities involved in some 
                                                 
27
 Plantinga and Tooley, KOG, 19.  For further discussion involving attempts to define naturalism, 
Plantinga recommends Chapters 2 and 3 of Michael Rea’s World without Design (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2002) and Bas van Fraassen’s The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2002) 49ff.  
28
 Willard, 45.  Willard goes on to say: “… Some [naturalists] look very much like pantheists, and yet 
others (Santayana, Dewey) reach very far to incorporate “the divine” and all that is humanly unique into 
“nature.” 
29
 Moser and Yandell, 8-9.  It will become much more clear later why all these categories are susceptible to 
Plantinga’s argument, but a quick preview of why this is so has to do with the fact that there is no design 
plan involved regarding cognitive faculties that are successfully aimed at truth. 
9 
 
versions of EAAN.  Some other philosophers have noted that Plantinga’s argument is 
reminiscent of problems that interested Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, and others about 
knowledge, and make their attacks along these lines.  (For instance, there are similarities 
between the issues that Plantinga highlights with matters involved in the Cartesian 
Circle.)  Still other philosophers have opposed EAAN by way of arguments involving 
varying analyses of Plantinga’s concept of epistemic defeat. 
      I survey and comment upon several important epistemological issues that are 
raised by the EAAN and some of its critics. In brief, I proceed as follows: 
Chapter 2 – EAAN AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
 
I will begin by explaining the basics of Plantinga’s argument, including a 
brief history of what has happened in the literature regarding EAAN since 
Plantinga launched it in 1993.    
 
Chapter 3 – SOME CONCERNS ABOUT EAAN AND EVOLUTION 
 
I will survey some of the main lines of attack with regard to matters that 
pertain to current evolutionary theory.  Then I assess the strengthening or damage 
that has been done to Plantinga’s argument.  It will become apparent that I don’t 
feel that this is the most important problem area regarding EAAN.  
  
Chapter 4 – SOME CONCERNS ABOUT PROBABILITY  
 
I look at certain issues involving probability and EAAN, especially the 
problem of what conditionalization setting should be used for an argument such as 
this.  
 
Chapter 5 – EAAN AND SOME ISSUES CONCERNING SKEPTICISM AND 
EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY 
 
This chapter will highlight how EAAN trades upon a certain circularity 
issue that has been historically intractable in philosophy. 
 
Chapter 6 – REMARKS ON INTUITIONS REGARDING EAAN AND 




In this chapter I discuss some arguments that are closely related to the type 
that Plantinga is giving in EAAN.  This brings out some important intuitions that 
they all share, but also highlights what Plantinga is doing that is new. 
 
Chapter 7 – SOME THOUGHTS ON DEFEATERS GIVEN THE PROBABILITY 
THESIS  
 
This chapter focuses on certain critics of EAAN who do not think that 
EAAN yields a defeater given the Probability Thesis.  Michael Bergmann’s 
critique is singled out and analyzed. 
 
Chapter 8 – AN EXTENDED SUMMARY OF EAAN IN LOGICAL FORM, WITH 
DISCUSSION OF PREMISES (1) THROUGH (6) 
 
   In this chapter I summarize EAAN into an argument with 23 premises.  
While commenting upon summary, I narrow down the major points of contention 
to two premises.  Of the first six premises, I pick out one to be especially 
controversial. 
 
Chapter 9 – AN EXTENDED SUMMARY OF EAAN IN LOGICAL FORM: 
DISUCSSION OF SOME PREMISES AFTER PREMISE (6), WITH 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PREMISE (10)  
 
 In this chapter I continue to discuss the SUMMARY, and focus upon 
Premise (10) as the second of two main points of contention regarding EAAN.  I 
conclude that Plantinga’s argument revolves crucially around the thought 
experiments used as analogies to support Premise (10).  As these analogies are 
intuitionally supported, Plantinga’s overall argument will only be persuasive to 

















EAAN and Its Development 
 
 As has been noted, Plantinga initially stated EAAN in Warrant and Proper 
Function in 1993.
30
  There have been revisions due to feedback and various objections, 
but in 2002 (almost a decade after he launched it) Plantinga wrote that he considered the 
argument to have “emerged unscathed – or if a bit scathed, then at least bloody but 
unbowed.”
31
   
 The latest version of EAAN appeared in 2008, when Plantinga and Michael 
Tooley published a debate between them entitled Knowledge of God.
32
  In this book, 
Plantinga’s affinities with EAAN are obvious, as he leans heavily upon it in his 
arguments against naturalism.  Thus, in the fifteen years or so since Plantinga first 
launched EAAN in Warrant and Proper Function, in spite of all the criticisms and minor 
revisions, Plantinga’s confidence in EAAN seemed unfazed.  Actually, his conviction 
that EAAN is a good argument seems to have grown even stronger over the years. 
I will concentrate mostly upon the versions of EAAN which appeared in between 
the bookend years of 1993 (WPF) and 2008 (KOG), primarily as Plantinga presented it in 
“Introduction” and “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in Naturalism Defeated?
33
  However, a 
history of how the argument reached this form is in order. 
                                                 
30
 So says Plantinga, in Beilby, 1.  However, James Beilby notes [in Naturalism Defeated?  Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) ix] that 
an even earlier Plantinga version appeared in Alvin Plantinga, “An Evolutionary Argument Against 
Naturalism”, Logos 12 (1991) 27-49. 
31
 Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in Beilby, 204-205. 
32
 Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008). 
33
 Alvin Plantinga, “Introduction -- The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism: An Initial Statement of 
the Argument” and “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts”, in Beilby, 1-12, 205-275.  
12 
 
Beginnings of EAAN:  The Final Chapter of Warrant and Proper Function (1993) 
      In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga began by noting that 
we have some true beliefs: 
Most of us think (or would think on reflection) that at least a function or  
purpose of our cognitive faculties is to provide us with true beliefs … 
Qualifications are necessary, of course.  There are various exceptions and special 
cases … Nevertheless over a vast area of cognitive terrain we take it that the 
purpose (function) of our cognitive faculties is to provide us with true or 
verisimilitudinous beliefs, and that, for the most part, that is just what they do … 
We think our faculties much better adapted to reach the truth in some areas than 
others; we are good at elementary arithmetic and logic, and the perception of 
middle-sized objects under ordinary conditions.  We are also good at 
remembering certain sorts of things:  I can easily remember what I had for 




     But Plantinga thinks that placing these truths in a naturalistic metaphysical 
framework brings about a certain dilemma: 
But isn’t there a problem, here, for the naturalist?  At any rate for the naturalist 
who thinks that we and our cognitive capacities arrived upon the scene after some 
billions of years of evolution (by way of natural selection, genetic drift, and other 
blind processes working on such sources of genetic variation as random genetic 
mutation)? ... If our cognitive faculties have … [thus originated], then their 
ultimate purpose or function (if they have a purpose or function) will be 
something like survival (of individual, species, gene, or genotype); but then it 
seems initially doubtful that among their functions – ultimate, proximate, or 




In this vein, Plantinga quotes Patricia Churchland: 
 Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to  
succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing.  The principle 
chore of the nervous system is to get the body parts where they should be in order 
that the organism may survive. … Improvements in sensorimotor control confer 
an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long 
as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances 
                                                 
34
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35
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      The point here is that current evolutionary theory (hereafter E) sensibly paints a 
picture of organisms being selected for adaptive behavior, but not necessarily true beliefs.  
As Plantinga says, “… our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous … but there 
is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested not in truth, 
but in appropriate behavior.”
37
 
      When E is conjoined with metaphysical naturalism (hereafter N), Plantinga thinks 
we have reason to doubt at least two things:  (1) that the purpose of our noetic faculties is 
to provide us with true beliefs, and (2) “… that they do, in fact, furnish us with mostly 
true beliefs.”
38
  (It is extremely important to note that Plantinga is not asserting that we 
do, in fact, have mostly false beliefs.  We will see that such a misunderstanding will crop 
up many times over.  He is arguing that, given N&E, we have reason to doubt that they 
do furnish us with mostly true beliefs.) 
Plantinga envisions that someone might respond in the style of Karl Popper – that, 
since we have evolved, “we may be pretty sure that our hypotheses and guesses as to 
what the world is like are mostly correct.”
39
   Plantinga goes on to also quote W. v. O. 
Quine: 
     What does make clear sense is this other part of the problem of induction: why 
does our innate subjective spacing of qualities accord so well with the 
                                                 
36
 Patricia Churchland, “Epistemology in the Age of Science,” Journal of Philosophy 84 (October 1987) 
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37
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38
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39
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functionally relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions tend to come 
out right?  Why should our subjective spacing of qualities have a special purchase 
on nature and a lien on the future? 
     There is some encouragement in Darwin.  If people’s innate spacing of 
qualities is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has made for the most 
successful inductions will have tended to predominate through natural selection.  
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy 





      However, Plantinga notes that Darwin himself had doubts about this very issue.  
Late in his life, less than one year before he died, Darwin wrote in a letter to William 
Graham Down:  
With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, 
which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or 
at all trustworthy.  Who would trust the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there 
are any convictions in such a mind?
41
   
 
Plantinga calls this “Darwin’s Doubt.”  He then comments on the insights of 
Churchland and Darwin:   
… One possibility: perhaps Darwin and Churchland mean to propose that a 
certain objective conditional probability is relatively low:  the probability of 
human cognitive faculties’ being reliable (producing mostly true beliefs), given 
that human beings have cognitive faculties (of the sort we have) and given that 
these faculties have been produced by evolution (… blind evolution, unguided by 
the hand of God or any other person).  If metaphysical naturalism and this 
evolutionary account are both true, then our cognitive faculties will have resulted 
from blind mechanisms like natural selection, working on such sources of genetic 
variation as random genetic mutation.  Evolution is interested, not in true belief, 
but in survival or fitness.  It is therefore unlikely that our cognitive faculties have 
the production of true belief as a proximate or any other function, and the 
probability of our faculties’ being reliable (given naturalistic evolution) would be 
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      This leads Plantinga to abbreviate by way of a formula:  P(R/(N&E&C)) is fairly  
low.   N stands for metaphysical naturalism and E means “current evolutionary theory”.  
C is a complex proposition “… which states what cognitive faculties we have – memory, 
perception, reason … and what sorts of beliefs they produce.”  R is the claim that these 
faculties are, for the most part and with a few qualifications, reliable (“… in the sense 




  To address concerns like the ones put forth by Popper and Quine, Plantinga refers 
to Stephen Stich.  Stich is suspicious of the idea that the evolutionary process guarantees 
that organisms which do not have mostly true beliefs do not survive and reproduce.  Stich 
sees this idea to involve at least these two premises: 
P1:  “[E]volution produces organisms with good approximations to optimally 
well-designed characteristics or systems”; 
P2:  “[A]n optimally well-designed cognitive system is a rational cognitive 
system” and a rational system is a reliable system (i.e., producing a preponderance of true 
beliefs).
44
   
      Stich questions both of these premises in order “to make it clear that there are 
major problems to be overcome by those who think that evolutionary considerations 
                                                 
42
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 Plantinga, WPF, 220. 
44




impose interesting limits on irrationality …”.
45
  Concerning P1, Stich points out that 
types of random genetic drift may result in the survival of the less-fit organisms.  
Additionally, because of pleiotropy (where a gene codes for multiple traits or systems), a 
negative trait might be perpetuated by its link with a positive trait.
46
  Therefore, an 
optimal system may never arrive in time for selection to work on it within the current 
development of the life form.
47
 
      Concerning P2, Stich questions whether reliable cognitive systems are 
necessarily more fitness-enhancing than unreliable ones.  Cognitive System A might be 
more reliable than Cognitive System B, but A might “cost too much by way of energy or 
memory capacity; alternatively, [… B] might produce more by way of false beliefs but 
nonetheless contribute more to survival.”
48
 
  If some proponents of positions of N&E think that evolution guarantees or insures 
reliable cognitive systems, arguments à la Stich seem to cast doubt on such positions.  
However, Plantinga thinks it is possible that Popper and Quine meant something less 
strong, like “it is fairly or highly probable, given that we and our cognitive faculties have 
evolved according to the processes endorsed by contemporary evolutionary theory, that 
those faculties are reliable.”
49
 
 Plantinga continues: 
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… What Stich shows is that it is perfectly possible both that we and our cognitive 
faculties have evolved in the ways approved by current evolutionary theory, and 
that those cognitive faculties are not reliable.  But that does not address Quine’s 
argument taken as an implicit argument for the claim that P(R/(N&E&C)) is fairly 
high, and a fortiori it does not serve as an argument for Darwin’s Doubt, that is, 




So then, what would be the best way to analyze this weaker claim?  Plantinga 
thinks it would be helpful to construct a thought experiment about a hypothetical group of 
creatures in some possible world:   
Suppose these creatures have cognitive faculties, hold beliefs, change beliefs, 
make inferences, and so on; and suppose these creatures have arisen by 
way of the selection processes endorsed by contemporary evolutionary 
thought. What is the probability that their faculties are reliable? What is 
P(R/(N&E&C)), specified not to us, but to them? According to Quine and 
Popper, the probability in question would be rather high: belief is connected 
with action in such a way that extensive false belief would lead to 
maladaptive behavior, in which case it is likely that the ancestors of those 
creatures would have displayed that pathetic but praiseworthy tendency Quine 
mentions. 51 
 
      But, Plantinga says, even if it is likely that their behavior is adaptive, nothing as 
yet follows about their beliefs.  This possible world scenario hasn’t yet stated a condition 
as to a causal connection between beliefs and behavior.  Beliefs may here be just 
epiphenomena.
52
  The Popper/Quine type objection assumes that there is a causal 
connection between beliefs and behavior; however, it is important to realize that such a 
position isn’t at all a necessary part of N.   
Plantinga then anticipates a problem looming over the definition of “belief” 
(which is important enough to quote at length, because a significant amount of his later 
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argument will have to do with problems about the linkage between behavior and 
thoughts, beliefs, and propositions): 
You may object that as you use 'belief', beliefs just are among the processes 
(neural structures, perhaps) that (together with desire, fear, and the like) are 
causally efficacious. Fair enough … but then my point can be put as follows: 
in that use of `belief' it may be that things with propositional contents are not 
beliefs, that is, do not have causal efficacy. It can't be a matter of definition 
that there are neural structures or processes displaying both propositional content 
and causal efficacy with respect to behavior; and perhaps the things that 
display causal efficacy do not display the sort of relation to content (to a 
proposition) that a belief of the proposition p must display toward p. You say 
that in that case the things, if any, that stand in that relation to a proposition 
would not be beliefs (because, as you see it, beliefs must have causal efficacy). 
Well, there is no sense in arguing about words: I'll give you the term 'belief' 
and put my case using other terms. What I say is possible is that the things 
(mental acts, perhaps) that stand in that relation to content (to propositions) 
do not also enjoy causal efficacy. Call those things whatever you like: they 
are the things that are true or false, and it is about the likelihood of their 
truth or falsehood that we are asking. If these things, whatever we call them, 
are not causally connected with behavior, then they would be, so to speak, 
invisible to evolution; and then the fact that they arose during the 
evolutionary history of these beings would confer no probability on the 
idea that they are mostly true, or mostly nearly true, rather than wildly false. 
Indeed, the probability of their being for the most part true would have to be 




      So, it is possible that the creatures in the thought experiment have beliefs that are 
merely epiphenomenal, in such a way that they are not connected with behavior.  But that 
is only the first possibility among many that Plantinga canvasses.  A second possibility 
Plantinga considers with regard to the creatures (in a possible world close to ours) is that 
the beliefs of the hypothetical creatures are effects of their behavior, but not causes of 
their behaviors.  As in the option before this, beliefs then would not necessarily have any 
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function related to truth.  Therefore, P(R/N&E&C) would be low.
54
 
      The third possibility (with regard to the creatures) is that beliefs are causally 
connected to behavior, but not by way of the content of the beliefs: 
     … in currently fashionable jargon, this would be the suggestion that while 
beliefs are causally efficacious, it is only by virtue of their syntax, not by 
virtue of their semantics. Indeed just this thesis is part of a popular 
contemporary view: the computational theory of mind … I read a poem very 
loudly, so loudly as to break a glass …
 
the sounds I utter have meaning, but 
their meaning is causally irrelevant to the breaking of the glass. In the same 
way it might be that these creatures' beliefs have causal efficacy, but not by way 




            Plantinga notes that this category represents a widely-held view, and he references 
several accounts, including those of Jerry Fodor, Stephen Stich, Patricia Churchland, 
Fred Dretske, Brian Loar, and Zenon Pylyshyn.  Plantinga remarks that “Robert 
Cummins goes so far as to call this view—the view that representations have causal 




It seems likely that, under such a scenario, the possibility that the creatures’ 
beliefs are mostly true would be low.
57
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      A fourth possibility is that the beliefs of the creatures are causally connected 
to their behavior (syntactically and semantically), but prove to be maladaptive to a 
substantial extent.
58
  Plantinga argues: 
… it is quite possible … that a system or trait that is in fact maladaptive – at 
any rate less adaptive than available alternatives – should nonetheless be-
come fixed and survive. Perhaps the belief systems of these creatures are like the 
albinism found in many arctic animals, or like sickle-cell anemia: maladaptive, 
but connected with genes coding for behavior or traits conducive to survival. 
They could be maladaptive in two ways. First, perhaps their beliefs are a sort a 
energy-expensive distraction, causing these creatures to engage in survival
-
enhancing behavior, all right, but in a way less efficient and economic than if the 
causal connections by-passed belief altogether. Second, it could be that 
beliefs in fact produce maladaptive behavior. Perhaps a mildly maladaptive 
belief-behavior structure is coded for by the same genetic structure that pro-
duces some adaptive behavior. Suppose these creatures' beliefs do not for the 
most part produce adaptive behavior: the mechanisms that produce them 
might nonetheless survive. Perhaps on balance their behavior is sufficiently 
adaptive, even if not every segment of it is.
59
   
 
  
 Under this fourth possible scenario, where beliefs and behaviors are causally 
connected but are significantly maladaptive, it seems that the probability of the creatures’ 
cognitive faculties being reliable would also be low.  The fifth and last possibility 
Plantinga considers is one in which the beliefs of the creatures are causally connected to 
their behaviors in a way that is adaptive.  Wouldn’t the probability that their cognitive 
faculties were reliable be quite high in this instance?  Not necessarily, Plantinga holds.  
This is because there are many different belief/behavior pairings that will result in the 
same behavior (which in this case is also adaptive), and some of these pairings will be 
founded upon beliefs which are false.
60
   For instance, take Paul, a prehistoric hominid.  
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To survive in his environment, he needs to “display tiger-avoidance behavior”.
61
  Think 
of some successful tiger-avoidance behavior B:  we think that Paul does B because Paul 
doesn’t want to be eaten by a tiger and thinks B is a good way to avoid such an end.
62
  
But that might be too hasty a conclusion:  
 … But clearly this avoidance behavior could be the result of a thousand other 
belief-desire combinations:  indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B 
equally well.  (Here let me ignore the complication arising from the fact that 
belief comes in degrees.)  Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, 
but whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, 
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him.  This will get his 
body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving 
much by way of true belief.  (Of course we must postulate other changes in Paul’s 





 In other words, it seems clearly possible that the behavior which is observable of 
Paul does not necessarily have to result from the kinds of beliefs that an observer (who 
presupposes that Paul’s cognitive faculties are reliable) might suppose.  Some unexpected 
belief-behavior pairings could involve false beliefs.  As long as the behavior is adaptive, 
natural selection will (all other things being equal) select Paul in spite of (or because of) 
the false beliefs. 
Plantinga anticipates a rebuttal which posits that such counterexamples are 
ridiculous.  When we think of the belief-desire combinations of other persons (so the 
criticism goes), we must “ … make use of ‘principles of humanity,’ whereby we see 
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others as resembling what we take ourselves to be.”
64
  Following David Lewis, we might 
require these principles of humanity in order to rule out belief-desire pairs that are deeply 
irrational and/or unthinkable for us.
65
 
 Plantinga agrees that we must do so when we ascribe content to the beliefs of 
other people.  (One of the beliefs we will ascribe to them, incidentally, is the belief that 
the “purpose or function of their cognitive systems, like that of ours, is the production of 
[mostly] true beliefs.”)
66
  But that is beside the point in this thought experiment, because 
we aren’t given that the creatures are humans.  Therefore, we aren’t given that such 
principles of humanity apply to them.
67
  Indeed, one of the main purposes of the thought 
experiment’s focus upon another world (containing creatures in many ways like us but 
not necessarily human) was to help clear away some of our biases, and help us to think 
about what the processes posited by E merely under N could provide: 
 … We must ask what sorts of belief-desire systems are possible for these creatures,  
given only that they have evolved according to the principles of contemporary 
evolutionary theory; clearly these gerrymanders are perfectly possible. So 
perhaps their behavior has been adaptive, and their systems of belief and desire 
such as to fit that adaptive behavior; those beliefs could nonetheless be wildly 
wrong. There are indefinitely many belief-desire systems that fit adaptive 
behavior, but where the beliefs involved are not for the most part true. A share of 




            Now, if these possibilities apply to these other creatures, they might possibly apply 
to us as well.  The foregoing five scenarios examined and exhausted the possibilities 
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concerning the linkages of beliefs with behavior.  Upon pondering these situations, there 
appeared some reasons to believe that the probability of R would be low on many of them.  
If we don’t know which of the scenarios applies to us, that yields an additional reason to let 
some doubt be introduced about R with respect to us.   
            The main question before us is whether or not, given N &E, we can trust our 
cognitive faculties. Once a doubt is allowed to enter concerning R, a problem is manifested 
concerning how to restore confidence in R.  Attempting to provide an argument to assuage 
the accompanying epistemic dissonance seems inappropriate.  We would be assuming our 
faculties’ trustworthiness in order to argue for their trustworthiness.   
             It is at this point in the development of his thoughts on the matter that Plantinga 
launched what he called the Preliminary Argument against Naturalism (which is not the 
Main EAAN … that comes later).  This Preliminary Argument assigned probabilities to 
variables and placed them in a Bayesian calculation.  This was all supposed to lead one 
eventually to the conclusion that naturalism is false.
69
 (The conclusion of the Preliminary 
Argument differs from what we will see to be the conclusion of Main Argument of EAAN.  
In the Main Argument, Plantinga will contend that it is irrational to believe in metaphysical 
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that P(N/R) is also low. But you do think R is true; you therefore have evidence against N. So 
your belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable gives you a reason for rejecting naturalism 




naturalism, not that N is false).   
      As it turned out, the Preliminary Argument against Naturalism made use of 
probability assignments that were problematic even for Plantinga.  In a work published 
about 7 years after Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga wrote in Warranted 
Christian Belief (WCB) that the Preliminary Argument was a straightforward 
argument for the falsehood of naturalism that was also straightforwardly incorrect.
70
  
He stated that the reason that his argument was faulty is because he confused the 
absolute (logical or objective) probability of R with the probability of R on our 
background information B.  In other words, he was “… confusing P(R/B) with P(R) 
simpliciter.”
71
   
      In WCB he proposed a repair for the Preliminary Argument, but he thought 
that the repair left it even less persuasive.
72
  Therefore, later writings of Plantinga 
regarding EAAN have abandoned all mention of the Preliminary Argument, in favor 
of the Main Argument.  
The Main Argument of EAAN in Warrant and Proper Function 
      In order to avoid the pitfalls of the Preliminary Argument, Plantinga now 
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reasons as follows: 
Suppose we think N&E is true: we ourselves have evolved according to the 
mechanisms suggested by contemporary evolutionary theory, unguided and 
unorchestrated by God or anyone else. Suppose we think, furthermore, 
that there is no way to determine P(R/(N&E&C)) (specified to us). What 
would be the right attitude to take to R? Well, if we have no further 
information, then wouldn't the right attitude here, just as with respect to that 
hypothetical population [i.e., the creatures in the thought experiment 





  Plantinga then asks what we should think of a religious believer who, from 
“an injudicious reading of Freud,”
74
 comes to think that religious beliefs (and 
especially theistic religious beliefs) are most often the result of wish-fulfillment.  
What would she say if she was asked about the objective probability that wish-
fulfillment is a reliable belief-producing mechanism?
75
  She may think that the 
probability of the reliability of her cognitive faculties with respect to beliefs formed 
by wish fulfillment is low (I’ll call this case (A)).  Or, she might think that there is 
no way to know what the probabilities are in such a case, and so the best course of 
action is to remain agnostic on the issue of the reliability of her cognitive faculties 
when it comes to religious belief (I’ll call this case (B)).  But, either way, Plantinga 
thinks that she has a defeater for any of her religious beliefs, since she thinks they 
are produced by the mechanism of wish-fulfillment.
76
 
      In case (A), Plantinga sees the beleaguered believer to be in a similar 
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situation to the person in the following example: 
[… a] person … comes into a factory, sees an assembly line carrying 
apparently red widgets, and is then told by the shop superintendent that these 
widgets are being irradiated by a variety of red lights, which makes it possible 
to detect otherwise undetectable hairline cracks. She should take it that the 
probability that a widget is red, given that it looks red, is fairly low; and she 
then has a reason, with respect to any particular widget coming down the line, 
to doubt that it is red, despite the fact that it looks red. To use John Pollock's 
terminology … she has an undercutting defeater (rather than a rebutting defeater). 
It isn't that she has acquired some evidence for that widget's being nonred, thus 





      This seems correct.  Take Proposition W to be the proposition the apparently red  
widget that I see before me is indeed a red widget.
78
 What is the probability that W is 
true?
79
   
That depends upon what kind of probability is involved.  If it is some kind of 
objective probability about which we are asking, it would seem difficult to see how such 
a figure could be obtained.  On the other hand, if it is epistemic probability (to her) that 
we want, even then it would be hard, if not practically impossible, to arrive at a precise 
quantitative measurement (or even an imprecise one).  Having said that, if we had to 
make a guess either way (objective or epistemic), wouldn’t it seem that the probability of 
W’s being true would at least be somewhat lower than ½?  
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Now if she knew that there were only two kinds of widgets (e.g., red and blue), or 
ten kinds of widgets with red widgets in the vast majority, etc., we might reconsider the 
epistemic probability of W for her.  But we are given none of these additional evidences, 
nor are we given any frequencies resulting from any tests she has been able to perform by 
taking some of them outside into natural light, etc..  She doesn’t know much at all about 
these widgets, apparently.  At the beginning of the story we are simply told that she 
“comes into a factory.” 
If I were in her situation, and someone pointed to one of the widgets on the 
conveyer belt and asked me “What do you think are the chances that that really is a red 
widget?”, what would I say?  I think that I would say, “Pretty slim”, and I think that most 
people would also answer that way.  So maybe Plantinga is right in saying that the 
specified probability in this case is low. 
Plantinga thinks that beleaguered believer (who has been convinced that perhaps 
most of her religious beliefs are the result of wish-fulfillment) is in an analogous situation 
to the woman in the irradiated widget case.   Exactly why is that?  
       She has reasons to suspect that beliefs generated by wish-fulfillment are likely 
untrue, but no reasons to believe that they are all untrue.  But, she has no way to sort out 
the true beliefs from the false ones, just like the woman viewing the assembly line has no 
way to ascertain which widgets are truly red.  It seems justifiable if she should give a low 
probability assessment to a proposition that positively asserted the actual status of the 
belief or widget. 
 Instead of thinking the relevant probability to be low, the woman in the factory 
28 
 
could decide that it is inscrutable (like the Beleaguered Believer in Case (B)).  She might 
wonder why she is supposed to trust the man who told her about the irradiation.  The 
vice-president of the widget company might come along and tell her that the shop 
superintendent (who originally informed her about the red light) suffers from 
hallucinations.  Can she still trust the superintendent?  But then, can she trust the vice-
president?  As she ponders issues like these: 
… she doesn't know what to believe about those alleged red lights. What will 
she properly think about the color of the widgets? She will presumably be 
agnostic about the probability of a widget's being red, given that it looks red; 
she won't know what that probability might be; for all she knows it could be 
very low, but also, for all she knows, it could be high … She has an 
undercutting defeater for the proposition a is red; this defeater gives her a 
reason to be agnostic with respect to that proposition. If she has no defeater for 
that defeater, and no further evidence for the proposition, then on balance the 
right attitude for her to take toward it would be agnosticism.80      
                                                                                                                         
    The take-home point of both case (A) and case (B) is that the reliability of her 
cognitive faculties with respect to widgets seems either low or inscrutable.  Plantinga 
thinks this is analogously the situation of the struggling believer who encountered Freud.  
She, too, has an undercutting defeater for her religious beliefs such that, “if that 
defeater remains itself undefeated and if she has no other source of evidence, then the 
rational course would be to reject belief in God.”
81
  That doesn’t mean that she 
would in fact discard her belief in God, but that would seem to be the epistemically 
right thing to do.
82
 
      If these conclusions are correct about the Case of the Irradiated Widgets and 
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the Case of the Beleaguered Believer, then why isn’t the person who thinks that 
P(R/N&E&C) is fairly low or inscrutable in the same situation?  Plantinga writes: 
… But now suppose we return to the person convinced of N&E who is agnos-
tic about P(R/(N&E&C)): something similar goes for him. He is in the same 
position with respect to any belief B of his, as is that believer in God. He is in 
the same condition, with respect to B, as the widget observer who didn't know 
what or who to believe about those red lights. So he too has a defeater for B, 
and a good reason for being agnostic with respect to it. If he has no defeater for 
that defeater, and no other source of evidence, the right attitude toward B 
would be agnosticism. That is not to say that he would in fact be able to reject 
B … still, agnosticism is what reason requires. Here, then, we have another 
way of developing Darwin's Doubt, a way that does not depend upon 





Now we have the argument in a significantly different form than the 
Preliminary Argument.  If P(R/N&E&C) is either low or inscrutable, then a person 
reflecting upon this has some kind of a defeater for any belief B that he holds, even 
the belief N&E.  Plantinga notes:  
     … our devotee of N&E has an undercutting defeater for N&E, a reason to 
doubt it, a reason to be agnostic with respect to it. (This also holds if he isn't 
agnostic about P(R/(N&E&C)) but thinks it low … he has a defeater either 
way.) If he has no defeater for this defeater and no independent evidence—if 
his reason for doubting N&E remains undefeated—then the rational course 




      An adherent of N&E might try to escape such a conclusion by arguing that, 
since experience seems to vindicate so many of her beliefs as true, she can therefore 
conclude that her faculties are reliable.  Plantinga anticipates this and responds as 
follows: 
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… The friend of N&E does no better, arguing this way, than the theist who 
argues that wish fulfillment must be a reliable belief-producing mechanism 
by running a similar argument with respect to the beliefs he holds that he 
thinks are produced by wish fulfillment. He does no better than the widget 
observer who, by virtue of a similar argument, continues to believe that those 
widgets are red, even after having been told by the building superintendent 





Similarly, someone might attempt to argue that the scientific findings of our 
day should assure us about the trustworthiness of R.  Plantinga holds out little hope 
for this option, either: 
… consider any argument from science (or anywhere else) he might produce. 
This argument will have premises; and these premises, he claims, give him 
good reason to believe R (or N&E). But note that he has the very same 
defeater for each of those premises that he has for R and for N&E; and he has 
the same defeater for his belief that those premises constitute a good reason 
for R (or N&E). For that belief, and for each of the premises, he has a reason 
for doubting it, a reason for being agnostic with respect to it. This reason, 
obviously, cannot be defeated by an ultimately undefeated defeater. For 
every defeater of this reason he might have, he knows that he has a defeater-
defeater: the very undercutting defeater that attached itself to R and to N&E 




So then, the reflective adherent of N&E cannot seem to offer an argument for 
the reliability of her cognitive faculties without already presupposing the 
trustworthiness of those very same cognitive faculties.  That is the central hub of 
EAAN.  In a very important passage that might serve well in describing the gist of 
the whole argument, Plantinga writes: 
… We could also put it like this: any argument he offers, for R, is in this 
context delicately circular or question-begging. It is not formally circular; its 
conclusion does not appear among its premises. It is instead … circular in 
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that it purports to give a reason for trusting our cognitive faculties, but is 
itself trustworthy only if those faculties (at least the ones involved in its 
production) are indeed trustworthy. … Once I come to doubt the reliability 
of my cognitive faculties, I can't properly try to allay that doubt by 
producing an argument; for in so doing I rely on the very faculties I am 
doubting. The conjunction of evolution with naturalism gives its adherents a 
reason for doubting that our beliefs are mostly true; perhaps they are mostly 
wildly mistaken. But then it won't help to argue that they can't be wildly 
mistaken; for the very reason for mistrusting our cognitive faculties generally 





      If this is so, it seems the main ways for an adherent of N&E to escape from 
this dilemma would be to (1) avoid doubting R, or (2) adopt a pragmatic stance 
toward R.  Concerning (1), notice that, for Plantinga’s argument to get started, he 
only needs for some adherent of N&E to entertain the possibility of ~R.  With 
regard to (2), it seems that Plantinga has no argument with the pragmatist, but only 
with those who are claiming N.  If someone takes only a pragmatic stance (which 
does not assert N to be metaphysically the case), this argument is not directed at her. 
Now, doesn’t this manner of doubting of our cognitive faculties involve a 
kind of infinite regress of defeaters?  Yes, says Plantinga.  It does, indeed, put one 
into a situation where one should doubt the defeater (since it is produced by the 
same questionable cognitive faculties), and then doubt the doubt of the defeater, and 
then doubt the doubt of the doubt of the defeater, etc..  Plantinga writes that “… 
[w]hat we really have here is one of those nasty dialectical loops to which Hume 
calls our attention …”.
88
 He then goes on to quote a relevant passage from Hume: 
The skeptical reasonings, were it possible for them to exist, and were they 
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not destroy'd by their subtlety, wou'd be successively both strong and weak, 
according to the successive dispositions of the mind. Reason first appears in 
possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, with an 
absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter 
under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the 
fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces in a matter, a patent under 
her hand and seal. This patent has at first an authority, proportioned to the 
present and immediate authority of reason, from which it is deriv'd. But as it 
is suppos'd to be contradictory to reason, it gradually diminishes the force of 
that governing power, and its own at the same time; till at last they both 




Plantinga thinks that the adherent of N&E is in an irrational position when he 
notices that he is in a situation such as Hume described.  Plantinga continues:   
When the devotee of N&E notes that he has a defeater for R, then at that stage 
he also notes (if apprised of the present argument) that he has a defeater for 
N&E; indeed, he notes that he has a defeater for anything he believes. Since, 
however, his having a defeater for N&E depends upon some of his beliefs, what 
he now notes is that he has a defeater for his defeater of R and N&E; so now he 
no longer has that defeater for R and N&E. So then his original condition of 
believing R and assuming N&E reasserts itself: at which point he again has a 
defeater for R and N&E. But then he notes that that defeater is also a defeater 
of the defeater of R and N&E;  ... So goes the paralyzing dialectic … The 
point remains, therefore: one who accepts N&E (and is apprised of the 
present argument) has a defeater for N&E, a defeater that cannot be 
defeated by an ultimately undefeated defeater. And isn't it irrational to 





The situation of a person being in the loop that is described above (noting that the 
defeater has a defeater which has a defeater, and so on) is called by Plantinga as having 
a “Humean defeater.”  (This is now a technical term in the argument that will later on 
become very important.)  An adherent of N&E has a reason to discard the belief in N 
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because it places one into the position of having an undefeated defeater and, from an 
epistemic point of view, that is bad.  
Remember, this is not an argument for the falsity of N, but rather an argument to 
the effect that the holding of N leads to irrationality.
91
  Plantinga compares it to a 
similar case made against classical foundationalism: 
… classical foundationalism is either false or such that I would be unjustified 
in accepting it; so (given that I am aware of this fact) I can't justifiably accept 
it. 
 
But of course it does not follow that classical foundationalism is not 
true; for all this argument shows, it could be true, though not rationally 
acceptable. Similarly here; the argument is not for the falsehood of 
naturalism, but for the irrationality of accepting it. The conclusion to be 





On the other hand, someone who holds T&E (where T stands for traditional 
theism e.g., Jewish, Christian, or Muslim), is considered by Plantinga to not necessarily 
be saddled with the same problem.  Someone might believe that God is the Premier 
Cognizer, that we are made in God’s image as cognizers,
93
 and that consequently there 
are good reasons to believe
94
 that our cognitive faculties are significantly aimed at the 
truth when they are properly functioning.
95
  (It should be kept in mind that arguing for T 
is not a part of EAAN. It is beyond the scope of my project here to examine Plantinga’s 
overall arguments for T.) 
      But isn’t the theist in the same boat with the naturalist, in that neither one of them 
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can provide a non-circular argument for R?  True, says Plantinga, a theist cannot escape 
that problem either, using R to establish R.    Plantinga continues: 
Of course he [a theist] can't sensibly argue that in fact our beliefs are mostly 
true, from the premise that we have been created by God in his image. More 
precisely, he can't sensibly follow Descartes, who started from a condition 
of general doubt about whether our cognitive nature is reliable, and then used his 
theistic belief as a premise in an argument designed to resolve that doubt. Here 
Thomas Reid is surely right: 
[quoting Reid] … Descartes certainly made a false step in this 
matter, for having suggested this doubt among others—that 
whatever evidence  he might have from his consciousness, his 
senses, his memory, or his reason, yet possibly some malignant 
being had given him those faculties on purpose to impose 
upon him; and therefore, that they are not to be trusted without 
a proper voucher. To remove this doubt, he endeavours to prove the 
being of  a Deity who is no deceiver; whence he concludes, that the 
faculties he had given him are true and worthy to be trusted.  It is 
strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive that in this reasoning 
there is evidently a begging of the question.  For, if our faculties be 





So what is someone to do if she finds that she has these kinds of doubts about our 
cognitive faculties and their reliability?  If she recognizes that there is no non-circular 
argument for R, then Plantinga says: 
Here no argument will help you; here [epistemic] salvation will have to be by 
grace, not by works. But the theist has nothing impelling him in the direction 
of such skepticism in the first place; no element of his noetic system points 
in that direction; there are no propositions he already accepts just by way of 
being a theist, which together with forms of reasoning (the defeater system, 
for example) lead to the rejection of the belief that our cognitive faculties 
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 Further Refinement of the Argument: 1994-2000 
 This is basically where Plantinga leaves the argument at the end of Warrant 
and Proper Function.  The next major restatement of the argument appeared in 1994 
in an unpublished manuscript that Plantinga entitled Naturalism Defeated.
98
  Here 
Plantinga laid out the argument in similar form as in WPF, and responded to various 
objections. 
      In 1996, a collection of articles regarding Plantinga’s ideas on warrant was 
published as Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of 
Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge.
99
  Although most of this work is about 
Plantinga’s wider views on warrant, some of it also relates specifically to EAAN.  
Plantinga’s Respondeo in this volume contains many lessons learned that he 
incorporated into later versions.
100
    
      The next major presentation and refinement of the argument appeared in the 
year 2000 in Warranted Christian Belief.
101
  The main section of WCB that relates to 
EAAN begins by the admission of the problem (and the proposed repair) with the 
Preliminary Argument.
102
  Then Plantinga swiftly moves to the Main Argument, 
which he has now streamlined as follows: 
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… In essence, the main argument is for the conclusion that 
P(R/N&E&C) (which I'll abbreviate as P(R/N)) …  is either low or 
inscrutable; in either case, so I argued, one who accepts N (and also 
grasps the argument for a low or inscrutable value of P(R/N)) has a 
defeater for R. This induces a defeater, for him, for any belief produced by 
his cognitive faculties, including N itself, hence, ordinary naturalism is 
self-defeating. Now I argued that P(R/N) is low or inscrutable by noting 
first that natural selection isn't interested in true belief but in adaptive behav-
ior (taken broadly), so that everything turns on the relation between belief 
and behavior. I then presented five mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
possibilities for the relation between belief and behavior, arguing with 
respect to each possibility P i that P(R/N&Pi) is low or inscrutable, 
yielding the result that P(R/N) is low or inscrutable.
103
 
       In WCB, Plantinga expands his discussion of the five possibilities (from his 
thought experiment in WPF regarding the possible world similar to our own). Again, 
the five exhaustive possibilities regarding the relation between behavior and beliefs were:  




P2:  Beliefs as “decoration” (where beliefs are mere effects of behavior, or 
“effects of proximate causes that also cause behavior”, that are “like a sort of 
decoration that isn’t involved in the causal chain leading to action”).
105
 
P3:  Semantic epiphenomenalism (where beliefs are causally linked with 
behavior, but not because of the content of the beliefs).
106
 
P4:  Maladaptive causal links, where beliefs are causally linked with 
behavior, “semantically” (i.e., content) as well as “syntactically,” but the 
                                                 
103
 Plantinga, WCB, 231. 
104
 Plantinga, WPF, 223. 
105
 Plantinga, WPF, 223. 
106
 Plantinga, WPF, 224. 
37 
 
belief results in a maladaptive situation.
107
 
P5:  Adaptive causal links, where beliefs are causally linked with behavior 
and the results are adaptive.
108
       
 In each of these possible scenarios, Plantinga believes that P(R/N) is either 
low or inscrutable.  That seems obvious enough under P2 and P4, so Plantinga 
concentrates on discussing epiphenomenalism (P1), semantic epiphenomenalism 
(P3), and the folk-psychological/common sense view (P5).   
      Plantinga now argues further for the low value of P(R/N) under P1 –
epiphenominalism.  (Plantinga uses the term “epiphenomenalism” to “denote any 
view according to which belief isn’t involved in the causal chain leading to  
behavior …”.)
109
  He begins by reasserting that epiphenomenalism, though counter 
to our intuitions, is very popular among many thinkers.  He quotes T. H. Huxley as a 
classic exemplar of this position: 
… It may be assumed ... that molecular changes in the brain are the causes of 
all the states of consciousness.... [But is] there any evidence that these stages of 
consciousness may, conversely, cause . . . molecular changes [in the brain] 
which give rise to muscular motion? I see no such evidence.... 
[Consciousness appears] to be … completely without any power of 
modifying [the] working of the body, just as the steam whistle . . . of a 
locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery … .
110
  
… To the best of my judgment, the argumentation which applies to brutes 
holds equally good of men; and therefore ... all states of consciousness in us, 
as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-
substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that 
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any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the 




      For purposes of EAAN, if beliefs are not causally connected with behavior, it 
seems “evolution would not have been able to mold and shape our beliefs … 
weeding out falsehood and encouraging truth; for then our beliefs would be, so to 
speak, invisible to evolution.”
112
  So, what would P(R/N) be on this scenario?  
Plantinga thinks it is reasonable to judge it to be very low, since any set of beliefs 
that humans are capable of having would seem just as likely as any other.
113
 
      Turning to the next possibility under consideration, P3 (semantic 
epiphenomenalism), we remember here that beliefs are causally connected with 
behavior, but only by virtue of the “syntax” of the beliefs, not the “semantics” of the 
beliefs.
114
  While thinking about this option, Plantinga firsts wonders what do most 
people believe human beings to be, given N?  A likely answer would be, “material 
objects”.  Although it has been historically very difficult to philosophically say 
exactly what material objects are,
115
 Plantinga grants here for argument’s sake that 
humans are material objects.  But then, what is the ontological status of a belief that 
these material human beings might have?       
                                                 
111
 Huxley, 243-244.  Quoted in Plantinga, WCB, 232. 
112
 Plantinga, WCB, 232. 
113
 Plantinga, WCB, 233. 
114
 As mentioned earlier, by this Plantinga means something like this: “… I read a poem very loudly, so 
loudly as to break a glass …
 
the sounds I utter have meaning, but their meaning is causally irrelevant 
to the breaking of the glass. In the same way it might be that these creatures' beliefs have causal efficacy, 
but not by way of the content of those beliefs.”  Plantinga, WPF, 224. 
115
 Plantinga refers to Bas van Fraassen’s article “Science, Materialism, and False Consciousness” in 
Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology:  Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, ed. 
Jonathan Kvanvig (Lanham: Rowman and Littefield, 1996) 149-181.  Plantinga, WCB, 233. 
39 
 
      Take the belief Cartesian dualism is false
116
 … presumably many adherents 
of N might hold such a belief to be basically a neural event with electrochemical 
properties.  These properties might together be called the belief’s “syntax”.  
Plantinga then writes: 
… [o]f course it is easy to see how these properties of this neuronal event 
should have causal influence on behavior … [But] … if this belief is really a 
belief, then it will also have other properties, properties in addition to its syntax 
or neurophysiological properties. In particular, it will have content; it will be 
the belief that p, for some proposition p — in this case, the proposition 
Cartesian dualism is false. But how does the content of this neuronal event —
that proposition — get involved in the causal chain leading to behavior? Under 
this scenario, it will be difficult or impossible to see how a belief can have 
causal influence on our behavior or action by virtue of its content.
117
 
… A question just as pressing, of course, is 'How does this neuronal event have a 
content at all?' What is it that assigns to this neuronal event the proposition that 
Cartesian dualism is false, as opposed, for instance, to the proposition that it is true, 




      Plantinga is highlighting the fact that the peculiar properties of beliefs 
(and the properties of the contents of those beliefs) are hard to locate on N’s 
metaphysical map.  Just what is an ontological status of the contents of beliefs 
(given N and semantic epiphenomenalism)?  Continuing along this line, 
Plantinga presses further in a passage which is extremely important in 
understanding one of the most critical issues of EAAN: 
 
… Suppose the belief had had the same electrochemical properties but 
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some entirely different content, perhaps the proposition Cartesian du-
alism is true; would that have made any difference to its role in the cau-
sation of behavior? It is certainly hard to see how … there seems to be no 
way in which content can get its foot in the door. Of course, it is the content 
of my beliefs, not their electrochemical properties, that is the subject of 
truth and falsehood: a belief is true just if the proposition that constitutes 
its content is true. As in the epiphenomenalist scenario, therefore, the 
content of belief would be invisible to evolution. Accordingly, the fact that 
we have survived and evolved, that our cognitive equipment was good 
enough to enable our ancestors to survive and reproduce—that fact 
would tell us nothing at all about the truth of our beliefs or the reliability of 
our cognitive faculties. It would tell something about the 
neurophysiological properties of our beliefs; it would tell us that, by virtue 
of these properties, those beliefs have played a role in the production of 
adaptive behavior. But it would tell us nothing about the contents of 
these beliefs, and hence nothing about their truth or falsehood. On this 
scenario as on the last, therefore, we couldn't sensibly claim a high prob-
ability for R. As with the last scenario, the best we could say, I think, is 





So, under either epiphenomenalism (P1) or semantic epiphenomenalism (P3), 
the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (in the sense of pointing toward 
truth in a preponderance of cases) seems low or inscrutable.  That leaves only the folk 
psychology option (P5) to consider.   
Under P5, beliefs are often (at least partially) causally linked to behavior, just 
like we often intuitively think.  So it would seem at first glance that P(R/N) would be 
high in this case.  However, Plantinga asks, “[c]an we mount an argument from the 
evolutionary origins of the processes, whatever they are, that produce these beliefs to 
the reliability of those processes?”
120
  He continues: 
… Could we argue, for example, that these beliefs of ours are connected with 
behavior in such a way that false belief would produce maladaptive 
behavior, behavior which would tend to reduce the probability of the 
believers' surviving and reproducing?
 
 No.  False belief doesn't by any means 
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      It doesn’t?  Many people think that it’s fairly clear that false beliefs would 
ultimately yield maladaptive results; recall the quotations from Popper and Quine, where 
organisms that were characterized too much by way of false belief displayed the pathetic 
but praiseworthy tendency to die off before reproducing.
122
  Plantinga has already 
responded to this, though, via quoting Churchland and Stich, and now adds this example: 
… Perhaps a primitive tribe thinks that everything is really alive, or is a witch or 
a demon of some sort; and perhaps all or nearly all of their beliefs are of the 
form this witch is F or that demon is G: this witch is good to eat, or that demon 
is likely to eat me if I give it a chance. If they ascribe the right properties to 
the right witches, their beliefs could be adaptive while nonetheless 




      Some might retort that, if the tribe members are at least consistently ascribing the 
right properties to the right entities, then there is enough truth at work (in a loose sense) 
to consider their behavior to be linked with true belief.  Plantinga anticipated this idea, 
and responded as follows: 
… by further gerrymandering, we can easily find schemes under which their 
beliefs would lead to adaptive behavior … but are not accurate even in this 
loose sense. There are schemes of this sort, in fact, in which the properties 
ascribed are logically incapable of exemplification. They think everything is a 
witch; perhaps, then, their analogue of property ascriptions involves ascribing 
certain sorts of witches (rather than properties). (One of these witches, for 
example, is such that, as we would put it, if a thing has it, then that thing is 





      Beliefs and desires are often paired in ways that affect behavior.  Plantinga thinks 
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there are examples that easily show many belief-desire combinations containing false 
beliefs that could result in the same adaptive behavior as other combinations containing 
true beliefs.  He states: 
… clearly there could be many different systems of belief and desire that yield 
the same bit of adaptive behavior, and in many of those systems the belief 
components are largely false; there are many possible belief-desire systems 
that yield the whole course of my behavior, where in each system most of the 
beliefs are false. The fact that my behavior (or that of my ancestors) has 
been adaptive, therefore, is at best a third-rate reason for thinking my beliefs 
mostly true and my cognitive faculties reliable—and that is true even given the 
commonsense view of the relation of belief to behavior.  So we can't sensibly 
argue from the fact that our behavior (or that of our ancestors) has been 






      Now, after all this, how would one try to estimate P(R/N)?  Plantinga agrees that a 
numerical value is problematic.  He decides to consider it inscrutable, or to give it a 
probability of .9 in order to concede as much as reasonable to the opposition. 
            Since P1 and P3 both involve no causal connection between beliefs and behavior, 
Plantinga designates them together to be -C (representing the contents of beliefs having 
no causal efficacy).
126
  Now the other possibility, C, will represent option P5 (where there 
is a causal connection between beliefs and behaviors).  Then: 
… What we have so far seen is that the probability of R on N&-C is low or 
inscrutable and that the probability of R on N&C is also inscrutable or at best 
… [.9]. Now what we are looking for is P(R/N). Because C and -C are jointly 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the calculus of probabilities tells us that 
                        P(R/N) = P(R/N&C) × P(C/N) + P(R/N&-C) × P(-C/N), 
that is, the probability of R on N is the weighted average of the probabilities of R 
on N&C and N&-C … .  We have already noted that the left-hand term of the 
first of the two products on the right side of the equality is either 
moderately high or inscrutable; the second is either low or inscrutable. What 
remains is to evaluate the weights, the right-hand terms of the two 
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      So, we are now looking for the values of P(C/N) and P(-C/N).   In thinking about 
the probabilities associated with the two choices, Plantinga first notes that it is difficult to 
see how epiphenomenalism (either type P1 or P3) can be avoided given N.  He notes that 
Robert Cummins
128
 has called epiphenomenalism the “received view”, since under 
materialism it is difficult to envision how beliefs and behavior could otherwise be 
connected.
129
  The reason for this is because: 
… it is extremely hard to envisage a way, given materialism, in which the 
content of a belief could get causally involved in behavior. If a belief just 
is a neural structure of some kind—a structure that somehow possesses 
content—then it is exceedingly hard to see how content can get involved in 
the causal chain leading to behavior: had a given such structure had a 
different content, its causal contribution to behavior, one thinks, would be the 
same. By contrast, if a belief is not a material structure at all but a 
nonphysical bit of consciousness, it is hard to see [given N] that there is any 
room for it in the causal chain leading to behavior; what causes the muscular 
contractions involved in behavior will be states of the nervous system, with no 





     If this is so, then the probability of P(-C/N) is going to be higher than P(C/N), but 
how much higher?  Assuming one thinks that the probabilities are not inscrutable, and 
given the foregoing discussion of the different types of epiphenomenalism, Plantinga 
ventures .7 for P(-C/N) and .3 for P(C/N).  He admits these numbers could be off … 
perhaps the best thing to do is to consider the valuation to be inscrutable.  If, however, the 
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figures seem to be generally reasonable, what does this do to the overall probability 
calculation?  With .7 and .3 as valuations for P(-C/N) and P(C/N), we only need now a 
figure for P(R/N&-C), for which Plantinga hazards an estimation of .2. (For 
P(R/N&C), remember, Plantinga already assigned it a (generous, he feels) 
figure of .9.) Even with such a large figure for P(R/N&C), the overall result 
for P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of .41, as follows:
131
 
                        P(R/N) = P(R/N&C) × P(C/N) + P(R/N&-C) × P(-C/N) 
                                   .41              .9                .3                .2                .7 
 
      These numbers are very speculatively and tentatively posited.  However, 
Plantinga notes that they can be shifted significantly without really changing the result: 
… Of course these figures are the merest approximations; others might make 
the estimates somewhat differently; but they can be significantly altered without 
significantly altering the final result. For example, perhaps you think 
P(R/N&C) is higher, perhaps even 1; then (retaining the other assignments) 
P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of .44. Or perhaps you reject the thought 
that P(-C/N) is more probable than P(C/N), thinking them about equal. Then 
(again, retaining the other assignments) P(R/N) will be in the neighborhood of 





      On the other hand, if one feels the probabilities above to be inscrutable, then 
P(R/N) will be inscrutable, too.  Therefore, says Plantinga, it is reasonable to think 
that P(R/N) is either low or inscrutable.
133
 
      Now say that someone reflects upon this and does indeed think that P(R/N) 
is either low or inscrutable.  Either way, Plantinga thinks that that person has a 
defeater for R (if she believes N).  In order to display this more clearly, Plantinga 
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refers back to various analogies from WPF (e.g., the Beleaguered Believer and the 
Irradiated Widgets).
134
  In WCB he offers a few more.  One of them is the case of 
the Mysterious Radio Device in Space.
135
 
      In this example, imagine being on a space voyage and finding a radio-like 
device which emits sounds you recognize to be sentences in English.  You do not 
know the truth values of these sentences, but at first glance you tend to believe 
them.  However, upon reflection, you realize that you know nothing about the 
makers of this instrument, nor its purpose.  What is the probability that the 
propositions sounded by the instrument are trustworthy?  Plantinga says the 
probability is low or inscrutable (illustrating his position that, often, agnosticism 
with respect to origins endangers knowledge). You have a defeater for your initial 
belief that the instrument was reliable.
136
 
      Now isn’t the supporter of N in such a position?  Plantinga believes: 
… The same goes for the naturalist who realizes that P(R/N) is low or 
inscrutable. With respect to those factors crucially important for coming to a 
sensible view of the reliability of his belief-producing mechanisms—how they 
were formed and what their purpose is, if any — he must concede that the 
probability that those faculties are reliable is at best inscrutable. Unless he has 




      Someone might seize on the phrase “unless he has some other information” 
and assert that this gesture toward additional evidence is a promising avenue 
toward restoring confidence in R.  However, that would seem to ignore the 
particular nature of this kind of defeater.  This defeater is tied in a very special way 
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to all of the output from one’s cognitive processes (at least the parts that involve 
propositions).  Plantinga writes: 
… And how could he have or get other information? Any such information would 
consist in beliefs that were a product of his cognitive faculties, but he has a defeater 




Don’t we have here again the same situation illustrated by the Humean 
defeater mentioned earlier?  The reflective adherent of N&E seems placed into the 
nasty dialectical loop.  Not only are her beliefs questioned, but also her doubts 
about these beliefs, and her doubts about her doubts, and any other proposition to 
which she might look for relief, ad infinitum.   This also affects the beliefs about N.  
Therefore, “we might say that N is self-defeating, in that if it is accepted in the 
ordinary way, it provides a defeater for itself, a defeater that can't be defeated.”
139
 
      As we recall, Plantinga believes that this is not only the case when we believe 
P(R/N) to be low, but also when we remain agnostic about N.   We have seen that he 
hopes to make this point more persuasive by analogizing with several examples.  Here in 
WCB he presents another one, the case of the Suspicious Barometer.
140
  Say you come 
upon an instrument, like a barometer, that you believe to be in one of two conditions. 
You think that the likelihood that it is in either condition is .5.  In Condition 1, the 
likelihood that the instrument is reliable is so high that you would “unhesitatingly accept 
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  But, if it is in Condition 2, you have no idea whether or not the 
instrument is reliable.  Now, asks Plantinga, given this situation, would you accept the 
instrument as reliable?  He thinks you should not.  Why wouldn’t the rational stance be to 
withhold belief?    
Likewise, Plantinga says, is the situation of our reflective adherent of N; because 
of the lack of knowledge about the origins and purpose of her cognitive faculties, should 
she think that P(R/N) is .5?  Or should she think the probability is inscrutable?  Either 
way she has a defeater for her ordinary belief R.  If she doesn’t have a defeater-defeater 
(and, in this situation, how could she have one?), she seems stuck. 
“… just as Hume sees, the rational attitude [in this situation] is to be agnostic 
with respect to any of the deliverances of … [her] cognitive faculties … [She] 
may not, in fact, be able to be agnostic with respect to them, but agnosticism is 
what rationality requires.”
142
   
 
      This is basically the argument as it stands at the end of WCB.  There is, however, 
a brief response in WCB to one of Keith Lehrer’s criticisms where Plantinga illustrates 
how he would handle some tu quoque objections.
143
  Lehrer’s point (which Plantinga 
believes to be perhaps the most challenging tu quoque against his argument) involves the 
problem of evil and develops in the manner, below. 
      Consider theism (T), the kind that includes the proposition that we are made by a 
loving and just God and that we and our cognitive faculties somehow reflect God’s 
image.  What would be P(R/T)?  Maybe not so high, given all the evils which plague our 
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existence.  Some of these evils (e.g., cognitive diseases) could very easily damage the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties.  Furthermore, since Plantinga’s version of T involves 
the existence of a malevolent supernatural being, on that scenario it seems that God 
allows Satan to disseminate widespread error which gives further reason to doubt our 
cognitive faculties under T.  So, Lehrer writes: 
Compare … 
 
S    Satan and his cohorts produce incredible deceps [where a decep is a unit of   
      deception
144
] of error 
            with 
E   Evolutionary processes produce incredible deceps of error. 
 
… I find little to choose between them.  A naturalist wishing to assign a high 
probability to the conclusion that the proper functioning of our faculties yields 
truth because they are the result of evolution must assign a low probability to 
E, while a supernaturalist wishing to assign a high probability to the 
conclusion that the proper functioning of our faculties yields truth because 




      Plantinga’s response is that, actually, something like this has indeed happened 
under T.  However, the Christian doesn’t accept merely T, but the other relevant aspects 
of the T account, including “… fall (along with corruption of the image of God), 
redemption, regeneration, and the consequent repair and restoration of that 
image.”
146
  The Christian believes she knows these things, in part, by way of divine 
revelation.  (Warranted Christian Belief has extended discussions in various places 
concerning how these beliefs might be warranted, propositionally and non-
propositionally.)  Therefore, Plantinga says, she does not necessarily have a defeater 
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for T.  He continues by discussing the following example involving Feike the 
Millionaire.  Suppose that someone tells you the following about Feike: 
 
(1)  Feike is a very wealthy eccentric who loves to wear dilapidated old clothes 
from the local Goodwill. 
 
Because of this, you believe (2): 
 
(2)  Feike wears dilapidated old clothes.  
 
But, you have also believed for a long time that: 
 




… But now I note that P((3)/(2)) is low (most people who wear dilapidated old 
clothes are not millionaires); I conclude in considerable puzzlement that (2) is a 
defeater, for me, of (3), and do my best to refrain from believing (3). My error is 
plain: (2) isn't, in fact, a defeater for (3), for me. Why not? Well, for one thing, 
because I see that the warrant (2) has for me is derivative from the warrant (1) has 
for me, and obviously (1) is not, for me, a defeater for (3). But that means that (2) 
is not a defeater of (3). If you would like a principle, try:  (4) If (i) S believes A, 
B, and C, and (ii) S believes that the warrant B has for her is derivative from the 
warrant A has for her, and (3) S believes that A is not a defeater, for her, of C, then 
B is not a defeater, for S, of C.   
       This principle, as I say, delivers R from defeat, for the Christian theist … believes 
that she knows the whole Christian story, or that at any rate it has some considerable 
warrant for her. Theism is part of that story, and the warrant theism has for her is 
derivative from the warrant had for her of the whole Christian story. Hence by (4) 
theism won't be a defeater of R for her unless the whole Christian story is. But it 





      In this way, Plantinga feels that the tu quoque mentioned by Lehrer doesn’t hurt his 
argument.  With that, the sections in WCB dealing with EAAN are finished.  The next major 
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published restatement and refinement of the overall argument of EAAN appears in 




EAAN in Naturalism Defeated? (2002) 
 
      Naturalism Defeated? is a collection of papers which are all specifically 
critiquing some aspect of EAAN.  Plantinga himself contributed two chapters to the 
volume:  a chapter of introduction in which he gives an overview of the argument (in 
roughly 12 pages),
150




             In the introductory chapter, Plantinga presents the argument in compacted form, 
with no substantial additions to what he had said in WPF and WCB.  He reminds the 
reader that his argument contains no detailed analysis on the question of what exactly 
philosophical naturalism is, nor does his argument attempt to analyze in depth the 
concept of reliability.  He hopes that, for the purpose of EAAN, general conceptions of 
these terms will suffice.
152
  The idea of “naturalism” with which he works is roughly 
taken to mean that there is no such person as God (as traditionally conceived by 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims).
153
  The concept of a reliable cognitive system is 
generally taken to mean one that “produces a preponderance of true beliefs.”
154
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             He does, however, include an important comment concerning reliability that we 
will see come into play later when he responds to various critics: 
     Very roughly:  a thermometer stuck on seventy-two degrees isn’t reliable even 
if it is located somewhere (San Diego?) where it is seventy-two degrees nearly all 
of the time.  What the thermometer (and our cognitive faculties) would do if 
things were different in certain (hard to specify) respects is also relevant.  Again, 
if our aim were to analyze reliability much more would have to be said.  Note that 
for reliability thus construed, it is not enough that the beliefs produced be fitness 
enhancing.
155
                                   
 
Important Objections to EAAN in Naturalism Defeated? 
It is time now to look at some important objections to EAAN in Naturalism 
Defeated?, which is probably the single most important book with which to interact 
regarding EAAN. The volume begins with a remark by James Beilby about the multi-
faceted nature of the argument.  As Beilby has noticed: 
… One of the most fascinating aspects of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument 
 against naturalism is its multilayered nature.  It raises issues of interest to 
 epistemologists, philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and philosophers 
 of religion, just to name a few.  The diversity of philosophical questions raised by 




      EAAN is not straightforward or simplistic; it touches upon many overlapping 
areas of interest in philosophy.  Such interweaving may be part of its attraction, but it also 
exposes it to challenge from a myriad of positions.  This makes difficult the attempt to 
group and categorize the possible objections.  However, many (perhaps most) of the so-
far published challenges do seem to fall into fairly recognizable areas.  Beilby helpfully 
and loosely categorizes some of the major criticisms as follows:  (1) those having to do 
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with science and evolution, (2) those concerning skepticism, (3) critiques regarding 
conditional probabilities, and (4) assessments about the nature of defeaters.
157
  In the next 
chapter, I discuss the first category, science and evolution; in later chapters other 
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Some Concerns about EAAN and Evolution 
 
      Perhaps the first reaction of many people, when they initially hear of Plantinga’s 
argument, is one of puzzlement … why would Plantinga believe that current evolutionary 
theory doesn’t have a mechanism to weed out organisms that have mostly false beliefs? 
In this vein, they are thinking similarly to Popper and Quine, quoted earlier.
158
  As we 
remember Quine putting it, “… [c]reatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a 
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.”
159
 
      By responding to various criticisms EAAN has received concerning current 
evolutionary theory, Plantinga has had the opportunity to refine his argument in that 
respect.  This refinement primarily consists in additional exposition in order to avoid 
misunderstandings (as opposed to any substantive changes).  In this chapter I will look at 
some important critiques of EAAN regarding evolutionary theory.  I will conclude this 
chapter by pointing out how the criticisms surveyed here help in grasping Plantinga’s 
main intentions in EAAN. 
William Ramsey’s Objections to EAAN  
      William Ramsey’s critique revolves around the idea of “evolutionary reliabilism”, 
the view that “natural selection tends to favor reliable belief-producing mechanisms”.
160
  
Ramsey believes that Plantinga’s EAAN does not sufficiently call into doubt 
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evolutionary reliabilism.  Although Ramsey grants that “… a belief’s truth value, though 
partly dependent upon what is going on inside the head, is not reducible to neurological 
matters”, he nevertheless feels that “a relational property [like truth] that fails to 
supervene on physical features can … [still] be a casually [sic]
161
 salient property that 
brings about a certain state of affairs.”
162
  How so? 
      Ramsey gives an example:  Bob is one of 10 creatures competing for a scarce 
resource, in this case food.   Bob’s cognitive equipment works along the lines of (as 
Plantinga calls it) semantic epiphenomenalism.
163
  The truth values of his beliefs are not 
causally connected with his behavior.   
Now, if all you want to do is explain Bob’s immediate behavior, you only need to 
look at the neurophysiological aspects.  There’s no need to look into his beliefs.
164
  But if 
we want to know why Bob survived while the others died out, then it is perfectly 
plausible to explain the situation by noting that Bob’s beliefs were based on truths (about 
where the food was located).  So, in one sense, beliefs and behavior might not be causally 
connected (because truths aren’t reducible to physical properties), but in another sense, 
since the truth values of beliefs can affect the consequences of behavior (i.e., making it 
successful behavior), “… truth and reliability are exactly the sort of features for which 
there can indeed be considerable selection pressure.”  In other words, “truth doesn’t make 
the behavior, it makes the behavior better.”
 165
  Therefore, truths can still be relevant to 
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the explanations of adaptations although they are not directly causally connected with the 
behavior of an organism. 
      Plantinga, in response, thinks that Ramsey must be mistakenly assuming that 
EAAN depends upon a proposition like relational properties cannot be selected for.  
Plantinga states that EAAN does not require this proposition, because “fitness itself is a 
relational property that is not reducible to and does not supervene on intrinsic 
neurophysiological properties … and fitness can certainly be selected for.”
166
   Rather, 
EAAN (in the context of the semantic epiphenomenalism that Ramsey is espousing, 
where only the syntaxes of beliefs and not the semantics are involved in the link between 
belief and behavior of an organism) stresses that: 
… [when the content of a belief] does not enter into the causal chain leading to 
behavior … [then] it is not the case that a belief produces adaptive behavior by 
way of being true, or maladaptive behavior by way of being false.  So natural 
selection can’t, directly at any rate, mold belief-producing mechanisms in the 
direction of the production of reliability by rewarding adaptive behavior and 
penalizing maladaptive behavior … What counts here is not whether truth is a 





      About the example of Bob, Plantinga notes that Ramsey’s illustration seems to 
conflate two different types of mental representations:  indicator representations and 
belief representations.  An indicator representation is like a mercury thermometer, where 
different temperatures result in different lengths of the mercury column.  Thus, one could 
say that the thermometer “indicates” or “represents” a certain temperature.  You could 
even say that the representation is accurate in a sense (i.e., “a representation r … is 
accurate if the state that r is in is the one with which r is correlated – in this case, the 
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  However, this is a trivial kind of accuracy.  This “indicator” 
kind of a representation “… is or course very different from a belief; it is not that this 
device … believes that the temperature is so and so.” 
169
 He continues: 
… Now it is not so much as remotely plausible to suggest that the indicator 
content of an indicator representation does not (in general) enter the causal chain 
that leads to behavior.  On the contrary: it is because the state in question 
represents what it does that it causes the behavior that it does; there is an easy 
explanation of its causing that temperature in terms of what it represents.  It is 
because it represents that temperature that, when it occurs, it causes shivering.  
Furthermore, since indicator representations are automatically accurate, natural 
selection will not be able to select for mechanisms that produce inaccurate 
representations.  But none of this, so far, has anything to do with belief, or with 




 If I am reading both men correctly, I understand Ramsey’s point and Plantinga’s 
rebuttal to be something like this:  suppose Bear A shows a predilection for a certain kind 
of tree.  Bear B likes to climb in a different type of tree. Now Bear A, for some reason, 
ends up in firmer looking trees, while Bear B, more often than not, ends up in softer, 
more flexible trees that lean out over precipices.  Although (let’s say) there are no beliefs 
with truth values at work (in the sense of a rational deliberation resulting in a certain type 
of behavior), we can expect the Bear A to more often be in the position, all other things 
being equal, to survive and reproduce.  This is because a truth is at work, namely, that 
bears in soft, flexible trees which lean out over precipices tend to fall more often than 
bears which are not so positioned.  That’s Ramsey’s point. 
            Plantinga grants all of this, but wonders how it is supposed to hurt EAAN.  
EAAN is an argument that, in part, says that natural selection does not necessarily select 
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for true beliefs of an organism when that belief’s truth value is associated with behavior 
by way of the content of that belief.   Is there a belief (with a content that has a truth 
value) at work here in the case of either bear?  No.  That’s Plantinga’s point. 
      Ramsey then tries a different tack.  He questions Plantinga’s examples of how the 
process of natural selection might result in the selection of organisms because of their 
fitness-enhancing behavior based upon false beliefs.  He complains that the examples 
don’t provide instances of a preponderance of false beliefs.
171
  Remember Plantinga’s 
example of the prehistoric hominid Paul, who runs away from tigers?  Plantinga said in 
WPF: 
… clearly this avoidance behavior could be a result of a thousand other belief-
desire combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B equally 
well. (Here let me ignore the complication arising from the fact that belief 
comes in degrees.) Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but 
whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, 
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his 
body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving 




      Plantinga’s point was that there are many belief-desire combinations (which are 
based upon false beliefs) that can produce behavior that can be fitness-enhancing.  
However, Ramsey thinks that this establishes little.  Sure, every now and then a being 
might have strange belief-behavior combinations that luckily become adaptive.  But 
Ramsey thinks that, to question evolutionary reliabilism, Plantinga owes an account that 
shows how a mechanism or process “… (a) could come about through evolution, and (b) 
generate … mostly false beliefs over time, and (c) nevertheless prove … [to be] 
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  It is hard for Ramsey to see how a being can, over the long run, persist in 
false beliefs without getting into significant trouble leading to maladaptivity.   This is, 
once again, the strong echo of the earlier mentioned thoughts of Popper and Quine. 
      Plantinga responds that it is relatively easy to provide examples of how “ … entire 
systems [as opposed to a few occurrences] of mainly false beliefs can be adaptive, and 
adaptive by virtue of their content.”
174
  He notes that several naturalists (like E. O. 
Wilson and Michael Ruse) “… have argued that belief in God, while false, is nonetheless 
adaptive.”
175
  Now entertain the following possible world: say naturalism is true (in the 
sense that there is no God, as traditionally described earlier).  Also suppose that there is a 
group of people, and that each person in this group believes in God and thinks that 
everything (other than God) is a contingent created thing; say, a “creature”.
176
  Imagine 
that their only possible way of referring to these things is by way of definite descriptions 
like “the tree creature before me” or “the tiger creature approaching me.”
177
  Now: 
… Suppose still further that all their beliefs are properly expressed by singular 
sentences whose subjects are definite descriptions expressing properties that entail 
the property of creaturehood – such sentences as ‘The tiger creature approaching 
me is dangerous’, or ‘The tree creature before me is full of apple creatures’.  
Suppose, finally, that their definite descriptions work the way Bertrand Russell 
thought definite descriptions work:  ‘The tallest man is Boston is wise’ … 
abbreviates ‘There is exactly one tallest man in Boston, and it is wise’.  Then 
from the naturalist perspective all their beliefs are false.  Yet these can still be 
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Or, imagine that the each person in this group thinks that: 
… for any situation calling for action, there is just one action which has the 
nonnatural property of being right … [g]iven that there isn’t any nonnatural 
property of being right, their judgments about actions will for the most part be 
mistaken – though adaptive, if they ascribe nonnatural rightness to fitness-




Or, Plantinga, says, try another example: 
 
… Michael Rea argues that naturalism implies an ontology of gunk, an ontology 
according to which there really aren’t any objects (although there is a sort of 
continuous gunk or goo which may … be ‘propertied’ differently in different 
places).  Suppose Rea is right: then since most of our beliefs imply that there are 
objects, most of our beliefs will be false.  Still, our natural way of cutting the 




      Now remember Ramsey had protested that although some of an organism’s 
beliefs may be false, that doesn’t mean that mostly false beliefs are guiding the organism.   
He charged that Plantinga implicitly subscribes to one or both of the following premises: 
P1:  If any of your beliefs about some subject are false, then all (or most) of your 
beliefs about that subject are false. 
 
P2:  If you suffer from a deep misconception of some subject, then all (or most) of 




But Plantinga denies holding either premise, and doesn’t think his examples use them: 
… Instead, I say that it is certainly possible that there be creatures all of whose 
beliefs are of the above form, and who are also such that their definite 
descriptions function Russelianly; in which case all or nearly all of their beliefs, 
from a naturalistic point of view, would be false (though still adaptive) … 
[Furthermore, imagine annexing] creaturehood to the properties expressed by the 
predicates of these speakers instead of to their referring devices … [t]hen once 
more the bulk of their beliefs will be false, from a naturalistic perspective, but 
could nonetheless be adaptive.  And couldn’t this easily happen … that a tribe 
comes to believe that there is such a person as God … [and that] this could have 
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adaptive advantages[?] … It could also easily happen that their predicates come to 




What has been revealed through the exchange between Ramsey and Plantinga?  
First of all, (and this is an important point) we have been reminded that EAAN is an 
argument about the relation of true beliefs to adaptive behavior, not truths (in general) to 
adaptive behavior.  There is no change here from Plantinga’s original formation, so in a 
sense Ramsey’s point about “Bob” belongs more properly to a case being made against 
some other argument.   
Secondly, we have examined the charge that the onus is on Plantinga to show that 
it is possible to have mostly untrue beliefs and that the behavior resulting from those 
beliefs be adaptive.  Plantinga believes that there are infinitely many pairings of untrue 
beliefs and behaviors that could be adaptive.  (However, he offers these only as 
possibilities, because one of the main points of the argument is that no one knows for 
sure whether these pairings of untrue beliefs and adaptive behaviors have actually 
happened.)  He presented an example involving theistic beliefs that a naturalist would 
take to be false, but noted that those beliefs seemed to be able nonetheless to become 
involved with adaptive behavior.   
Has Plantinga shown that the belief system of the group of theists was so 
drastically false that that R was threatened?  Plantinga feels that he has, by way of 
crafting the thought experiment in such a way that all (or almost all) propositions that 
each person in the group might believe are false.  However, we will see (below) that 
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Ramsey’s type of objection does not die easily, as it will be repeated and refined in some 
critiques of Jerry Fodor, Elliot Sober, and Branden Fitelson. 
 
 
Jerry Fodor’s Objections to EAAN 
  
      Jerry Fodor begins his critique of EAAN by stating that he is an adherent of 
Scientism, which he claims to be the view that “… on the one hand, that the goals of 
scientific inquiry include the discovery of objective empirical truths … and, on the other 
hand, that science has come pretty close to achieving this goal, at least from time to 
time.”
183
  He thinks that Scientism (defined this way) is obviously and certainly true, but 
nonetheless is puzzlingly under attack by various groups of people like some relativists, 
pragmatists, idealists, a priorists, fundamentalists, feminists, etc..
184
  Additionally, if that 
isn’t enough, he notes that currently even some Darwinists are attacking Scientism:   
“… [n]ot all Darwinists, to be sure; or even, I should think, a near majority.  Still, the 
following rumor is definitely abroad in the philosophical community: … Darwinism … 
undermines the scientific enterprise.”
185
  In Fodor’s essay on EAAN, he claims that 
“[there is] nothing at all in evolutionary theory that entails, or suggests, or even gives one 
grounds to contemplate, denying the commonsense thesis that scientific inquiry quite 
generally lead to the discovery of objective empirical truths [i.e., Scientism].”
186
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      As Plantinga’s EAAN is one of these supposedly undermining positions, Fodor 
begins to look at Plantinga’s contention, which Fodor takes to be something like this: 
Argument A:  Our minds evolved, so we can assume that our behavior is mostly 
adaptive.  But our behavior could be mostly adaptive even if our beliefs were 




Fodor notes that this probably is not exactly Plantinga’s argument, but that there is an 
important argument somewhere “in the immediate vicinity of Argument A.”
188
  Fodor 
states: 
… Plantinga’s point is that you can imagine the mind’s succeeding as a belief-
making mechanism even if the beliefs that it makes aren’t true.  Still, I don’t think 
that Argument A could be exactly what Plantinga has in mind; not, at least, if 
what he has in mind is an argument against Scientism (or what he calls 





… What Plantinga really needs (and what I haven’t any doubt is what he really 
intends) is argument A* … [which is] just like Argument A except that the 
conclusion is stronger [e.g., an argument that concludes there is reason to think 




      Fodor continues by saying that “… Plantinga thinks (as I do not) that there is 
some serious chance it will turn out that we don’t act out of the content of our mental 




      To begin analyzing Plantinga’s case, Fodor examines some of Plantinga’s 
examples which countenance living beings exhibiting adaptive behavior that is based 
upon false beliefs.  Fodor, however, doubts that these examples show what Plantinga 
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thinks that they show.  Consider the Plantingian illustration about creatures who think 
that everything is a witch (e.g., they think that witchcat on the witchmat is asleep.)
192
  
Rather than this illustrating a situation involving a massive amount of false beliefs, Fodor 
thinks that these creatures still have mostly true beliefs: 
Let it be that that appletree witch is blooming is false, or lacks a truth value … 
[s]till much of what a creature believes in virtue of which it believes that that 
appletree witch is blooming (and in virtue of which the thought that that appletree 
witch is blooming leads to behavioral success) are perfectly straightforwardly 
true.  For example: that’s an appletree; that’s blooming; that’s there; something 




      Fodor thinks that it is just not clear that these creatures have mostly false beliefs, 
although he admits that there is no agreed upon way of counting beliefs.  Nonetheless, 
Fodor thinks that Plantinga’s case requires “… that it not be in doubt that a system of 
mostly false beliefs could be adaptive.  If there were anything wrong with the notion of a 
system of mostly false but adaptive beliefs, Plantinga’s Darwinian argument against 
Scientism
[194]
 couldn’t get off the ground.”
195
  However, Fodor acknowledges: “… I 
haven’t an argument for what I strongly suspect, that there is no way of constructing such 
a system.” 
      Like Ramsey, Fodor thinks that it is up to Plantinga to show how our adaptive 
success has been based upon mostly false beliefs.  “What’s needed”, Fodor says, “… is 
some independent reason for thinking that many of our behavioral successes have 
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      What is the inductive evidence?  Fodor goes on: 
… this morning I managed to get my teeth brushed; a small behavioral success, to 
be sure, but mine own.  Such as it was, I’m quite certain that it was prompted and 
guided by a host of true beliefs including, inter alia:  true beliefs about my teeth 
needing a brush; true beliefs about the spatiotemporal location of my tooth brush, 
true beliefs about the spatiotemporal location of my teeth, true beliefs about the 
spatiotemporal location of my limbs with respect to my toothbrush and my teeth, 
and so on.  Certainly short of philosophical skepticism, I can think of no reason in 





This isn’t to say that untrue beliefs can’t be successful, but that we normally and rightly 
think that such occurrences (i.e., successful false beliefs) are the exceptions, not the rule: 
… What we all believe is that when actions out of false beliefs are successful, 
that’s generally a lucky accident; and, correspondingly, that a policy of acting on 
false beliefs, even when it works in the short run, generally gets you into trouble 
sooner or later …The inductive evidence is that, though some of our actions on 
false beliefs have succeeded from time to time, pretty generally our actions on 





 A global philosophical skepticism might cause one to doubt all of this.   But since 
Fodor does not consider extreme philosophical skepticism as a viable option, he thinks 




      Plantinga responds by first noting that, on Fodor’s definition of Scientism, 
Plantinga is himself an adherent of Scientism.  Plantinga agrees with the thought that 
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science strives to (and often does) discover objective truths about the world.  This idea 
fits well within theism.  He states that “… when I say that the naturalist has a defeater for 
R, I certainly don’t mean to say that a defeater for R afflicts just anyone who thinks that 
science aims at the discovery of objective true beliefs and sometimes succeeds in that 
aim.”
200
  So, Plantinga does not accept Fodor’s equating of Scientism with naturalism; 
Plantinga does not see himself arguing against Scientism, so defined.   
      Likewise, regarding another of Fodor’s assertions, it is worth noting that 
Plantinga would not doubt that the Toothbrushing Behavior was based on mostly true 
beliefs.  Plantinga agrees that we know many things.  Once again (and it bears repeating 
many times), EAAN isn’t an argument Plantinga is using to support global skepticism, 
but a specific argument to reject naturalism.   It is an argument questioning whether N&E 
can coherently provide the basis for what we know.  EAAN assumes that we know many 
things … we just can’t account for the things that we know given N&E.  
      Plantinga reminds us: 
Recall that according to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) this 
gives the naturalist a defeater (a Humean defeater) for R, and hence a (Humean) 
defeater for anything else he believes, including N&E itself.  The argument for (a) 
… [came from the formula:]  
 P(R/N&E) = [P(R/N&E&C) × P(C/N&E)] + [P(R/N&E&-C) × P(-C/N&E)].
[201]
 
Now Fodor’s attention is directed entirely at … [the terms in the first bracket, 
since Fodor apparently considers -C to be negligible] … Fodor thinks there is no 
serious chance that … the content of our beliefs does not enter into the causal 
chain leading to behavior.  Right, I agree … [b]ut of course that does nothing to 
show that P(-C/N&E) is negligible.  The probability of semantic 
epiphenomenalism may still be high on N&E … no matter how strongly we 
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      In other words, -C might be improbable given our strong intuitions that there is a 
causal link between our beliefs and our behavior.  But, Plantinga believes that he has 
presented an argument that P(-C) is high given N&E.  Therefore, “so much the worse for 
N&E”.
203
   “[T]here is no guarantee, after all, that N&E supports common sense.  Indeed, 
the heart of my argument is that it does not.”
204
 
      This is in part because of some concerns Plantinga laid out in WPF and WCB 
regarding the difficulties of ontologically accounting for the content of propositions in a 
naturalistic framework.
205
  If the relevant leading theory in the philosophy of mind 
(among the various naturalistic ones) is semantic epiphenomenalism, then a belief is in 
the causal chain by way of “its neurophysiological properties, not its content.”
206
  Under 
such a scenario, it seems very difficult indeed to ontologically account for the content, 
but the content is needed in order to have true and false propositions. 
      So, Plantinga believes P(-C/N&E) is high, and if so, then it is reasonable to think 
that P(R/N&E&-C) is low.
207
  Assuming this is correct, then it wouldn’t matter very 
much what value is associated with P(R/N&E&C): 
Suppose, for example, P(R/N&E&-C) is .2 and P(-C/N&E) is .8.  Then P(C/N&E) 
will be .2; and then even if we assign P(R/N&E&C) a value of 1, P(R/N&E) will 





      However, Plantinga did also give an argument that P(R/N&E&C) was, at best, 
only moderately high.  Plantinga thinks that Fodor is correct in noting that this part of 
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EAAN “depends upon the claim that it is quite possible, and perfectly compatible with 
N&E, that there be creatures with adaptive but mainly false beliefs.”
209
   Fodor’s 
misgivings about this were illustrated by his objections to Plantinga’s thought experiment 
about beings who think everything is a witch.  Fodor thought that most of these creatures’ 
beliefs were still true, or at least that it wasn’t clear that most of their beliefs were false.  
About Fodor’s criticisms, Plantinga writes: 
[Fodor] … overlooks the fact that, as I constructed the case (and whose case is it, 
after all?), these creatures form beliefs only of the form ‘that P-witch has Q’ for 
properties P and Q.  (We may add, if we like, that they form general beliefs of the 
form all (some) P-witches are Q, together with propositions appropriately 
constructible out of these general and singular beliefs.)  So the creature in 
question doesn’t believe that’s an appletree (though he may believe that witch is 
an appletree) or that’s blooming (though he may believe that witch is blooming).  
Why couldn’t there be creatures like that? … surely [the creature’s] behavioral 
successes can be explained as well by virtue of its believing that witch is 




 Plantinga then takes issue with Fodor’s claim that Plantinga is reasoning from the 
mere possibility that our behavior could be adaptive while most of our beliefs are false to 
the conclusion that most of our beliefs, then, are false.  Plantinga responds: 
What I actually said is that there are indefinitely many systems of belief and 
desire that will yield the same (adaptive) behavior; among these there are 
indefinitely many where most of the beliefs involved are mostly false; and then, 
“Here one doesn’t know what to say about the probability that their cognitive 
systems would produce mostly true beliefs, but perhaps it would be reasonable to 
estimate it as somewhat more than ½” (WPF, 227).  No claim here that we have 
reason to think most of our beliefs are false; and certainly no argument to the 
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 Now, what about Fodor’s assertion that Plantinga needs to provide independent 
evidence for the claim that most of our behavior is linked to false beliefs?  Plantinga 
wonders why it needs to be independently plausible: 
… Independent of what?  I’m not sure what he means, but perhaps it’s this: if the 
naturalist has a defeater for R in N&E and the Probability Thesis,
[212]
 it must be 
because he has something like evidence independent of N&E that as a matter of 
fact -R is true with respect to him.  But why think a thing like that?  I learn that 
my sphygmomanometer was fabricated by a wealthy eccentric who wants to do in 
the medical establishment; as far as I can see, the probability of its being reliable, 
given this origin, is low or inscrutable; I have no other evidence for its reliability.  
Doesn’t that just in itself give me a defeater for my initial assumption that the 
sphygmomanometer is reliable?  Why do I need independent evidence that it is 
unreliable?  Suppose I’ve ingested that reliability-inhibiting drug XX and I think 
that the probability of R, given that fact, is low or inscrutable.  Then don’t I have 
a defeater for R, with respect to me, even if I don’t have independent evidence 




 Plantinga here brings up a point redolent of a problem we encountered earlier; 
once one is in Hume’s dialectical loop, how could one present any independent 
evidence in order to get out of it?  Once one has admitted the possibility that one’s 
cognitive faculties might be unreliable, how can one allay that fear by presenting 
“independent” evidence which uses those same faculties?  How could one possibly 
acquire “independent” evidence in such a situation?  What could possibly be the 
criteria be for knowing that the evidence is “independent”? 
At the end of Fodor’s article there is a significant admission by him which seems 
to concede a lot to EAAN.  He agrees that E, just by itself, doesn’t provide a reason to 
think we’re “true believers”.  He writes:   
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I propose to conclude with a caveat … I also want to warn against the … fallacy 
… of arguing from “Darwinism doesn’t imply that most of our beliefs are false” 




… Since, for all we know, evolution would have chosen false believers if it had 
been given the chance, the fact that evolution chose us isn’t, in and of itself, a 
reason for thinking that we’re true believers.  There is, as far as I can tell, no 
Darwinian reason for thinking that we’re true believers.  Or that we aren’t … 
Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business, and evolution doesn’t care whether 





      Fodor thinks it is possible that we were once selected (long ago in the past) 
because of adaptive behavior based upon false beliefs (evolution doesn’t care), but that 
it’s pretty clear that it just doesn’t work that way right now.  Because of the predictive 
success of so many of our scientific theories, clearly “it’s mostly true beliefs that 
eventuate in adaptive behavior now”.
216
  In other words, Fodor agrees that the theory of 
natural selection does not entail adaptive behavior based upon true beliefs, but it just so 
happens that (now anyway) that is how the process is working.  He states: 
[Why] … do I believe that the lunar theory of the tides … [is] pretty close to 
being true?  … [O]n account of my (casual, to be sure) acquaintance with the 
evidence that has been alleged for … [it].  And, of course, the evidence that has 
been alleged for the lunar theory of the tides isn’t that human cognition evolved; 
it’s that, for example, the lunar theory correctly predicts that (all else equal) the 
tides are highest when the moon is full … What on earth does whether or not our 





     So, for Fodor, evolution doesn’t care one way or another whether or not we’re 
true believers.  But, we can tell that, at least now, we are.  How can we tell?  Because, for 
the most part, our theories work, Fodor says.   
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This inductive strategy seems to fall prey to Plantinga’s earlier general points 
about the problems associated with inductive evidence coming from the same 
questionable faculties.  Even granting Fodor the point, however, doesn’t seem to get at 
the heart of Plantinga’s argument.  This is because Plantinga agrees that most of our 
theories work, and Plantinga agrees (in EAAN) that our minds did evolve.  The crucial 
question is the probability of whether they evolved in a strictly naturalistic framework, 
and this is something that Fodor seems to just be assuming.   
 What have we learned from Fodor’s critique and from Plantinga’s response to 
him?  First of all, Fodor illustrates what I have found to be a frequent misunderstanding 
of EAAN … that it is questioning our knowledge of the world.  This is a significantly 
large misunderstanding of the argument; maybe Plantinga was originally not as clear 
about this as he could have been, but it is important to remember that EAAN is not a 
skeptical argument.  Plantinga claims that we have knowledge, but asserts that there is 
something peculiar about the combination of N&E that corrodes our knowledge, or takes 
away the basis for us to know. 
 Another way to get at this point is to revisit the question with which I began this 
chapter:  “why would Plantinga believe that current evolutionary theory doesn’t have a 
mechanism to weed out organisms that have mostly false beliefs?”
218
  The fact is, he 
doesn’t.  As can be seen from his remarks to Fodor about himself subscribing to 
Scientism (as defined by Fodor), Plantinga does think that natural selection could weed 
out organisms that have mostly false beliefs.  It’s just that Plantinga thinks that an 
adherent of naturalism can’t account for this fact, because when N is conjoined with E 
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one is put in a curious epistemic muddle … one has been saddled with an undefeated 
defeater (which doesn’t necessarily happen when E is conjoined with some other things, 
say, like the proposition T). 
    Secondly, Fodor’s critique brings up the question of how Plantinga’s argument 
treats other evidence that we have besides N&E.  This, in turn, brings up the question of 
“independent evidence”, which Fodor thinks we could have and Plantinga thinks we 
could not have (merely given N&E).  Fodor admits that, given just E, we have no reason 
for thinking R.  He says:  “There is, as far as I can tell, no Darwinian reason for thinking 
that we’re true believers.  Or that we aren’t … Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business, 
and evolution doesn’t care whether most of our beliefs are true.”
219
  (One might take this 
last sentence to be a good popular summary of EAAN if one adjusts it to “evolution given 
N doesn’t care …”.) 
 However, Fodor thinks that adding additional evidence to N&E helps us to see 
that we can hold R.  At least some of this additional evidence is inductively acquired (i.e., 
typically unquestioned gains of science).  But Plantinga asks how we can trust this if it 
comes from the questioned faculties.  Fodor retorts that we can trust it because it works.  
Plantinga agrees that a lot of it works, but doesn’t see how that rescues the naturalist.  
This is because, for Plantinga, the metaphysical naturalist still has a defeater that should 
take away the basis for her confidence in R in spite of the inductive evidence.  Sure, a lot 
of our scientific evidence works for us, but Plantinga never questioned that.  Sure, the 
naturalist can function pragmatically in the world on Fodor’s inductive evidence, but that 
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doesn’t mean that someone cannot have a Humean defeater.
220
  Plantinga thinks the 
reflective adherent of N&E does have a Humean defeater, that it is bad to have a Humean 
defeater; and that we should strive to disabuse ourselves of ideas that put us in such a 
position.   
 We shall see that the issue of inductive evidence still gets a lot of play later on, as 
the charge that Plantinga has ignored certain evidences is also part of the critique of 
Fitelson and Sober, below. 
 
Branden Fitelson’s and Elliott Sober’s Critique of EAAN 
      Branden Fitelson and Elliott Sober (hereafter F&S) have criticized both 
Plantinga’s Preliminary Argument and his Main Argument of EAAN.
221
  F&S’s remarks 
on the Preliminary Argument were factors in Plantinga’s revision of that argument.
222
  
However, for reasons I’ve already stated, I am mainly interested here in their critiques of 
the Main Argument. 
 Like the evaluations of Ramsey and Fodor, F&S’s criticisms and Plantinga’s 
responses are, at the very least, helpful in bringing EAAN into sharper focus.  F&S take 
Plantinga’s Main Argument to be as follows: 
1. Pr (R/E&N) is low or its value is inscrutable. 
2. Therefore, E&N is a defeater of R – if you believe E&N, then you should 
withhold assent from R. 
3. If you should withhold assent from R, then you should withhold assent from 
anything else you believe. 
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4. If you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from E&N (E&N is self-
defeating). 
∴   You should not believe E&N.
223
    
      
      However, they state that even if the probability in question is low “that would not 
entail that R suffices to reject E&N.”
224
  Adherents of E&N could have other reasons for 
holding R (e.g., R is a basic proposition, or R is reasonable because of something other 
than E). Similarly, this applies for those who think that the matter at hand is 
inscrutable.
225
  F&S say: 
… We suspect that many people who are well acquainted with the theory of 
special relativity and who think that birds fly still don’t know what value to assign 
to Pr(Special relativity | birds fly), especially if probability has to be an objective 
quantity; however, that doesn’t show that they should withhold belief in special 
relativity. The Principle of Indifference is flawed because it claims to obtain 
probabilities from ignorance; the start of Plantinga’s main argument makes the 





… Notice that Plantinga assumes that evolutionary naturalists have no basis for 
deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition E&N itself. This 
crucial assumption is never defended in either Warrant and Proper Function or 
“Naturalism Defeated.”
227
   
 
… [Naturalism] must be evaluated in the light of all the evidence, not just with 





      Additionally, F&S hold that even if the naturalist is in a situation where she ought 
to withhold R, that doesn’t mean that she should also withhold assent from anything else 
she believes.  R is a proposition like the great bulk of our beliefs are true.  Someone 
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could withhold R and still believe that many of her beliefs are true.   Additionally, even if 
E&N defeats the claim most of our beliefs are true, it does not follow that it also defeats 
the claim half of our beliefs are true.  Accordingly, F&S think that Plantinga must “show 
that E&N not only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that “at least a non-negligible 
minority of our beliefs are true.”
229
 
      Although F&S do not think that Plantinga’s argument works, nor that N&E is 
self-defeating, they do take care to point out that this does not mean that E is self-
guaranteeing.  (This is reminiscent of Fodor’s closing admission.) F&S note that many 
cognitive scientists believe human reasoning to be subject to various biases.  They refer 
to the work of Kahneman, Tversky, and Solvic which asserts that “[i]t isn’t just that 
people occasionally make mistakes, but that the human reasoning faculty seems to follow 
heuristics that lead to systematic error.”
230
  Given this to be so, perhaps it plausible 
(under E) to expect human reasoning to be more reliable on matters affecting survival and 
reproduction but to be less reliable on more theoretical matters (e.g., philosophy, 
theology, and theoretical science).  About this, F&S say:  
Anyhow, if evolutionary theory does say that our ability to theorize about the 
world is apt to be rather unreliable, how are evolutionists to apply this point to 
their own theoretical beliefs, including their belief in evolution? One lesson that 
should be extracted is a certain humility— an admission of fallibility. This will 
not be news to evolutionists who have absorbed the fact that science in general 
is a fallible enterprise. Evolutionary theory just provides an important part of 
the explanation of why our reasoning about theoretical matters is fallible. 
Far from showing that evolutionary theory is self-defeating, this consideration 
should lead those who believe the theory to admit that the best they can 
do in theorizing is to do the best they can. We are stuck with the cognitive 
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      This leads F&S to recognize a problem that overarches what they have heretofore 
focused upon in Plantinga’s argument, and that problem is that there is no non-circular 
argument available to us that will enable us to confirm the reliability of our cognitive 
equipment without first presupposing its substantial reliability.  We have seen this 
problem earlier, and it will come up again, especially in Chapter 5.  F&S’s last word on 
the subject is: 
… Plantinga suggests that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating, but that 
traditional theism is not. However, what is true is that neither position has an 
answer to hyperbolic doubt. The theist, like the evolutionary naturalist, is unable 




Plantinga’s Response to Fitelson & Sober 
      To begin with, Plantinga thinks that when F&S say that he believes P(R/E&N) is 
low or its value is inscrutable
233
 that they have mistakenly interpreted him as saying that 
P(R/N&E) under only one scenario regarding the link between beliefs and behavior is 
low and that that makes P(R/N&E) in general also low.  F&S seem to only consider the 
argument under the option where beliefs and behavior are causally connected in an 
adaptive manner.
234
   
      This revisits a response that Plantinga gave to Fodor on a similar point.
235
  
Plantinga maintained that it doesn’t really matter what value is given to only that one 
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option, because the formulation of the argument involves many different scenarios 
examining the link between behavior and belief.  The four
236
 options are: (1) 
epiphenomenalism (no causal link between belief and behavior), (2) semantic 
epiphenomenalism (also no causal link), (3) belief/behavior are causally linked but 
maladaptive, and (4) “the common sense possibility … according to which belief is both 
adaptive and also causally efficacious by way of content as well as neurophysiological 
properties.”
237
  Plantinga notices that F&S really only considered the last scenario: 
… F&S consider only … [option four].  But given the structure of the argument, it 
might be that P(R/N&E) … [in general
238
] is low or inscrutable even if P(R/N&E) 
… [under only option four
239
] is very high – indeed, as high as you please.  So 
even if their animadversions of my argument for at best a moderately high value 




      Next, Plantinga responds to F&S’s assertion that adherents of E&N might have 
other reasons for believing R (e.g, R is basic, or R derives support from something than 
E&N).  He responds: 
They might indeed argue for both those theses [R is basic, or R derives support 
from reasons other than E&N] … and if they did, I think they’d be right.  But that 
fact does not insulate R from defeat for the naturalist.  My belief that I see a sheep 
is a basic proposition that does not require theoretical support; nevertheless, it is 
possible to get a defeater for it (as when you, the local authority on sheep, point 
                                                 
236
 Here Plantinga has combined options 1 (epiphenomenalism) and 2 (beliefs as decoration) [from the five 
options that were in WPF] into one option (epiphenomenalism) to give now a total of four.  See my p 36. 
237
 Plantinga, “Probability and Defeaters,” 292. 
238
 P(R/N&E) “in general”, is when all the options are factored in.  In other words:  
P(R/N&E) = (P(R/N&E&P1) × P(P1/N&E)) + (P(R/N&E&P2) × P(P2/N&E)) + (P(R/N&E&P3) × 
P(P3/N&E)) + (P(R/N&E&P4) × P(P4/N&E)). Plantinga, “Probability and Defeaters,” 292. 
239
 I.e., P4. 
240
 Plantinga, “Probability and Defeaters”, 292.  I am changing some of Plantinga’s wording to avoid 
confusion about the denotation of “C” which he included here.  In this article where Plantinga responds to 
F&S, “C” denotes “… the common sense possibility … according to which belief is both adaptive and also 
causally efficacious by way of content as well as neurophysiological properties.”  Plantinga, “Probability 
and Defeaters,” 292.  However, in other books and articles regarding EAAN, C sometimes stands for other 
things.  For instance, in WPF, 220, C is a complex proposition “… which states what cognitive faculties we 
have – memory, perception, reason … and what sorts of beliefs they produce.”  In later writings, C drops 
out altogether as an unnecessary complication. 
77 
 
out that what I see is only a sheep dog that looks like a sheep from this distance).  
So it is entirely possible to acquire a defeater for a belief you hold in the basic 
way.  In the same way, R (we may suppose) is a basic proposition … nevertheless 
the naturalist’s belief (N&E) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable can perfectly well 




Regarding R deriving support from something other that E&N, Plantinga 
reiterates the XX drug story: 
 
… [Say] I believe I’ve taken XX, a substance I believe sometimes induces 
massive unreliability; I also believe that P(R/I’ve taken XX) is low or inscrutable.  
I then have a defeater for R with respect to myself; but of course R does not 
derive its epistemic credentials from my belief that I’ve taken XX.  So it is 
entirely possible to acquire a defeater D for a belief, even if the belief does not 
derive its epistemic credentials from D … [In the same way, although R is not 
derived from N&E] nevertheless (N&E) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable 





      About the suggestion of F&S that inscrutability is not a reason to reject R (e.g., 
the special relativity/birds fly example), Plantinga notes that F&S seem to be relying on 
the falsity of a certain proposition, namely:  For any propositions A and B, if P(B/A) is 
inscrutable, then A is a defeater for B.   
      F&S think this principle is false.  Plantinga agrees that it is false, but does not 
think that his argument presupposes it.  Instead, he claims that there are some cases like 
this that do result in a defeater, and some cases that do not, depending upon the particular 
situation. EAAN is one of the former cases (where there is a defeater).  Plantinga thinks 
this is shown by way of his analogies.
243
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      Along the same lines, Plantinga notes that F&S “seem also to think that ignorance 
of probabilities is never a guide to belief …”.
244
  But surely, Plantinga says, sometimes it 
is: 
… I assume, as usual, that the thermometer T I’ve just bought is reliable.  You tell 
me that this thermometer was made in a factory F whose … owner aims to do his 
best to frustrate modern industrial society by fabricating instruments many of 
which are unreliable, but you don’t know the ratio of reliable to unreliable 
instruments … P(T is reliable/T was fabricated in F) is then inscrutable for you, as 
it will be for me if I believe you.  This constitutes a defeater, for me, of my initial 




      
      What about F&S’s criticism that “… Plantinga assumes that evolutionary 
naturalists have no basis for deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition 
E&N itself”?  He responds that he thinks R has intrinsic warrant (as a basic belief) partly 
because of human beings’ sharing in the imago Dei.
246
 Therefore, he says, “… of course I 
don’t think that the naturalist’s only basis for what to think about R is N&E.  (But I do 
think that neither the naturalist nor anyone else can give a cogent argument for R.)”
247
 
      Plantinga feels that F&S are bringing up the conditionalization problem:  
“… what, in this context, can the naturalist properly conditionalize upon?  Just N&E 
itself?  Presumably not: but then what further?  This is indeed a tough problem, but not, 
so far as I can see, in such a way as to give the naturalist an escape route.”
248
  (Since this 
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is a matter that has been brought up in various ways by numerous authors, I consider it in 
Chapter 4.)  
      Plantinga then responds to the charge of F&S that he must show that E&N not 
only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that “at least a non-negligible minority of our 
beliefs are true.”
249
  He states: 
But why must I show that?  I agree that (E&N) & P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable 
does not offer a direct defeater for the belief that at least 50% of our beliefs are 
true.  But how does that help the naturalist?  F&S seems to make the mistake … 
of thinking that if you don’t have a defeater for the proposition that 50% of your 
beliefs are true, then 50% of your beliefs are such that you don’t have a defeater 
for them.  But that doesn’t follow at all.  I still have a defeater for each of my 





      For example, take the thermometer T mentioned earlier.  If you tell me that the 
factory owner designed T to read correctly 50% of the time, then (if I believe you and 
have no other information) I have a defeater for each of my readings of T (because I 
don’t know which of them are in the set of the true readings).
251
 
       Concerning F&S’s remarks about the impossibility of constructing a non-
question-begging argument for R, that is something with which Plantinga agrees.  I take 
that question up in Chapter 5. 
 So then, what have we learned from the analysis of F&S and Plantinga’s 
responses?  F&S think that one could see the truth of the Probability Thesis and still not 
have a defeater for R.  This is because they think that one could have other evidence for 
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R other than N&E.  (This is a version of the Total Evidence charge that we have seen 
before.)   
 Plantinga agrees that one could initially have other evidence than N&E for R (like 
R being a basic belief, etc.) but he thinks that such evidence will be threatened with the 
same defeater that attaches to N&E.  Plantinga’s XX drug analogy is one that he will lean 
on especially heavily in this regard.  I will look more in depth at it in later chapters.  At 
this point, I’d like to turn to the conditionalization problem alluded to in Plantinga’s 



























      The conditionalization problem is one that Plantinga feels is deep and hard to 
precisely define.
252
  Having said that, Plantinga tries to set it out as follows: 
… According to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) the naturalist 
who sees the truth of (a) has a (Humean) defeater for R.  But why think (b)?  
There are plenty of other propositions the naturalist N believes, and on some of 
them, the probability of R is high … Which beliefs of his are such that if R is 
improbable on them, then he has a defeater for R?
253
   
  
We saw earlier that Fitelson and Sober brought up a similar point when they 
wrote: 
… Notice that Plantinga assumes that evolutionary naturalists have no basis for 
deciding what to think about R, other than the proposition E&N itself. This 





      Richard Otte describes Plantinga’s conditionalization problem in this manner: 
One of the most basic objections to … [arguments like Plantinga’s] is that they 
make use of the wrong probabilities.  It is well know that probability is very 
sensitive to the information conditionalized on.  Plantinga’s arguments look at the 
probability of R conditional on N&E, but this ignores other information we have 
that would make R likely.  In effect this objection claims that Plantinga’s 
argument ignores relevant evidence we have for R, and thus it is no surprise that 
P(R/N&E) is low.  But when we take into consideration this additional evidence, 
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      Otte notices that the strategy of bringing up additional evidence might not be very 
helpful for the naturalist under Plantinga’s Preliminary Argument for EAAN, because the 
other evidence might also strengthen the argument for T, theism.  But, the Main 
Argument of EAAN does not compare N with T, but rather argues that if P(R/N&E) is 
low or inscrutable then “the naturalist has a defeater for all his beliefs, including N, and 
thus the naturalist is self-referentially incoherent.”
256
   
      In trying to get a handle on the conditionalization problem, Otte thinks it is 
helpful to think in terms of possible worlds, or “narrowing down the worlds that we are 
interested in.”
257
  The narrowing down could begin by first imagining a wide set of 
possible worlds, and then slimming the set of worlds -- each subsequent level 
representing a further restriction of possible worlds: 
•  begin by looking at how likely R is, given any possible world;  
•  restrict to worlds in which N&E is true;  
•  restrict to worlds in which there are beings; 
•  restrict to worlds in which the beings have beliefs; 
•  restrict to worlds in which the beliefs cause behavior; 
•  restrict to worlds where the beings are communicative and live in societies; 
•  restrict to worlds in which advanced science has been developed by the beings; 
•  restrict to worlds “in which massive mistakes are not made”;
258
 





      The problem is in determining at which level to stop, since the level at the bottom 
is clearly inappropriate as it begs the question.  Although there is no answer to solve “the 
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general problem of what to conditionalize on in cases like this … we can discern some 
principles to guide us …”, Otte thinks.
260
  What might these principles be? 
      For the issue at hand, we know that we must conditionalize on N&E, and we 
know that we cannot conditionalize on anything that already presupposes R.  But, we 
must conditionalize on relevant information that is “independent or not epistemically 
based on the source in question [which is R].”
261
  He continues: 
… If we were to ignore any of this evidence, then the probability would be 
useless, since the ignored evidence might affect the probability … Since Plantinga 
claims that naturalism and evolutionary theory is an unreliable source of our 






      Otte then asks if it might be appropriate to conditionalize on our experience.  By 
experience, Otte means that we should conditionalize on propositions about our external 
and internal experience.
263
  The list of these propositions includes: 
 • we experience that we believe that our beliefs causally affect our actions; 
  • we experience that we believe that we live in society; 
      • we experience that we believe that we can communicate with each other; 
 • we experience that we believe that we do not make massive mistakes; 
 • we experience that we believe that we tend to correct the mistaken beliefs that  
                     we do form; 
 • we experience that we believe that our science is quite good; 




      However, notice that we cannot assume that the experiences of our beliefs are 
veridical without begging the question.  We do know that we experience that we believe 
that they are veridical, but Plantinga is not questioning that.  Otte concludes, because of 
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this, that conditionalizing on our experience is not a fruitful way to defeat Plantinga’s 
argument. 
      So, what kinds of propositions are such that can we add them to N&E (other than 
propositions about our experiences of our beliefs) to yield R?    
      Carl Ginet has proposed adding that it is entailed by naturalism that our cognitive 
faculties are reliable: 
… Now how is it that the theist is allowed to build into her metaphysical 
hypothesis  something that entails R or a high probability of R but the naturalist 
isn’t?  Why isn’t it just as reasonable for the naturalist to take it as one of the 
tenets of naturalism that our cognitive systems are on the whole reliable 




 So, the other evidence to add to P(R/N&E) is a proposition to the effect that it is 
entailed by naturalism that our cognitive faculties are on the whole reliable.  In a similar 
vein John Perry suggests adding the proposition “we have won the evolutionary 
lottery”.
266
  Yes, R is improbable under N&E, but sometimes improbable things happen. 
Fitelson & Sober use a card-dealing illustration that is similar to Perry’s point.   
F&S say: 
If you draw a card at random from a standard deck of cards, the probability is 
only 1 in 52 that you will draw the seven of diamonds.  If you do draw this card, 
that doesn’t mean that you should conclude that the deck isn’t standard or that the 
card wasn’t drawn at random.  If you have independent evidence that the deck is 
standard and that the draw was random, you simply accept the fact that some of 
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      Yet another author, Timothy O’Connor, proposes adding a general proposition 
(O):  “the initial conditions of the development of organic life and the sum total of 
evolutionary processes (including ones as yet unknown or only dimly understood) were 
and are such as to render … [P(R/N&E&O)] rather high … .”
268
 
      Plantinga responds that, generally, all these responses can’t be appropriately 
lodged against EAAN, or really against any argument.  If they could, then “every defeater 
could automatically be defeated.”
269
  Plantinga presents the following example as an 
appropriate rejoinder to Ginet’s point:  say a Christian theist comes to believe proposition 
U, that the Bible is unreliable and full of egregious errors.  U seems to be a defeater for 
any belief that the theist holds on the sole basis of its being in the Bible: 
… now consider some belief B I do hold just on the basis of Biblical teaching … 
U looks to be a defeater for B.  Could I defend B from defeat just by adding a little 
something to U?  Ginet suggests that the naturalist add R itself to naturalism; 
could I analogously add B to U, thus moving to U*, pointing out that the 
probability of B on U* (i.e. U&B) is neither low nor inscrutable? Or better, since 
this adding something isn't really relevant, could I point out that I believe not 
merely U but B&U, adding that this conjunction entails B, and claiming 
triumphantly that I now no longer have a defeater for B? As Quine says in another 




     Plantinga then considers Perry’s slightly different suggestion, that although R is 
unlikely given N&E, sometimes unlikely things happen … we have won the evolutionary 
lottery, and thus R.  Plantinga writes: 
… But this can't be right either. Consider the probabilistic argument from evil 
against theism and consider the analogue of Perry's response: "Well, I concede 
that the existence of God is unlikely given all the suffering the world displays, but 
I have a defeater for this defeater. I believe that we have won the divinity lottery, 
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and, despite its improbability, that there is indeed such a person as God." Again, 
not the method of true philosophy. If you discover that you have a defeater D for 
one of your beliefs B, you can't in general deliver B from defeat just by noting that 
you believe the conjunction of D with some other proposition D* such that D&D* 
entails B. In particular, if you believe naturalism and the Probability Thesis and 
see that this threatens a defeater for R, you can't preserve the latter from defeat 
just by noting that you also believe N&E&L,
[271]
 with respect to which the 




      
      Moving then to O’Connor’s idea, Plantinga notes: 
 
      O'Connor's suggestion is a bit different again; it is that the naturalist should add 
There is some true proposition P such that P(R/N&E&P) is high
273
 to his noetic 
structure. But clearly this is no better than the two preceding suggestions. It would 
be like conceding that the existence of evil is a defeater for theistic belief, but 
suggesting that this defeater can be defeated by adding that you think there is 
some other true proposition P (theism itself perhaps?) such that the probability of 
theism with respect to P together with that evil is high. Once more, not the 




      So, what propositions Q might there be such that if (1) the naturalist believes Q, 
and (2) if P(R/Q&N&E) is high, then R is not defeated for the naturalist by the 
combination of N&E and the Probability Thesis [P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable]?
275
  In 
other words, which beliefs function as defeater-deflectors in this case?
276
 
      One option would be that any proposition that satisfies (1) and (2) would be a 
defeater-deflector.  But then it would be possible to defeat any probabilistic argument 
(i.e., there would be no probabilistic defeaters).  For instance, in considering P(R/N&E), 
there might be some naturalists who would take R itself to be Q (i.e., satisfy conditions 
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(1) and (2)).  Therefore, P(R/N&E&R) = 1.  In this way, any belief could be insulated 
from defeat.  So, this option in general seems wrong because surely, Plantinga says, there 
are probabilistic defeaters: 
I believe on the usual grounds that the sphygmomanometer I have just purchased 
is at least reasonably reliable; I then learn that it was made in a factory owned by 
a wealthy eccentric whose aim it is to discredit the medical establishment and that 
90 percent of the sphygmomanometers made in his factory are unreliable.  Then I 
have a defeater, and a probabilistic defeater, for my initial belief that the 




Applying this to arguments surrounding EAAN, he then says: 
 
… And can’t I also acquire a probabilistic defeater for R in my own case?  I come 
to believe that I am a brain in a vat, or a victim of a Cartesian evil genius, or have 
ingested XX, that anti-reliability drug, and also that 90 percent of those thus 
afflicted are no longer cognitively reliable.  Then don’t I have a defeater – a 




 So, if not just any believed propositions satisfying (1) and (2) count as defeater-
deflectors, which ones do?   Plantinga admits that he has no complete and rigorous 
answer to this, but thinks a complete account is not necessary to see that one has a 
probabilistic defeater at times in specific cases.  His analogies are supposed to be 
instructive in this regard.
279
  Additionally, there do seem to be some general guidelines 
involved in the case regarding EAAN: 
•  neither R itself, nor any proposition equivalent to R
280
 … is a defeater-deflector  
    here; 
 •  conjunctions of R with other propositions P the naturalist believes … will  
                not be defeater-deflectors unless P itself is.   
 •  no proposition P that is evidentially dependent upon R for S – i.e., such that S  
                believes P on the evidential basis of R – is a defeater-deflector for R.
281
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 What all this is supposed to have shown is that Plantinga does not think there is 
any “independent” or additional evidence that could be brought forth by the naturalist 
that would not have the same defeater attached to it.  It is hard to see how considering 
Total Evidence could make any difference.  This is because the weighing of any other 
evidence will necessarily involve R, and R is in dispute.  Any such evidence will be 
flowing from the suspected faculties, and have the same taint.   
 Once someone sees this, then she is in a position to recognize how Plantinga’s 
argument highlights a long-recognized epistemological puzzle:  we can’t seem to provide 
a reasoned argument for the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties without using those 
very same faculties.  Although other issues concerning probabilities will come up later
282
 
(e.g., concerning objective and subjective probability), it is to the epistemic circularity 
issue that I now turn. 
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      Some commentators on EAAN have noticed similarities between this argument 
and some of Descartes’ reasoning, principally in Meditations on First Philosophy and 
Objections and Replies.
283
  In struggling to arrive at certain knowledge, Descartes saw 
the need to bring in God (and a God who is not a deceiver at that) to underwrite this level 
of knowledge.  Arriving at such knowledge of God, however, seemed to involve 
problems that set up what is now sometimes called the Cartesian Circle.  In this chapter, I 
will look into some of the similarities between Plantinga’s argument and some of these 
problems.  This comparison will highlight some interesting and important aspects of 
EAAN. 
      James van Cleve helpfully summarizes the issues of the Cartesian Circle in this 
manner: 
The problem of the Cartesian Circle arose for Descartes because he appeared 
to commit himself to each of the following two propositions: 
 
(1) I can know (be certain) that (CD) whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is 
true only if I first know (am certain) that (G) God exists and is not a deceiver. 
 
(2) I can know (be certain) that (G) God exists and is not a deceiver only if I first 
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      There is a vast body of literature concerning the Cartesian Circle.  Some 
philosophers see a way out of the Circle, others think it is impossible to get out of the 
Circle, and still others think the Circle might not be so vicious in the first place (e.g., due 
to co-implication).
285
  At this point I just want to note a few ways that Plantinga and 
Descartes seem to resemble one another regarding how God might be related to our 
ability to trust our cognitive faculties. 
      Both Descartes and Plantinga run arguments that seriously call into question our 
ability to trust our cognitive faculties in the absence of a Divine cognitive faculty maker.  
Descartes wrote: 
I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and 
if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for 






Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so 
powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain.  Let us not 
argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction.  
According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or 
chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since 
deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my 
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      To Descartes (and, as we have seen, to Plantinga), agnosticism about the origins 
of our cognitive faculties (especially absent a creator God) seems to corrode some types 
of knowledge.  Nietzsche also commented upon this: 
… It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God’s credibility frivolous.  
Indeed, only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the 
search for truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success.  This 





For Descartes, without a particular type of knowledge about God, one can be 
subject to all kinds of skeptical doubts, in particular the Malevolent Demon hypothesis 
and/or the Deceiving God hypothesis.  This, however, is not to say that Descartes thought 
someone (e.g., an atheist) who lacks knowledge of God knows nothing: 
That an atheist can know clearly that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on the other hand, such 
knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science,
289
 because no knowledge
290
 
that can be rendered doubtful should be called science.
291
  Since he is, as 
supposed, an Atheist, he cannot be sure that he is not deceived in the things that 
seem most evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown; and though perchance 
the doubt does not occur to him, nevertheless it may come up, if he examines the 
matter, or if another suggests it; he can never be safe from it unless he first 
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      So it seems that Descartes is willing to grant one level of knowledge to an atheist, 
but not allow the highest level of knowledge to her.  The higher level of knowledge here 
for Descartes is scientia, and the lower level of knowledge is cognitio.
293
 
      Do we see something similar happen when the question of the extent of an 
atheist’s knowledge is put to Plantinga?  Like Descartes, Plantinga seems to grant 
knowledge on the level of cognitio to a naturalist; at least, at first.  But, later on in 
EAAN, Plantinga seems to say that the reflective atheist (caught in a Humean dialectical 
loop)
294
 can lose that even that. 
      James Van Cleve writes: 
My interest in this argument [EAAN] is not in its final step, the allegedly self-
defeating character of naturalism, but in the penultimate step, in which Plantinga 
asserts that the naturalist has a defeater for everything he believes.  If so, then on 
the assumption that no defeated belief can amount to knowledge, it follows that 
the naturalist has no knowledge whatsoever.  It appears that Plantinga renders a 
more severe verdict on the atheist’s epistemic position than Descartes ever did:  
Descartes allowed that the atheist geometer might know (for a while, or in a way) 





      Plantinga, in response, restates that “the conclusion of EAAN is not just that the 
naturalist doesn’t know R or N&E (either by way of cognitio or scientia) but that he has a 
rationality defeater for it – a Humean rationality defeater.”
296
  This reminds us that 
Plantinga isn’t saying that the naturalist has a proper function defeater, but an alethic 
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defeater and a Humean defeater.  It is only a reflective naturalist (concerning EAAN) 
whom Plantinga thinks to have a Humean defeater, not a non-reflective naturalist.   
The distinctions drawn among these defeaters were not made in Plantinga’s 
original argument, but they have become important in responses that Plantinga has 
given.
297
  At the end of this chapter, I go into more detail on proper function defeaters, 
alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters.  For now, the quick idea is that “Humean 
defeaters” come about when one is in the particular vicious dialectical loop Plantinga has 
described.
298
  Alethic defeaters have to do with, for lack of a better way of putting it, the 
objective fact-of-the-matter.  Someone has an alethic defeater when she believes 
something that puts her in a situation that she should, if she were being rational, see that 
she has a defeater for her belief.  (However, in fact, she may not be aware of this). 
A “proper function defeater” has to do with whether or not one’s cognitive 
faculties are aimed at truth.  Maybe the design plan of a person allows her to function 
well in certain situations while believing something that a rational person should not 
believe.  For example, say she believes that she will recover from a sickness (when the 
chance of recovery is only .01), and her optimism initiates actions in her body that help 
her to indeed recover.
299
 Although she has an alethic defeater, she doesn’t have a proper 
function defeater.  She would have a proper function defeater in this particular case if the 
belief in question did not allow her to function well.   
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These defeater distinctions will be explained in more detail, below.
300
  
      Van Cleve lodges several objections at this point.  In order for Plantinga to think 
that his argument degrades knowledge of R for a naturalist, Van Cleve surmises that 
Plantinga must be implicitly relying upon a general principle like this: 
For any propositions A and B that I believe, if B is improbable or inscrutable with 




Van Cleve’s point is that such a principle would make trouble for everyone, not just a 
naturalist.  “I believe that it is raining now; I also believe that the Broncos won Super 
Bowl XXXII; and I have no idea what the probability of the first is given the second.  
Does my Super Bowl belief therefore defeat my belief about the rain?”
302
   
      Plantinga agrees that would be a troublesome principle:  
Most contingent propositions I believe – for example, that at the moment there is 
robin in my backyard – are, I should think, such that their probabilities with 
respect to, say, the Fundamental Theory of Calculus, are either low or inscrutable; 
furthermore, their warrant, for me, does not derive from the warrant, for me, of 
this theorem.  Yet surely that low or inscrutable probability doesn’t constitute 




      However, Plantinga says that he is not relying on a general principle such as the 
one above, but is rather arguing by way of analogy:
304
    
… N&E (if true) gives us crucial information about the origin, provenance, and 
development of the cognitive faculties in question: the process by which they 
arose, whether they were designed (and if so, by whom), what their purpose is if 
they have a purpose, and the like.  Now analogous cases where the relevant 
probabilities are low do offer a defeater.  Thus if I learn that my new 
sphygmomanometer was manufactured in a factory such that the probability of its 
being reliable given that it was manufactured there is low or inscrutable, and have 
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no other relevant evidence, then I have a defeater for my initial assumption that 
the instrument is reliable.  If I come to think that Sam has ingested that reliability-
destroying substance XX, or that he is a victim of a Cartesian demon, or that he 
has mad cow disease, and if I know nothing else relevant about him, I will have a 
defeater for my initial belief that R holds with respect to Sam.  The same goes, I 
say, if I come to think I myself am in one of these conditions – or rather, 





      Well then, so what if one does acquire a Humean rationality defeater for R?  Van 
Cleve thinks that this fact alone shouldn’t give one a defeater for everything else one 
believes.
306
  Van Cleve and Ernest Sosa
307
 think that Plantinga might be leaning on 
something like an implicit premise thesis: “… the thesis that whenever we accept any 
deliverance of a faculty, our doing so rests on the implicit premise that that faculty is 
reliable.”
308
   
     No, Plantinga says, he does not argue EAAN on the basis on the implicit premise 
thesis, because one might accept, say, many sensory perceptions without raising the 
question of whether or not the relevant faculties are reliable.
309
  He continues: 
In order for your acceptance of memory beliefs to be warranted, it is not 
necessary that you actually believe that your memory is in fact reliable.  Notice, 
however, that if you come to think it is not reliable (in a certain range, say) then 
you have a defeater for any memory belief (in that range), provided there is no 
other source of warrant, for you, for the belief in question … In general, if you 
have considered the question whether a given source of information or belief is 
reliable, and have an undefeated defeater for the belief that it is, then you have a 
defeater for any belief such that you think it originates (solely) from that source.  
But then the same applies in the present context; in acquiring an undefeated 
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      Van Cleve then wonders that, if circularity is the worry, are all circular arguments 
equally damaging?  Van Cleve maintains that some circular arguments are damaging and 
some are not.  “The really damaging kind of circularity … is the kind in which not merely 
the truth of an argument’s conclusion, but knowledge of it, is a necessary precondition of 
obtaining knowledge of the argument’s premises.”
311
   
In response, Plantinga thinks that Van Cleve means to suggest that a naturalist 
might agree that P(R/N&E) is low and see the circularity problem that ensues, but claim 
that the circularity is not vicious.
312
 
      Plantinga agrees that it might be possible “… in some cases that one can base an 
argument for the reliability of a certain faculty on premises (beliefs) that themselves are a 
product of that faculty.”
313
  An example of this might again be the trust of one’s 
perceptual faculties before one has reflected upon them.  Once the question is brought up, 
one might think that, as far as one could remember, one’s perceptual faculties produced 
beliefs that were for the most part true.  “This is a plausibly sensible procedure”, 
Plantinga writes.
314
  Let us classify this example as a Type 1 scenario. 
     However, in other matters, such a procedure seems out of place.  Here Plantinga 
quotes Thomas Reid: 
If a man’s honesty were called into question, it would be ridiculous to refer to the 
man’s own word, whether he be honest or not.  The same absurdity there is in 
attempting to prove, by any kind of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, that our 
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Plantinga then wonders: 
 
Suppose I am worried about whether R is true with respect to me:  I seem to 
remember ingesting XX a couple [of] hours ago, and believe that nine out of ten 
people who have done so suffer from serious cognitive disability within the next 
couple of hours, so that R no longer holds with respect to them.  Now suppose I 
try to reassure myself by … [a kind of ] epistemically circular argument … [like 
this one:] 
 
I believe p1 and it’s true, 




I believe pn and it’s true; 
 
so most of my beliefs are indeed true; so my faculties are reliable.  Is this a 




      Let us term Reid’s Honesty example and Plantinga’s XX example as illustrations 
of Type 2 cases.  What is the distinguishing mark, then, between Type 1 cases and Type 2 
cases?   Isn’t it just that in Type 1 cases the questioning of R has not come up … there is 
no reason to question R?  However, in Type 2 cases, for various reasons R is suspected of 
being possibly untrue, and in such a situation: 
… you can’t properly assuage that doubt by giving yourself an argument; for you 
will, or will if you are proceeding rationally, have the same doubt about the truth 
of the premises of the argument, as well as your belief that if the premises are 
true, so is the conclusion. 
     In the EAAN case then: if you accept naturalism and the Probability Thesis 
and as a result come to doubt or wonder whether R is true, you cannot sensibly 
lay that doubt to rest by way of an epistemically circular argument.
317
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      This seems to highlight once again that, for Plantinga, R is first held in a basic 
way but, once doubted, needs a story to make sense of its basicality in order to preserve 
rationality.  Plantinga agrees that theists and naturalists alike tell stories which they think 
might enable them to trust that R.  However, Plantinga thinks that the person holding N is 
incapable of telling an adequate story which can defeat the defeater that comes with the 
acceptance of the Probability Thesis.  (Part of the reason for this has to do with 
Plantinga’s overall account of warrant; specifically, the relation of proper function to 
warrant.  This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine, below.) 
      This becomes clear in Plantinga’s response to an objection lodged by Ernest Sosa.  
Sosa wrote that the theist and the naturalist were both in the same sort of epistemic boat 
as far as telling a comforting story that yields R.  Sosa asks: 
Why can’t you as a naturalist develop a view of yourself and your surroundings 
that shows your situation to be epistemically propitious.  You would need to be 
able to self-attribute ways of acquiring and retaining beliefs that put you so in 
touch with your surroundings, relative to the relevant fields of interest to you, that 
you would tend to believe correctly in virtue of using those ways.  What precludes 
your doing so, by means of science, as a naturalist, if the supernaturalist can do so 




      Plantinga, however, counters that the problem is that it’s hard to see how any 
story that is told given N can possibly defeat or deflect the Humean defeater that attaches 
to an adherent of N once she has seen the Probability Thesis.  He writes: 
… [Suppose] I believe I have ingested XX and I also believe R is unlikely with 
respect to this.  Could I nonetheless achieve reflective knowledge, scientia, that R 
is in fact true, with respect to me, by elaborating a story according to which R 
holds for me even though I’ve taken XX?  Could such a story be either a defeater-
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defeater or a defeater-deflector in such a way that I wind up with scientia or R?  I 
can’t see how. 
 
(Notice that Plantinga is starting to lean on the XX Drug Example fairly often.  
We will see that it is indeed one of the most crucial of his analogies.  When presented 
along with the Case of the Curiously-Produced Sphygmomanometer and the Case of the 
Irradiated Widgets, the Case of the Mysterious Radio Device, and the Case of the 
Questionable Thermometer, Plantinga seems to have a decent overall analogical case.  I 
look at some of these in more detail in Chapter Nine.)   
Continuing his response to Sosa, Plantinga goes on to say: 
… Perhaps I believe, for example, that while it is certainly unlikely that we 
human beings should be reliable, given our origins, natural selection has 
nevertheless inexplicably brought it about that we are … The problem would be 
with the status of those beliefs constituting the story.  Presumably they would be 
the sort of beliefs for which evidence is required, if they are to be accepted 
rationally: but where would we find the evidence? On the other hand, suppose the 
naturalist just assumes that R is true … and then looks for and embraces the best 
explanation of its being true.  Then his belief in that explanation is evidentially 
dependent on his belief that R, and thus cannot function as a defeater-deflector 
with respect to R … The truth is, so it seems to me, that reflection doesn’t give 
the naturalist scientia or reflective knowledge of R; what it does is give him a 
reflective (Humean) defeater of R, and hence deprives him even of his animal 
knowledge of that proposition.  How does telling the story that Sosa proposes 




Sosa, in his second article on EAAN, admits that things do look bleak: 
What seems bad for the naturalist is not just that, given our brutish etiology, it is 
monumental luck that we exist at all.  That would seem acceptable … What seems 
bad for the naturalist is that however accidental our existence, it is a further 
accident that our faculties are reliable, if indeed they are.  Suppose we have no 
basis for supposing that things have turned out well enough for our faculties, 
despite how little reason we have to suppose they would turn out that way, given 
their evolutionary origins.  This would be bad.  It would put us in an epistemic 
situation about as bad as if we knew that we had taken a pill that nearly always 
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disables one’s faculties terminally, except for those in some miniscule subset.  If 
one believes that one did take such a pill, it seems incoherent to think that one is 
still cognitively reliable.  This would require believing that one falls in the 
favored miniscule subset.  But how could one rationally believe that one was so 
lucky, unless one had some special reason for so believing?  And how could one 




      Sosa now thinks that Plantinga’s argument has turned the tables on the naturalist 
opposition, and “a fully adequate response remains to be formulated.”
321
  He does, 
however, point in two directions where naturalists might look to respond to this situation.   
      Sosa’s first idea is the thought that perhaps it is not possible that human beings 
can come into existence while being “deprived of our successful cognitive faculties.”
322
  
For instance, maybe it is not possible to be the beings we are, with beliefs having content, 
without those beliefs corresponding to a “… substantial amount of built-in truths … For it 
is only through adequate sensitivity to the presence or absence of perceptible properties 
that we acquire corresponding concepts of those properties.”
323
  
      Here is another line that Sosa thinks a naturalist might use to develop a story that 
can save R:  make us of the fact that, although our evolutionary origins do not entail R, 
they also do not preclude R – we may be reliable nonetheless.  That we get into some sort 
of circularity in trying to establish R is not totally incapacitating; no story can avoid some 
type of circularity, so this cannot be a “disabling objection in the end.”
324
 
In testing these thoughts, Sosa looks in detail at the example of the cognitively 
disabling pill (Sosa calls it DISABLEX … it seems to work substantially the same as 
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Plantinga’s XX).   This pill permanently disables one’s cognitive faculties such that these 
faculties are no longer reliable, but the person taking the pill still believes the faculties to 
be reliable.  Thinking about such a scenario, I might wonder how I could know that I 
have never taken such a pill.
325
 
      Well, I think right now that my faculties are indeed reliable … by default, I 
manifest my commitment that R, Sosa says.  What else can I do?  Sosa writes: 
… the claim that you have taken any such pill is a self-defeating claim.   Both 
believing that you have taken the pill and even suspending judgment on that 
question are epistemically self-defeating.  The contrary claim, that you have taken 
no such pill, follows logically from what is epistemically obligatory and self-
sustaining, namely, the [default] commitment to the reliability of your faculties.  
Therefore, it is hard to see how you could possibly go wrong epistemically not 
only in affirming the reliability of your faculties but also in affirming anything 
you can see to follow logically from that, including the consequence that you have 
never taken any such pill. 
 
 So, Sosa holds that, once you get into the muddle of wondering if you have ever 
taken DISABLEX, you are stuck either way.  Therefore, the only reasonable thing to do 
is to believe that you have never taken such a pill.  It’s hard to see how anyone could 
epistemically fault you for that.  If this is indeed true, then Plantinga’s argument should 
not trouble the naturalist.  Sosa applies this to EAAN as follows: 
 … the same goes for Plantinga’s evolutionary argument.  Again, believing that 
our faculties are unreliable is self-defeating, as is even suspending judgment on 
that question.  On the question whether your faculties are reliable, you have no 
rational choice but to assent, therefore, and so you would be within your rights to 
draw the further conclusion that if your origins are evolutionary, then such origins 
cannot make your faculties unreliable.  Would that necessarily preclude a 
naturalist from believing in evolution?  Only if evolutionary origins entailed the 
unreliability of our faculties.  But nothing like this is shown by any of the 
considerations adduced in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument.  At most, what 
those considerations show is that the probability that our faculties are reliable is 
low or inscrutable.  And this is compatible with our faculties being reliable.  
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Indeed, from those considerations it cannot even be inferred that it is unlikely that 
our origins are evolutionary, for inscrutability would permit no such inference.
326
 
      
      Notice in his argument that Sosa (here, at least) seems to be arguing in large part 
for something that Plantinga has already granted, namely, that our cognitive faculties 
have evolutionary origins.  Plantinga just will not grant that N is the metaphysic that 
frames the evolutionary process.  In addition, Plantinga is not saying that our faculties 
aren’t cognitively reliable, or that we shouldn’t rely upon them.  For the most part, he 
thinks they are reliable and that we are right to rely upon them.   
He claims that N does not have the resources to explain why our cognitive 
faculties are reliable.  Additionally, he claims that there is something curious about the 
conjunction of E with N that puts one in an irrational situation (once one reflects upon the 
Probability Thesis).  Sosa’s critiques, however, do make me think about a certain 
intuitional issue.  Plantinga might be relying here on a very widespread intuition about 
brute forces, to which I will turn in the next chapter. 
 
Excursus: Concerning Various Types of Defeaters 
 Near the beginning of his “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts”, Plantinga makes some 
important comments about different kinds of defeaters.
327
  He begins by saying that 
EAAN holds that an adherent of naturalism who sees the truth of the Probability Thesis 
has a rationality defeater for R: 
… the reflective naturalist … will be in some sense irrational if he continues to 
believe R.  In what sense?  At the fundamental level, I explain rationality in terms 
of proper function:  the rational thing to believe, in circumstances C, is what a 
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properly functioning human being – more exactly, one whose cognitive or rational 





 But even if someone had such a defeater, wouldn’t that person still continue to 
believe R?  Here Plantinga brings up the case of the XX drug, that, within one hour of its 
being taken, causes such cognitive disorder that R is no longer true.  The drug also does 
not allow the victim to detect it.  Suppose that someone believes that 90% of those taking 
the drug are cognitively unreliable (although they cannot tell that they are unreliable).  
Also suppose that this person takes XX.   Plantinga writes: 
… The first thing to see here is that a person in this condition will continue to 
form perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and the like; and she will also continue, 
in some sense, to assume that her cognitive faculties are reliable.  Furthermore (at 
least so one thinks), in so doing she is conforming to our design plan; this is 
precisely what proper function requires [i.e., in a way, it is the right thing to do to 
continue to believe R].  In this sense, then, her cognitive behavior is entirely 
rational. 
Still, one wants to say that is some way she really does have a defeater for 
R specified to her case.  She believes that R no longer holds for the vast majority 
of those who take this drug; she knows of nothing that distinguishes her case from 
theirs; someone who was thinking straight would certainly no longer (without 
additional evidence) believe R for someone else she thought had ingested XX; so 
doesn’t rationality dictate that she cease believing R in her own case?
329
   
 
So, in one sense (the proper function rationality sense), the victim is believing properly to 
continue to hold R.  In another sense (the alethic rationality sense), though, she ought to 
not hold R any longer.  To further explicate a “proper function defeater”, Plantinga says: 
… our cognitive establishment contains (or at any rate could contain) processes, 
modules, whose purpose it is not to produce true belief, but belief with some other 
property.  If you fall victim to a usually fatal disease, you may somehow think 
your chances are much better than is indicated by the statistics you know (“the 
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optimistic overrider”) …  [such beliefs] therefore, do not issue from cognitive 
processes whose purpose it is to produce true beliefs … but [in this case to 
increase] the likelihood of recovery … [So] being produced by properly 
functioning cognitive capacities is not sufficient for warrant; in addition, to have 
warrant, a belief must be such that it is produced by a module that is successfully 
aimed at truth … [the beliefs in the optimistic overrider do] not meet this 
condition.  They display proper-function rationality (they are produced by 





      Plantinga is ready to grant that the naturalist who sees the truth of the Probability 
Thesis does not necessarily have a proper-function defeater.  However, he wants to insist 
that the naturalist in this situation has an alethic defeater: 
[I have already agreed that] … proper function requires that the naturalist 
continue in assuming R, despite her seeing that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable.  
Proper function would require the same of someone who believes that she has 
ingested that reliability-destroying drug XX and that P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is 
very low, indeed even zero.  But it doesn’t follow either that R has warrant for her 
under those conditions, or that she doesn’t have a defeater for it.  True, she 
doesn’t have a proper-function rationality defeater for it; but she does have (so I 
claim) a purely alethic rationality defeater for it, and consequently, if she is 





In order to spell out more clearly the nature of this alethic defeater, Plantinga says: 





… I do have a defeater of some sort for R, if I believe that I display some 
condition c such the R is false with respect to all who display that condition – or if 
I believe that I display a condition c such that R is false with respect to most of 
those who display that condition, and I know of nothing relevant that 
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      In cases like the XX case, the person who believes she has taken the drug will still 
believe R, but “only because of the presence and power of processes not aimed directly at 
the production of true belief [but which instead are aimed at survival or carrying on].”
 334
  
Alethically speaking, though, she has a defeater for R.  A rather detailed definition of an 
alethic defeater goes like this: 
D is a purely epistemic [i.e., purely alethic] defeater of B for S at t iff (1) S’s 
noetic structure N at t includes B and S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any person 
S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, 
(b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sustaining of B in her 
noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the maximization of true 
belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic 
structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else 





     Now, if someone has such an alethic defeater, and additionally is reflective about 
her situation, then Plantinga maintains she additionally has what he calls a Humean 
defeater: 
My situation will be like that of Hume, who concludes that while, to be sure, he 
can’t stop believing what nature prompts him to believe, these beliefs are at best 
doubtful.  When he follows out what seem to be the promptings and leading of 
reason, he winds up time after time in a black coalpit, not knowing which way to 
turn … [T]he enlightened person, Hume thinks, hold the consolations of Nature at 
arm’s length.  She knows she can’t help acquiescing in the common illusion, but 
she maintains her skepticism of “the general maxims of the world” and adopts a 




… That’s the situation the naturalist will be in:  he won’t be able to help believing 
or at least assuming R; but (if he reflects on the matter) he will also think, sadly 
enough, that what he can’t help believing is unlikely to be true.  He will have a 
purely alethic rationality defeater for R, but at those reflective moments when he 
thinks about his cognitive situation he will also have a … Humean rationality 
defeater.  Of course when he isn’t thinking about his epistemic condition he will 
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naturally assume that R is true – nature permits nothing else.  But when he 
reflectively considers his condition he will, if functioning properly [re: faculties 




So go the distinctions involving proper function defeaters, alethic defeaters, and 
Humean defeaters.  Although these defeater distinctions were not originally part of the 
argument (but trotted out later in responses to critiques), they have become an 
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Some Remarks on Intuitions Regarding EAAN and Similarities with 
Related Arguments 
 
      Sosa (in his second article on EAAN) distinguishes between (1) Plantinga’s 
argument gutted of its evolutionary trappings [i.e., merely P(R/N) is low or inscrutable] 
and (2) Plantinga’s argument given E [i.e., P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable].
338
  Just what 
work is the E portion of the argument doing for EAAN? 
In order to answer this question, I believe it is helpful to think more generally 
about the intuition undergirding Plantinga’s overall argument:  that brute, blind, uncaring, 
unintentional forces are sources of dubious trustworthiness when it comes to having 
confidence that R.  Regarding this, it does not seem to matter whether E is involved in 
this blindness or not.  Such untrustworthiness of a source results in a defeater for a belief 
in R given N, similar to the kind of defeater we would get if we came to believe 
Descartes’ malevolent demon hypothesis.  Sosa writes:  “… [such a] belief is a defeater 
for one’s trust that R is true, and is also thereby a defeater in turn for the ostensible 
deliverances of these faculties.”
339
  
With regard to this intuition about brute forces, Plantinga’s EAAN is reminiscent 
of some arguments made previously by others.  In a footnote of a relevant chapter of 
WPF, Plantinga writes:  
“Victor Reppert reminds me that the argument of this chapter bears a good bit of 
similarity to arguments to be found in chapters III and XIII of C. S. Lewis' 
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      I believe that a look at these other arguments helps to clarify crucial aspects of 
Plantinga’s argument, and also helps in discerning just what it is he is doing that is novel.  
What were the arguments of Lewis and Taylor, and how is Plantinga’s argument similar 
and dissimilar to them? 
An Argument by C. S. Lewis 
      On February 2, 1948, G. E. M. Anscombe and C. S. Lewis engaged in a debate at 
a meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club.  The topic of the debate was Lewis’s argument 
against naturalism as expressed in Chapter Three of the first edition of his book Miracles 
(1947).
341
  (This chapter was called “The Self-Contradiction of the Rationalist.”)  At the 
Oxford Socratic Club meeting, Elizabeth Anscombe read a paper entitled “A Reply to 
Mr. C. S. Lewis’s Argument That ‘Naturalism’ is Self-Refuting.”
342
  She began her 
presentation by briefly summarizing what she took to be Lewis’s argument:   that a 
naturalist was in an irrational position because naturalism is “inconsistent with the 
validity of reason.”
343
  Since naturalism (roughly defined) usually carries with it the idea 
that all things (including thought) are the result of irrational (natural) causes, this 
“impugns the validity of reason, and therefore any thinking by which it itself is 
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  Lewis had set forth a rule:  “no thought is valid if it can be fully explained 
as the result of irrational causes.”
345
   
      Anscombe’s primary irritation with this seems to be that she felt Lewis’s 
argument contained many crucial terms that had not been sufficiently defined.  The set of 




      What did Lewis mean by the validity of reason? What is the distinction between 
valid and invalid reasoning?  What, precisely, is an irrational cause?  If a naturalist 
maintains that she believes X because of Y, what exactly is the relation between X and Y?  
Does she mean it to be a scientific cause-and-effect relation, or a relation between 
propositions? 
      Anscombe’s aim was not to defend naturalism as the correct metaphysical stance, 
but to contend that, because of his imprecise usage of key terms, Lewis’s argument did 
not go through.  She said in conclusion:  
… I do not think that there is sufficiently good reason for maintaining the 
“naturalist” hypothesis about human behaviour and thought.  But someone who 
does maintain it cannot be refuted as you [Lewis] try to refute him, by saying that 
it is inconsistent to maintain it and to believe that human reasoning is valid and 
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      Lewis responded that his wide and varied uses of the word valid were unfortunate 
in communicating what he meant:  “veridical (or verific or veriferous) would have been 
better.”
348
  Concerning the term because he added: 
… I also admit that the cause and effect relation between events and the ground 
and consequent relation between propositions are distinct.  Since English uses the 
word because of both, let us here use Because CE for the cause and effect relation 
(“This doll always falls on its feet because CE its feet are weighted”) and Because 
GC for the ground and consequent relation (“A equals C because GC they both 
equal B”).
349
   
      
      Around ten years after this meeting of the Socratic Club, Lewis revised the 
chapter of his book Miracles in order to meet some of Anscombe’s criticisms.  The new 
title of the chapter was “The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism.”
350
  Anscombe read the 
revisions, and although she still found some reasons for criticism, thought that the second 
version was “… much less slick and avoids some of the mistakes of the earlier one; it is 
much more of a serious investigation … it certainly does correspond more to the actual 
depth and difficulty of the questions being discussed.”
351
 
      Lewis’s revised argument is now mostly contained in Chapter Three of the second 
edition of Miracles.
352
  The argument there, in nutshell, is that “no account of the 
universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real 
insight.”
353
  Naturalism, Lewis held, seems to have a difficulty at this point.  It appears to 
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result in a situation that discredits our processes of reasoning “or at least reduces their 
credit to such a humble level that it can no longer support Naturalism itself.”
354
 
      One way to begin to see this, Lewis now asserted, was to notice the difference in 
the following two sentences of the use of the word because (one here sees the influence 
of Anscombe’s criticism): 
 (1)  Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday. 
(2)  Grandfather must be ill today because he hasn’t got up yet (and we know that         




      Sentence (1) above illustrates Because CE (because regarding cause and effect), 
while sentence (2) illustrates Because GC (because regarding the relation of ground and 
consequent).  The one “indicates a dynamic connection between events or ‘states of 
affairs’; the other, a logical relation between beliefs or assertions.”
356
   
      Now, for the most part, reasoning has no value (with regard to finding truth) 
unless inferences are connected via a Ground-Consequent relation.  “If what we think at 
the end of our reasoning is to be true, the correct answer to the question, ‘Why do you 
think this?’ must begin with the Ground-Consequent because.”
357
 
      But, concerning events in the physical world under Naturalism, “every event in 
Nature must be connected with previous events in the Cause and Effect relation[;] … the 
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true answer to ‘Why do you think this?’ in this regard must begin with the Cause-Effect 
because.”
358
   
 Note that Lewis is assuming here that Naturalism entails determinism. About an 
alternative based on, say, quantum physics, he says:  
     The older scientists believed that the smallest particles of matter moved 
according to strict laws; in other words, that the movements of each particle were 
‘interlocked’ with the total system of Nature.  Some modern scientists seem to 
think – if I understand them – that this is not so.  They seem to think that the 
individual unit of matter (it would be rash to call it any longer a ‘particle’) moves 
in an indeterminate or random fashion; moves, in fact, ‘on its own’ or ‘of its own 
accord’.  The regularity which we observe in the movements of the smallest 
visible bodies is explained by the fact that each of these contains millions of units 
and that the law of averages therefore levels out the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual unit’s behaviour … Now it will be noticed that if this theory is true we 
really have admitted something other than Nature.  If the movements of the 
individual units are events ‘on their own’, events which do not interlock with all 
other events, then these movements are no part of Nature.  It would be, indeed, 
too great a shock to our habits to describe them as super-natural.  I think we 
should have to call them sub-natural.  But all our confidence that Nature has no 
doors, and no reality outside herself for doors to open on, would have 
disappeared.  There is apparently something outside her, the Subnatural; it is 





      It doesn’t really matter for Lewis whether one is a naturalistic determinist or 
naturalistic indeterminist, because either way he would say that it is hard to see how 
propositions could be related in the necessary Ground-Consequent relation for us to be 
able to trust our cognitive faculties.  In a train of reasoning, unless the conclusion “is the 
logical consequent from a ground it will be worthless [re: gaining the truth] and could be 
true only by a fluke.”
360
  But, at the same time, unless the thinking is the effect of some 
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cause, “it cannot occur at all.”
361
  Therefore, regarding a train of thought and its purchase 
on the truth, it seems as if the two different systems of connection (i.e., Ground-
Consequent & Cause-Effect) “must apply simultaneously to the same series of mental 
acts.”
362
   
      However, the two systems seem vastly distinct:  “[t]o be caused is not to be 
proved.”
363
   If natural causes fully account for a belief, it seems as though “the belief 
would have had to arise whether it had grounds or not.”
364
  How is one thought seen to be 
a ground for another?
365
  And how is that seeing to be worked into a naturalistic 
framework of all reality?  (Here we are reminded of Plantinga’s comments about 
epiphenomenalism.) 
      Acts of thinking can have intentionality, and the associated beliefs and assertions 
regarding these acts can many times be true or false.  But, “events in general are not 
‘about’ anything and cannot be true or false.”
366
  How is this truth and falsity, the 
Ground-Consequent relation, and the phenomena of knowing (beyond being taken in just 
a subjective sense) to be worked into the naturalistic Cause-Effect relation?
367
  If Nature 
is the whole show, and all events are linked in some kind of cause-effect relation, then 
“this account, on inspection, leaves no room for the acts of knowing or insight on which 
the whole value of our thinking, as a means to truth, depends.”
368
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      Lewis agreed that both he and his hypothetical naturalistic opponent both believe 
that we do make real inferences, and that we know things.  Lewis’s account is not a 
global skeptical account about knowledge anymore than is Plantinga’s account.  Like 
Plantinga, Lewis just thinks that the naturalistic framework cannot account for how we 
have this knowledge.
369
      
      If the naturalist responds that our thinking is useful, and so it is reasonable to 
believe that it must have been preserved over the years for its utility, Lewis thinks that 
the here the question is being begged, for: 
     “[i]f the value of reasoning is in doubt, you cannot try to establish it by 
reasoning.  If … a proof that there are no proofs is nonsensical, so is a proof that 
there are proofs.  Reason is our starting point.  There can be no question whether 
of attacking it or defending it.  If by treating it as a mere phenomenon you put 





      One could, Lewis notes, retreat to pragmatism, and not make reference to truth in 
the traditional (roughly) correspondence sense about our real metaphysical situation, but 
then one could not posit naturalism as the “true” worldview.  Nature (such as is involved 
in the concept of naturalism) “… is not an object that can be presented either to the 
senses or the imagination.  It can be reached only by the most remote inferences.”
371
  The 
positing of a correspondence of the truths of the conclusions of our inferences to our 
“true metaphysical position” is way beyond our pragmatic phenomenological experience.   
So, for reasons such as these Lewis did not see his argument as one that could be 
defeated by a pragmatic line of reasoning.  A pragmatist would not be asserting 
                                                 
369
 Lewis (1960) 31. 
370
 Lewis (1960) 33. 
371
 Lewis (1960) 34. 
115 
 
metaphysical naturalism as a true belief; Lewis’s argument (like Plantinga’s) is against 
those who do. 
      Lewis realized that he needed a working definition of naturalism and 
supernaturalism to get the discussion off the ground.  But he also realized that it is 
practically impossible to fully define the terms.   Lewis thought the best way to get a 
handle on what we usually mean by naturalism would be via the ordinary language route.  
Lewis brings this out by examining how the words nature or natural are used in 
sentences like the following: 
 Are those his natural teeth or a set? 
 The dog in his natural state is covered with fleas. 
 I love to get away from tilled lands and metalled roads and be alone with 
Nature. 
 Do be natural.  Why are you so affected? 
 It may have been wrong to kiss her but it was very natural.372 
      Lewis thought that the common idea portrayed in these sentences is that a thing 
that is “natural” is characterized by whatever springs up (or comes forth, arrives, goes on, 
etc.) on its own (i.e., “of its own accord:  the given, what is there already: the 
spontaneous, the unintended, the unsolicited.”)
373
  He goes on to say: 
… What the Naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can’t go 
behind, is a vast process in space and time which is going on of its own accord.  
Inside that total system every particular event (such as your sitting here reading 
this …) happens because some other event has happened; in the long run, because 
the Total Event is happening.
374
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      Could a conscious God have sprung up from the universe this way?  Could there 
be a God who has emerged from the forces and operations of Nature?  Lewis said: 
… It is, of course, possible to suppose that when all the atoms of the universe got 
into a certain relation … they would give rise to a universal consciousness.  And it 
might have thoughts.  And it might cause those thoughts to pass through our 
minds.  But unfortunately its own thoughts, on this supposition, would be the 
product of non-rational causes and therefore, by the rule that we use daily, they 
would have no validity.  This cosmic mind would be, just as much as our own 
minds, the product of a mindless Nature.  The cosmic mind will help us only if we 
put it at the beginning, if we suppose it to be, not the product of the total system, 
but the basic, original, self-existent Fact which exists in its own right.  But to 





      The “rule that we use daily” is the rule that whenever we trace beliefs back to 
non-rational causes (non-rational in that they are Cause-Effect related instead of Ground-
Consequent related), we tend to take that as a basis to disbelieve the assertions (e.g., He 
believes he can fly because he has taken a drug, or She believes she is a child again 
because of a tumor in her brain.)
376
  
      So we see that Lewis’s main argument is that rationality cannot come from non-
rationality, and even if it does, that in itself is no reason to believe that the deliverances of 
the cognitive faculties so formed are actually veridical.  This reminds us of the stages of 
Plantinga’s argument that emphasize the difficulties of naturalism to account for the 
linkages between beliefs, propositions, truth and behavior.  Additionally, it is reminiscent 
of Plantinga’s contention that the trustworthiness of a cognitive source is important in 
determining the trustworthiness of beliefs downstream from the source.   
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    Interestingly, most of Lewis’s argument is given (or could be given) without 
reference to evolution.  When he does treat matters involving evolution, he does so 
mainly as a response to some perceived lines of rebuttal.  About evolutionary 
considerations, Lewis said:   
… It is agreed on all hands that reason, and even sentience, and life itself are late 
comers in Nature.  If there is nothing but Nature, therefore, reason must have 
come into existence by a historical process.  And of course, for the Naturalist, this 
process was not designed to produce a mental behavior that can find truth.  There 
was no Designer; and indeed, until there were thinkers, there was no truth or 
falsehood.  The type of mental behaviour we now call rational thinking or 
inference must therefore have been ‘evolved’ by natural selection, by the gradual 
weeding out of types less fitted to survive. 
Once then, our thoughts were not rational.  That is, all our thoughts once 
were … merely subjective events, not apprehensions of objective truth.  Those 
which had a cause external to ourselves were (like our pains) responses to stimuli.  
Now natural selection […works by] eliminating responses that were biologically 
hurtful and multiplying those which tended to survival.  But it is not conceivable 
that any improvement of responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or 
even remotely to do so.  The relation between response and stimuli is utterly 
different from that between knowledge and the truth known.  Our physical vision 
is a far more useful response to light than that of the cruder organisms which have 
only a photo-sensitive spot.  But neither this improvement nor any possible 
improvements we can suppose could bring it an inch nearer to being a knowledge 
of light.  It is admittedly something without which we could not have had that 
knowledge.  But the knowledge is achieved by experiments and inferences from 
them, not by refinement of the response … 
Besides natural selection there is, however, experience – experience 
originally individual but handed on by tradition and instruction.  It might be held 
that this, in the course of millennia, could conjure the mental behavior we call 
reason – in other words, the practice of inference – out of a mental behavior 
which was originally not rational … [But my] belief that things which are equal to 
the same thing are equal to one another is not at all based on the fact that I have 
never caught them behaving otherwise.  I see that it ‘must’ be so.
377
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Here we see Lewis arguing that it is difficult to see how evolution could bring 
about insight or knowledge through modification.  Jerry Fodor seems to express a similar 
idea when he says:   
… Perhaps I should mention … that I’m not actually an adaptationist about the 
mind; I doubt, that is, that Darwinism is true of the phylogeny of cognition.  For 
reasons I’ve set out elsewhere [
378
] I think our kinds of minds are quite likely 




 This difficulty, of seeing how insight could historically arise under naturalism, 
attends to relevant discussions involving either biological evolution and/or cultural 
evolution.  (Cultural evolution is also affected because the process of knowledge 
acquisition could never get off the ground in the first place).  The reason for this is that 
the very nature of insight or knowledge is too different than the materials that evolution 
originally had to work with.  Plantinga, in effect, makes the same point when he 
emphasizes the intractability (under naturalism) of ontologically accounting for 
propositions, truths, and beliefs, and the relationships of these entities to behavior.  We 
will see, below, that a similar argument arises from Richard Taylor’s contentions. 
 
An Argument by Richard Taylor     
      The relevant argument by Richard Taylor (from Chapter 11 of the 4
th
 edition of 
Metaphysics) follows below.
380
 Note that, although it may look at first glance like a case 
for the existence of God by way of a standard design argument, there is a slight twist.  As 
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will be seen, there will be something made of the relationship between rationality and 
natural forces that reminds one of Plantinga’s EAAN.
381
 
      Taylor’s argument begins by way of a couple of examples.  Here is the first one.  
Suppose you are riding on a train and, glancing out the window, you see white rocks on a 
small hillside near the train that are seemingly arranged into letters that read THE 
BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES.  You would probably not think 
that nature had assembled these stones into such a pattern.  Most likely you would not 
even question the fact that the stones had been purposely arranged to convey information.  
However, reflecting upon this, you note that you cannot prove that nature did not do it.  It 
is logically possible that, given enough time, the stones were rolled into precisely their 
current positions by way of natural operations.  You know from experience that 




      Now we come to the most important point to notice:   
… if, upon seeing from the train window a group of stones arranged as described, 
you were to conclude that you were entering Wales, and if your sole reason for 
thinking this, whether it was in fact good evidence or not, was that the stones 
were so arranged, then you could not, consistently with that, suppose that the 
arrangement of stones was accidental.  You would, in fact, be presupposing that 
they were arranged that way by an intelligent and purposeful being or beings for 
the purpose of conveying a certain message having nothing to do with the stones 
themselves.  Another way of expressing the same point is that it would be 
irrational for you to regard the arrangement of the stones as evidence that you 
were entering Wales, and at the same time to suppose that they might have come 
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to have that arrangement accidentally, that is, as the result of ordinary interactions 
of natural and physical forces.  If, for instance, they came to be so arranged over 
the course of time simply by their rolling down the hill, one by one, and finally 
just happening to end up that way, or if they were strewn upon the ground that 
way by the forces of an earthquake or storm or whatnot, then their arrangement 
would in no sense constitute evidence that you were entering Wales, or for 
anything else whatever unconnected with themselves.
383
 
   
        The second example goes like this:  say an archaeologist dug up a stone that had 
various marks on it, and all the marks were roughly about the same size and were 
arranged in rows.   It is of course possible that these marks had been made as a result of 
natural forces.  Even on the further supposition that the marks were found to be similar to 
a known ancient alphabet, that still would not necessarily destroy the hypothesis of a 
natural origin.  However, suppose a recognized scholar (having knowledge of the 
resembled language) translates the marks to read:  HERE KIMON FELL LEADING A 
BAND OF ATHENIANS AGAINST THE FORCES OF XERXES.  Now, of course, it is 
still logically possible that nature has produced the marks.
384
  But, as Taylor continues: 
The point to make again, however, is this:  If anyone having a knowledge of this 
stone concludes, solely on the basis of it, that there was someone named Kimon 
who died near where this stone was found, then he cannot, rationally, suppose that 
the marks on the stone are the result of the chance or purposeless operations of the 
forces of nature.  He must, on the contrary, assume that they were inscribed there 
by someone whose purpose was to record an historical fact.  If the marks had a 
purposeless origin, as from volcanic activity or whatnot, then they cannot reveal 
any fact whatever except, perhaps, certain facts about themselves or their origin.  
It would, accordingly, be irrational for anyone to suppose both that what is 
seemingly expressed by the marks is true, and also that they appeared as the result 
of nonpurposeful forces, provided the marks are his sole evidence for believing 
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      Now, our human bodies are exceedingly complex organisms (especially our 
cognitive faculties), much more so than the complexity displayed in an arrangement of 
rocks or marks as mentioned above.  (This is one of the standard facets of a typical design 
argument for the existence of God.)  However, in the considered opinions of many 
people, these complexities (and the seemingly purposeful composition of human beings) 
do not necessitate a non-natural explanation.
386
   
      However, there is an additional consideration that Taylor wants us to ponder: 
The important point, however, and one that is rarely considered is that we do not 
simply marvel at these [complex cognitive] structures, and wonder how they came 
to be that way … We, in fact, whether justifiably or not, rely upon them for the 
discovery of things that we suppose to be true and that we suppose to exist quite 
independently of those organs themselves.  We suppose, without even thinking 
about it, that they reveal to us things that have nothing to do with themselves, 
their structures, or their origins.  Just as we supposed that the stones on the hill 
told us that we were entering Wales – a fact having nothing to do with the stones 
themselves – so also we suppose that our senses in some manner “tell us” what is 
true, at least sometimes.  The stones on the hill could, to be sure, have been an 
accident, in which case we cannot suppose that they really tell us anything at all.  
So also, our senses and our faculties could be accidental in their origins, and in 
that case they do not tell us anything either.  But the fact remains that we do trust 
them, without the slightest reflection on the matter.
387
   
 
  
      The argument at this stage is depending upon the assumption that accidental and 
truth-displaying are not descriptions that go together to any great extent.  This does not 
seem to be an unreasonable assumption.  Someone might respond that naturalistic 
evolution does not produce accidental characteristics in organisms, because over a long 
period of time it produces traits well-suited for survival and reproduction.  But Taylor 
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means accidental in the sense of having nothing to do with intentional direction – and 
this, of course, naturalistic evolution does not have. 
  Now, not only does the fact that we trust our cognitive faculties in the way the we 
do inspire wonder, but additionally the basicality of many of our beliefs stemming from 
these faculties inspires curiosity:   
     Our seeing something is often thought to be, quite by itself, a good reason for 
believing that the thing exists, and it would be absurd to suggest that we infer this 
from the structure of our eyes as speculations upon their evolutionary origins.  
And so it is with our other faculties.  Our remembering something is often 
considered to be, quite by itself, a good reason for believing that the thing 
remembered did happen.  Our hearing a sound is often considered, quite by itself, 
a good reason for believing that a sound exists; and so on. 
     We are not here suggesting that our senses are infallible, nor even that we 
ought to rely upon their testimony.  The point is that … [w]e assume, rightly or 
wrongly, that they are trustworthy guides with respect to what is true, and what 
exists independently of our senses and their origins; and we still assume this, even 




      Once we have seen this, the last step of the argument is to assert the irrationality 
of depending upon cognitive faculties that have accidental, non-purposeful origins to 
deliver truths to us (the way that we do).  This is the most crucial part of the argument 
and it will remind us of both Lewis and Plantinga: 
We saw that it would be irrational for anyone to say both that the marks … on 
the stone had a natural, nonpurposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth 
with respect to something other than themselves, something that is not merely 
inferred from them … So also, it is now suggested, it would be irrational for one 
to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, nonpurposeful 
origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than 
themselves, something that is not merely inferred from them.  If their origin can 
be entirely accounted for in terms of chance variations, natural selection, and so 
on, without supposing that they somehow embody and express the purposes of 
some creative being, then the most we can say of them is that they exist, that they 
are complex and wondrous in their construction, and are perhaps in other respects 
interesting and remarkable.  We cannot say that they are, entirely by themselves, 
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reliable guides to any truth whatever, save only what can be inferred from their 
own structure and arrangement.  If, on the other hand, we do assume that they are 
guides to some truths having nothing to do with themselves, then it is difficult to 
see how we can, consistently with that supposition, believe them to have arisen by 





      After laying out the argument in such a fashion, Taylor tries to field the main 
objections to his argument.  He writes: 
At this point persons who have a deep suspicion of all such arguments as this, 
and particularly persons who are hostile to any of the claims of religion, are likely 
to seize upon innumerable objections of a sort that it would hardly occur to 
anyone to apply to our first two examples ...  Thus, it is apt to be said that our 
cognitive faculties are not so reliable as some would suppose, which is irrelevant 
… Or it is claimed that we rely on our cognitive faculties only because we have 
found them reliable in the past, and thus have a sound inductive basis for our 
trust, which is absurd, if not question-begging.
390
   
 
 
      The first criticism is deemed irrelevant because Taylor’s argument is about why 
we trust our cognitive faculties to point to truth when we think that they are indeed doing 
so.  It doesn’t matter that they aren’t always reliable as long as they are sometimes 
reliable.  The only way this objection would work is if they were never reliable, but then, 
how would one successfully lodge the objection (or any objection)?  
       Regarding the claim that we only trust our cognitive faculties because of past 
inductive evidence, Taylor further underscores the basicality of many of our beliefs: 
… The reason I believe there is a world around me is, quite simply, that I see it, 
feel it, hear it, and am in fact perpetually in cognitive contact with it, or at least 
assume myself to be, without even considering the matter.  To suggest that I infer 
its existence from the effects that it has within me, and that I find the inference 
justified on the ground that such inner effects have, in the past, been accompanied 
by external causes, is not only a ridiculous caricature but begs the question of 
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how, without relying upon my faculties, I could ever confirm such an idea in the 
first place.
391
   
 
      This seems to make it all the more unlikely that we came to value and trust the 
primary deliverances of our cognitive faculties in any inductive way, which would take 
away the threat of this objection. 
      Once again, like in the case with Lewis, we see that most of these arguments take 
place in a context where there is no reference to evolution.  Taylor does elsewhere very 
briefly address evolutionary concerns, but he also mainly does so in response to 
perceived objections (i.e., E is not part of the main argument).   Here is Taylor’s brief 
comment on an evolutionary concern regarding this argument: 
Again, it is sometimes said that the capacity to grasp truths has a decided value 
to the survival of the organism, and that our cognitive faculties have evolved, 
quite naturally, through the operation of this principle.  This appears farfetched, 
however, even if for no other reason than that our capacity to understand what is 
true, through reliance upon our senses and cognitive faculties, far exceeds what is 
needed for survival.  One might as well say that the sign on the hill welcoming 
tourists to Wales originated over the course of ages purely by accident, and has 
been preserved by the utility it was then found to possess.  This is of course 
possible, but also immensely implausible.
392
   
 
One might say, though, that Taylor has missed an important point here:  our 
capacity to grasp such truths (those beyond what mere survival would require) is a 
product of cultural evolution, not biological evolution.  However, such a retort seems still 
vulnerable to Lewis’s point, above: that it is hard to see how cultural evolution could 
produce something of the nature of “insight” and “knowledge” in the first instance, given 
the materials of biological evolution.
393
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Comparing the Arguments of Lewis and Taylor to Plantinga’s EAAN 
 To many observers, it might seem that Plantinga’s argument is simply a 
reworking of those of Lewis and Taylor.  It does seem that Plantinga’s argument depends 
upon some of the same crucial intuitions working in the other arguments;  whether that is 
helpful or hurtful to Plantinga depends upon what one thinks of those intuitions.  
However, it should be noticed that Plantinga’s argument is the only one that, using 
evolution as a given, tries to reveal an inherent defeater that flows from E when 
combined with N.  Looking into the nature of such a supposed defeater is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
























Some Thoughts on Defeaters Given the Probability Thesis 
 
 
Ernest Sosa points out that, in EAAN, it is E itself that, under N, yields a problem 
and highlights the difficulties surrounding the link between behavior and beliefs.  E, 
being so well-confirmed and currently the main game in town for those who hold N, 
leads to the surprising conclusion from its own premises.  Without E in the argument, you 
have an intuitional case about brute forces.  With E in the argument, you have the 
intuition about brute forces plus the purported indifference that natural selection has to 
truth (in that it is concerned with mere adaptability – see Chapter Three), the difficulty of 
naturalistically correlating brain states to truths, the mystery of the naturalistic 
evolutionary development of (and ontological status of) propositions, and so on. Sosa 
writes:  
After all, evolution cares fundamentally about adaptation and fitness.  If it cares at   
all about the truth of our beliefs, this will have to be because of how our true 
beliefs contribute to our adaptation and fitness.  But the probability that our true 
beliefs make any such contribution is low or at best inscrutable.  According to 
naturalist cognitive science, beliefs are brain states with cognitive content.  Their 
place in the causal order is thus at the juncture between afferent and efferent 
nerves.  But how then can the content or truth of a belief gain any purchase in the 
causal order?  It is presumably the physical, electrochemical properties of the 
brain and nervous system that link up with our sensory receptors on one side and 
with our muscles on the other, serving thus as causal intermediaries between 
perceptual stimulus and behavioral response.  It is those electrochemical 
properties that matter causally.  The propositional content of a belief thus seems 
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      Say then, for argument’s sake, that because of these types of considerations 
mentioned by Sosa, above, that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable.  But, asks Sosa, would 
this necessarily defeat many ordinary beliefs that we have?  Is a child irrational for 
forming ordinary beliefs about food and shelter?  Is someone walking down a lane who 
sees a stone and thinks this stone is smooth and would reliably roll down inclines 
irrational in thinking this?
395
  What about my belief that I now have an ache in my knee, 




      Plantinga would again bring up the differences between proper function defeaters, 
alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters.
397
  Plantinga is not saying that just any adherent 
of N has a defeater for these ordinary beliefs.  Plantinga acknowledges that, even after 
seeing the truth of the Probability Thesis, a person is still probably going to believe 
propositions about stones and hands, etc., because this is to go along with what proper 
function dictates.  However, according to Plantinga, the reflective naturalist would have 
an alethic defeater, and then a Humean defeater, because that person has been saddled 
with an undefeated defeater (which, however, she could be relieved of if she abandoned 
N).  If someone S does indeed have an undefeated defeater for a belief, Plantinga holds 
that B would not be warranted for S, and so B would not be an instance of knowledge.   
And, if the particular belief that is involved is R, then one would not have warrant for R, 
and so one would not have knowledge that R. 
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      Michael Bergmann wonders if one might argue that, although a reflective 
adherent of N might seem to be in trouble because of certain propositions she believes, 
she might still have enough nonpropositional knowledge about R to keep her from being 
in an irrational position.  (This will basically echo Sosa’s points about the reliably-rolling 
stone and the ache in the knee).   
What Bergmann is doing is granting that one can see that the Probability Thesis
398
 
is true, but still not have a defeater for R.  In formulating this argument, Bergmann 
depends heavily upon portions of Thomas Reid’s epistemology, which Bergmann 
summarizes like this:  
… (i) a belief can be noninferentially justified or warranted – that is, justified or 
warranted even if formed on the basis of an experience rather than on the basis of 
another belief … – and that (ii) among our noninferentially justified beliefs are a 
good number of our commonsense beliefs.
399
   
       
To begin to explicate his line of thinking, Bergmann uses an example from one of 
Plantinga’s own Reidian-style defenses which Plantinga uses elsewhere (i.e., outside of 
EAAN) regarding the Problem of Evil.  Plantinga thinks that even if a theist believed 
P(G/HE) is low (where G is God exists and HE is there are horrendous evils), this does 
not necessarily give the theist a defeater for G.  This is because even if G is unlikely on 
the total propositional evidence the theist has, she may have enough nonpropositional 
evidence (e.g., by way of the sensus divinitatis) to keep her belief in HE from rendering 
her belief in G irrational.
400
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      Here is a Plantingian example to illustrate how nonpropositional evidence might 
keep propositional evidence from defeating various beliefs:  suppose you are accused of 
stealing a letter, and that there is a very impressive amount of evidence amassed against 
you (in the form of an inductive argument to the conclusion that you stole the letter).  
This evidence includes: (1) you had a motive to steal it, (2) you have done similar things 
in the past, (3)eyewitnesses testify that you were in the area, and so on.  But you claim to 
have been on a walk in the woods (W) when the letter was stolen.  Now, everyone 
involved very reasonably believes that P(W/k) – where k is the total propositional 
evidence – is very low.  But you have a clear memory belief that you really were on a 
walk in the woods when the letter was stolen.  You know you did not steal the letter … 
don’t you?  So, here the nonpropositional evidence (by which you know W) keeps the 
relevant propositional evidence from rendering your belief in W (and your belief that 
you’re innocent) irrational or unjustified.  Likewise, Plantinga held, a theist might not 
have a defeater regarding the problem of evil if she had enough of the right kind of 
nonpropositional evidence. 
      Now what Bergmann wants to know is whether or not the same sort of defense is 
available to an adherent of N in the face of EAAN: she has strong nonpropositional 
evidence for R, and so the Probability Thesis need not threaten her with a defeater.  What 
is this nonpropositional evidence for R? 
      Here Bergmann builds upon Thomas Reid’s idea that we know R in a basic way 
(i.e., we do not know R based on other beliefs).  R is a first principle, and all first 
130 
 
principles are non-inferentially justified.
401
  We obtain knowledge of first principles 
through a part of our faculty of reason that Reid calls “common sense”.
402
  By “common 
sense” Reid does not mean beliefs that are formed by education, but because of our 
constitution.  Common sense beliefs can be necessary truths (e.g., logical axioms) or 
contingent truths (e.g., other humans have minds).
403
   
      Here is something important about how Reid says these kinds of beliefs are 
recognized: 
… We may observe, that opinions which contradict first principles are 
distinguished from other errors by this; that they are not only false, but absurd: 
and to discountenance absurdity, nature has given us a particular emotion, to wit, 
that of ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of 
countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice.
404
 
      
      So, beliefs in first principles, although they are not shored up by other beliefs or 
evidences, are supported by the fact that the denial of a first principle strikes one as 
absurd or ridiculous.
405
  With this groundwork being laid, Bergmann applies such Reidian 
thinking to the case of the naturalist who has accepted the truth of the Probability Thesis.  
This “commonsense naturalist” could reply to Plantinga as follows: 
… Even if a naturalist believed that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, this needn’t 
give her a defeater for R.  For she could have nonpropositional evidence for R that 
is sufficiently strong to make belief in R rational, reasonable, and warranted – 
even for someone whose total relevant propositional evidence, k, was such that 
P(R/k) is low or inscrutable.  The nonpropositional evidence she has could be of 
the sort Reid describes.
406
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      Now, this does not mean that Bergmann is proposing that R is altogether 
undefeatable.  One could still gain a defeater by, say, coming to believe that one is a 
victim of a Cartesian demon.  Or, in the Case of the Purloined Letter, you could come to 
believe that there was something wrong with your memory.  Similarly, a theist faced with 
the problem of evil might at first hold belief in God as a basic belief, but later become 
convinced that such a belief is really the result of wish fulfillment.
407
   
      Bergmann then considers the possibility that the examples in his Reidian 
response to EAAN are disanalogous to Plantinga’s response to the problem of evil.  This 
might be because of the differences between rebutting defeaters and undercutting 
defeaters.  Rebutting defeaters provide evidence for the falsity of some belief.  
Undercutting defeaters work by casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the source of 
some belief, and thereby defeat the belief by pointing to the tainted spring from which it 
comes.
408
   
      Unlike the case with undercutting defeaters, nonpropositional evidence can still 
be valuable in the face of a rebutting defeater – someone could still hold onto her belief 
B; she has merely become aware that something she believes (because of 
nonpropositional evidence) is unlikely on the basis of the propositional evidence that she 
has.  However, in the case of an undercutting defeater that casts doubt on B’s source, it is 
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hard to see how the nonpropositional evidence can rescue B.  The nonpropositional 
evidence also flows from the possibly infected source.
409
 
      In order to make these distinctions more clear, Bergmann analyzes in more detail 
the structure of arguments involving what he calls the Wish Fulfillment Defeater, the 
Memory Implant Defeater, and Plantinga’s N&E Defeater.  Then he contrasts these with 
the structure of the Problem of Evil Defeater in order to see if his cases are properly 
analogous. 
Freudian Defeater (Wish Fulfillment Defeater) for Theism 
  Because of the following beliefs: 
 
X:  The source of my belief that G (i.e., that God exists) is wish fulfillment 
  Y:  P(a belief source is reliable/it is a sort of wish fulfillment) is low or   
                 inscrutable 
 
it is reasonable to then doubt: 
 





Artificial-Memory-Implant Defeater for W 
 
Because of the following beliefs: 
 
X:  The source of my belief that W (i.e., that I was out for a walk in the 
woods at the time the letter was stolen) is artificial input by scientists who, 
as far as I know, have no particular interest in the beliefs so produced 
being true 
 
Y:  P(a belief source is reliable/it consists of input by scientists who, as far 
as I know, have no particular interest in the beliefs so produced being true) 
is low or inscrutable 
 
it is reasonable to then doubt: 
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Plantinga’s N&E Defeater for Naturalism 
 
Because of the following beliefs: 
 
X:  The sources of our beliefs (including my belief in naturalism) came 
about by way of N&E 
  Y:  P(a belief source is reliable/it came about by way of N&E) is low or   
                 inscrutable 
 
it is reasonable to then doubt: 
 





      In these arguments, belief in X and Y are supposed to usher in doubts about Z.  
Actually, in the Freudian case and the Memory Implant case, it is probably safe to say 
that most people would agree that one does indeed have a defeater because of the 
unreliable nature of the sources.  But does the next argument work in the same way? 
 Defeater for Theism from Evil 
  Because of the following beliefs: 
  X:  HE (i.e., there exists horrendous evil) 
  Y:  P(G/HE) is low or inscrutable 
  it is reasonable to doubt: 
  B:  G.
413
 
      Here, says Bergmann, is a rebutting defeater, one that directly casts doubt on a 
belief.  In the other three cases, an undercutting defeater indirectly defeats a belief by 
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casting doubt on the source of the belief.  Bergmann agrees that the Freudian 
undercutting defeater and the Memory Implant defeater would be successful even if one 
had nonpropositional evidence to support the belief in question.  However, he says that 
the nonpropositional evidence could come to one’s aid in the rebutting defeater case 
(involving the problem of evil).  So, if Plantinga’s EAAN argument is more like the 
Freudian and Memory Implant cases than it is like the Defeater for Theism from Evil, 




      To try to strengthen a Reidian defense, Bergmann maintains: 
     … it’s important to recognize that there is no reason to think that such 
defeaters [undercutting ones] will be successful if the person holding the 
threatened belief does not come to have doubts about the trustworthiness of its 
source.  So the question we need to ask ourselves is whether belief in X and Y in 
cases that are like the first three always requires the person holding the threatened 




      Bergmann thinks that there are cases where believing X and Y don’t cause you to 
doubt Z.  As an example, he uses the Straw-Drawing Case: 
  X:  The straw is drawn from the lottery straws. 
  Y:  P(straw is about three inches long/it is drawn from the lottery straws)  
is low or inscrutable. 
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Here the reason for your belief in Z is nonpropositional sensory evidence.  You 
have a proposition (Y) that casts doubt upon your belief, but you don’t have to let that 
lead you to question your sensory evidence or your source… you just learn that what you 
believe happens to be unlikely given your propositional evidence.  So, Bergmann says, 
this shows that even when you are faced with an argument with the same structure as the 
Freudian argument and the Memory Implant argument, you don’t necessarily need to 
have doubts about your belief.
417
 
      At this point, one might well ask whether Bergmann’s line of thinking is really 
appropriate; the straw case involves a rebutting defeater, and the Freudian and Memory 
cases involve undercutting defeaters.  Remember, Bergmann said that an argument (like 
the Freudian Wish Fulfillment case or like Memory Implant Case), involving an 
undercutting defeater for a belief in the reliability of some source S, could not be 
overturned by nonpropositional evidence.  Therefore, if Plantinga’s case against N is 
appropriately analogous to the undercutting defeaters in those cases, then Bergmann’s 
nonpropositional evidence approach would not succeed.   
To this, Bergmann says:  “… [notice that] the three undercutting defeaters (for G, 
for W, and for N)
418
 [still] involve rebutting defeaters for the belief that the source of the 
belief that G or W or N is reliable.”
419
  To explain further, he says: 
… the cases involving undercutting defeat work by way of a rebutting defeater for 
Z – the claim (in the Freudian and memory implant cases) that the source of the 
belief threatened with undercutting defeat is reliable.  And my point is that if this 
rebutting defeater doesn’t work, then the undercutting defeater that depends upon 
its success won’t work either.  So it is relevant to focus on rebutting defeaters 
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(like the straw-drawing case) that parallel the sort of rebutting defeater that plays 





     So, is Plantinga’s EAAN more like the straw case than it is like the Freudian or 
memory implant cases?  Bergmann says yes, because almost anyone who sees the truth of 
X and Y in the Freudian or memory implant cases will think Z to be extremely 
improbable.  But Plantinga doesn’t give an improbability argument, says Bergmann – he 
only gives an inscrutability argument:  “[t]he only persuasive reason Plantinga gives for 
thinking that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable is that P(R/N&E) is inscrutable.”
421
  
(Recall, though, that Plantinga thinks he has provided a disjunctive argument, based upon 
either inscrutability or low probability (the low probability disjunct stemming from the 
analysis of the five options of correlating beliefs and behavior.))
422
 
      In the straw case, Bergmann holds that the nonpropositional evidence (of memory 
and sense perception) trumps the probabilistic propositional case against Z.  This 
nonpropositional evidence keeps the propositional evidence against Z from being a 
possible defeater in the first place.  Similarly, says Bergmann, goes Plantinga’s argument.  
The strong nonpropositional evidence which a naturalist has for Z (which in this case is 
R) prevents the probabilistic evidence from even being considered.  Bergmann writes: 
… the evidence for Z in the Plantingian N&E case is as strong or stronger than it 
is in the Freudian and memory implant cases.  For it is natural and sensible to 
place much more confidence in R than in the reliability of the source of one’s 
belief that G or the trustworthiness (on that particular occasion) of the source of 
one’s belief that W.  As a result, less counterevidence is required to make it 
rational to mistrust the source of G or of W than is required to make it rational to 
doubt R. 
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     So, the evidence against Z is much weaker in the Plantingian N&E case than it 
is in either the Freudian or memory implant cases … [so it] is reasonable for the 
naturalist to believe R.  And all that her acceptance of X and Y does in that case is 
make it reasonable for her to think that something she knows to be true – namely, 





      Yes, but in Plantinga’s case Z is about all of your cognitive faculties, which 
crucially distinguishes it from the straw case.  The rescue in the straw case comes from 
only two faculties, sense perception and short-term memory.  Regarding EAAN, the way 
out of the dilemma (Bergmann style) is supposed to come from a Reidian type of 
common sense.  But you can’t use that if your common sense is in doubt.  Is one’s 
common sense in doubt because of the Probability Thesis?
424
   
Bergmann has granted (for argument’s sake) the truth of the Probability Thesis.  
This means that there is strong propositional evidence to doubt the reliability of your 
cognitive faculties.  “Cognitive faculties” includes the faculty of common sense.  But 
common sense is supposed to be the faculty that protects belief in R via nonpropositional 
evidence.  How can one trust the nonpropositional evidence if it, too, comes from the 
denigrated source?  There seems to be a kind of epistemic loop involved here. 
        This brings up again the circularity question that we have seen before, and, of 
course, Bergmann is well aware of it.  He begins to attempt to tackle this circularity issue 
by distinguishing between three different types of circularity: 
(1) logical circularity, 
(2) epistemic circularity involving source confidence, and  
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(3) Bergmann’s brand of Reidian circularity.425 
      An argument is logically circular ((1), above) when its conclusion is already 
contained in one of the essential premises.  An epistemically circular argument of type 
(2), above, is one in which a belief source produces beliefs which are used to restore lost 
confidence in that source.  Bergmann agrees that both of these types of circularity will 
make arguments infected with them vicious and argumentatively unimpressive.
426
  
However, he thinks his Reidian response ((3), above) displays a type of circularity which 
is not vicious because it involves basic justification: 
The reason belief in R can be maintained is that it is justifiably believed quite 
firmly in the basic way.  By employing her faculty of common sense, the person 
holding R comes to have very powerful nonpropositional evidence for R, which 
justifies her belief in it.  So R isn’t believed on the basis of a logically circular 
argument.  It isn’t held on the basis of an argument at all, since it is based on 





      But isn’t it true that in this case the Reidian move (type (3)) is really the same 
thing as type (2), since you have common sense vouching for itself?  No, says Bergmann:  
in type (3) common sense justifies belief in R, while in type (2) common sense is 
restoring lost confidence in R.  Bergmann writes: 
… although this is a case of a belief source vouching for its own trustworthiness 
… it is not a case of a belief source being depended upon to restore lost 
confidence in its own trustworthiness.  For the person in question does not have 
any doubts about the trustworthiness of common sense.  It’s true that if she did, 
then common sense would be of no help to her.
428
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      Bergmann buttresses this point with the fact that, if this kind of type (3) response 
isn’t available, then R cannot be justified for any position: naturalist, theist, or otherwise.  
“Not even God could form the belief that his ways of forming beliefs are trustworthy 
without relying on those ways of forming beliefs.”
429
  If this is so, then Bergmann says 
the really important question to ask is: 
… Should the believer in N&E, initially at least, doubt R once she learns that 
P(R/N&E) is inscrutable?  Or should her natural and sensible confidence in R 
remain high?  If the latter, then the epistemic circularity is of the third kind 




      Bergmann notes that another way of putting the question is to ask whether the 
response to EAAN involves a defeater-defeater (i.e., a defeater to defeat Plantinga’s 
defeater for R), or whether the response invokes something that keeps Plantinga’s 
defeater from working in the first place.
431
  Bergmann agrees that, once doubt in R has 
been thus engendered, nothing can work as a defeater-defeater.  However, he argues that 




One of Bergmann’s last shots at EAAN is to try to paint Plantinga’s argument as 
just another global skeptical argument.  He notes that a typical structure of these types of 
arguments goes like this: 
Typical Skeptical Argument to R   
                                                 
429
 Bergmann, in Beilby, 79.  He refers also to Plantinga, “Respondeo,” in Kvanvig, 342.  Here Plantinga 
says:  “Would God have an answer to the question ‘What is your reason for believing 2+1=3?’ I doubt it.  
He knows that 2+1=3 and that’s that; he doesn’t know it by way of some infinite chain of propositions, 
each his reason for the succeeding one.  But however things stand with God, it is clear that you and I do not 
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know that we know them.” 
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Because of the following beliefs: 
  X:  I currently have these experiences and beliefs 
  Y:  P(R/I currently have these experiences and beliefs) is inscrutable 
it is reasonable to doubt: 




      Bergmann’s point is that such an argument need not lead one to doubt R in his 
Reidian framework, because R is not believed because of an inference of the likelihood 
of R given such experiences.  R is believed in the basic way; one can have confidence in 
R.
434
  That is the main gist of Bergmann’s Reidian strategy regarding EAAN.   
Plantinga, in response, leans heavily upon something already referred to:  the 
difference between proper-function defeaters and alethic defeaters.
435
  Notice that, in 
order for a belief B to have warrant, two of the necessary conditions involved include: (a) 
that the belief is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, and (b) that the 
belief be produced by a module that is successfully aimed at truth.  Plantinga is ready to 
grant that the naturalist who sees the truth of the Probability Thesis may still be operating 
under proper function in believing R, and so does not have a proper function defeater. 
However, since such a naturalist cannot know that her basic belief in R is produced by a 
module successfully aimed at truth, Plantinga wants to insist that the reflective naturalist 
has an alethic defeater.  (He again refers to the case of the XX drug to buttress the point.) 
 
In cases like the XX case, the person who believes she has taken the drug will still 
believe R, but “only because of the presence and power of processes not aimed directly at 
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the production of true belief [but which instead are aimed at survival or carrying on].”
436
  
Likewise, if a person has, because of seeing the truth of the Probability Thesis, come to 
have doubts about R, she has the same difficulty trying to rescue R as does the person 
who has taken XX.  If someone has an alethic defeater because of the Probability Thesis, 
and additionally is reflective about her situation, then Plantinga maintains she also has a 
Humean defeater.  
Remember, in the case involving the hypothetical creatures we would withhold 
believing R with respect to them.
437
  Bergmann concedes this, but thinks that our 
nonpropositional evidence (of continuing to believe R) makes the conclusion involving 
us different from the conclusion that we would draw of the other creatures.  But Plantinga 
wants to know why would the fact that we continue to believe R give us any warrant for 
believing R?  Bergmann would say that we have warrant for R in the basic way, Reidian 
style, and very, very strong confidence in R.   
Now Plantinga has great affinity with Reid, and would agree that we can have 
(and do have) much confidence in R because of its basicality, but thinks that the 
reflective naturalist should have the right to that confidence stripped from him once he 
come to believe the Probability Thesis.  Again, this happens also, analogously, to the 
person who comes to believe that she has taken XX – confidence in R, or at least warrant 
for R based on its basicality, is now eroded.  Plantinga writes: 
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and suppose these creatures have arisen by way of the selection processes endorsed by 
contemporary evolutionary thought. What is the probability that their faculties are reliable? What is 
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True … he [the naturalist in question] also has this strong impulse to continue to 
believe or assume R.  But (as in the above case of the person who believes she’s 
ingested XX) he can’t take that as evidence for his reliability; no doubt he would 
have that inclination to believe R whether or not it is true … but can he, in this 
circumstance, take the strength of that inclination as measuring the degree of 
warrant R has for him?  I think not.  That is because R has warrant for him only if 
it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly and successfully aimed 
at the production of true belief.  But of course he can’t sensibly suppose that his 
cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at the production of true belief.  For he 
realizes that they are successfully aimed at the production of true belief only if 
they are in fact reliable; and of course that is precisely the question at issue.  So he 
can’t sensibly take it that his cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at truth.  
Further, he also realizes that if N&E is true, there is no reason to think his 
cognitive faculties are aimed at the production of true belief at all, whether 
successfully or not.  (For example, if his beliefs supervene on neurophysiological 
processes plus environmental condition, they are presumably not aimed at 
anything at all; they are more like what Stephen Jay Gould calls a spandrel.)  
Therefore he can’t suppose that his beliefs have warrant.  And hence he can’t 
sensibly follow Bergmann in thinking that he has nonpropositional evidence for R 
– evidence strong enough to overwhelm the defeating tendencies of his belief in 




Note that when Plantinga says “he can’t sensibly suppose that his cognitive 
faculties are successfully aimed at the production of true belief”, Plantinga doesn’t mean 
to say that the issue at hand is mainly about the adherent of N’s justification of his belief 
in R;  the issue is whether or not R has warrant now for that person.  A person might be 
justified in a belief (in the sense of the person’s faculties and volitions are good) and that 
person still not have warrant for a belief (because that belief is, in fact, false).  Warrant, 
as defined by Plantinga, is the factor which makes a true belief count as knowledge; so, in 
order for a person to have warrant for a belief, that belief must first be true.  Now this 
might seem to be in conflict with something Plantinga has said earlier about proper 
function.  But really, it’s not, because in effect Plantinga is saying that sometimes our 
proper function beliefs, although understandable, are not warranted.  And his classic case 
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for this is illustrated in the story about the XX drug.  The person still believes R, but no 
longer has warrant for R.  And we can see that she doesn’t have warrant for R.  How can 
we see this?  We can see this because we can see that, because of the drug’s effect, it is 
probable for her that she will have a false belief about something even as basic as R. 
 Here is perhaps the crucial element to look at in the exchange between Plantinga 
and Bergmann.  Bergmann would probably agree that we can all see that the person 
taking the XX drug might still believe R but not have warrant for R.  But, Bergmann 
might ask, what exactly is it that makes Plantinga’s XX case supposedly analogous to the 
kind of maneuvers involved in the Probability Thesis? 
 Plantinga might reply that what makes the two cases analogous is that in both 
cases we notice that a person has been put in a scenario that a rational outside observer 
could see that the person has lost warrant for the basic belief in R.  In the XX case, it is 
the usual effect of the drug that erodes warrant.  In the case of the Probability Thesis, it is 
in noticing the circular nature of the propositions that are associated with N when coupled 
with E. 
      To unpack this a bit, let’s think more deeply about just what it is that makes one 
lose warrant in the XX case.  Plantinga agrees that the person might be behaving 
according to proper function in believing R even though she has taken XX.  So, in one 
sense of the word, she is still “justified” in believing R. But, according to Plantinga, 
something about her belief in R, since taking the drug, is now changed.  And that is:  her 
right to believe in R alethically.  In other words, she can still believe R pragmatically, but 
has now lost the right to believe that R “really is the case”. 
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  Now, in one version of the XX case, there is still a 10% chance that R, even after 
taking XX.  Therefore, her belief in R, even after taking the drug, might be justified 
regarding proper-function and might be justified alethically, too (if she is in the 10% 
group that is still reliable).  So, in this case, whether she has warrant depends upon 
whether or not she is in the 10% group.  But Plantinga wants to say that even if she is in 
the 10% group, her right to believe in R alethically has been taken away.  So, she is in a 
position where she only has pragmatic confidence in R.  Plantinga thinks this is a bad 
position to be in regarding R.  What can she, the victim, do to recover more than 
pragmatic confidence in R?  Well, it is hard to think of any evidence she might be able to 
use, because that evidence will have to be sifted through the source in question that, in all 
probability, has been tainted.  The moral of this story … don’t take XX, because, until it 
wears off (if it wears off, and if it hasn’t done any permanent damage), you have lost 
something precious … you have lost the ability to have knowledge of R.  Now, it may be 
true that R; but, even if that is the case, if you have taken XX, you have lost the 
knowledge of R (unless possibly you are in the 10% group … but then, how could you be 
objectively sure that you were?).  And Plantinga thinks that’s bad. 
Now, how should this be analogous with the Probability Thesis (PT)?  Plantinga 
thinks that, like taking the XX drug, combining N with E and seeing PT results in a 
similar dissolution of knowledge of R.  Before combining N with E (and even afterwards 
if one hasn’t reflected on PT) one possibly could have warrant to believe R as a basic 
belief.  However, upon reflection and seeing PT, one loses warrant to believe R as a basic 
belief and therefore loses knowledge of R.   
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What is it that causes one to lose knowledge?  In the XX case, it was the probable 
effect of the drug that made it so that a rational outside observer could see that knowledge 
of R has been lost.  In the case of EAAN and the Probability Thesis, it is the circular 
nature of the resulting string of propositions … one comes to see that there is simply no 
evidence that one could present to get out of the muddle.  (This is because, again, this 
evidence would have to be sifted through the source under suspicion; propositional 
evidence or nonpropositional evidence.) 
Question: can one have knowledge without having warrant for a belief?  Under 
Plantinga’s definition of warrant, the answer is no.  The reason is because warrant is the 
entity that transforms mere true belief into knowledge. 
             Moving to Bermann’s charge that EAAN is just another version of some global 
skeptical argument, let’s look again at the supposed general structure of such an 
argument: 
 
Typical Skeptical Argument to R   
Because of the following beliefs: 
  X:  I currently have these experiences and beliefs 
  Y:  P(R/I currently have these experiences and beliefs) is inscrutable 
it is reasonable to doubt: 





Plantinga agrees that just believing X and Y doesn’t give one a defeater.  He 
writes: 
 
If, for R to be warranted for me, I had to infer it from my present experiences, 
then R will have warrant for me only if it is probable with respect to those 
experiences.  But clearly that is not how warrant [in the case of the types of basic 
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beliefs at issue] works.  My memory beliefs (let’s assume) have warrant for me; 





But EAAN isn’t an argument based along those lines anyway.  Plantinga is not 
arguing that R is in trouble because it is not probable based upon one’s current beliefs 
and experiences.  Plantinga has granted all along that we can have the knowledge of R.
441
  
EAAN is, however, an argument that the knowledge of R comes to be in jeopardy when it 
is put in the framework of N and conjoined with belief in E.  The belief in N&E (when 
seen through the Probability Thesis) is itself supposed to generate the Humean dialectical 
loop for the reflective naturalist, who then cannot use argumentation to solve the muddle 
now present.  Nor can the reflective naturalist use Bergmann’s Reidian method to appeal 
to nonpropositional evidence to allay the fears about R, since one cannot be at all sure 
that this method is aimed at truth; perhaps it is only part of a proper function mechanism 
to enable one to carry on when presented with an argument threatening noetic disaster.  
So, EAAN is no global skeptical argument … it is a very particular argument working 
within a certain metaphysical worldview, (N), when combined with a certain other 
theory, (E).  Perhaps an extended summary of EAAN would make it more clear that it is 
not a global skeptical argument, and also will aid in helping readers to see where their 
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An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form, with 
Discussion of Premises (1) through (6) 
 
In this chapter I summarize EAAN, putting it in logical form.  I will discuss, in 
some detail, matters that lead to and affect the first contentious premise, which is 
SUMMARY Premise (3).   
                    
Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form (SUMMARY) 
Here is Plantinga’s EAAN, summarized by me into an argument with 23 premises.
442
 
(1)  Given N&E,
443
 there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,  
       regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior: 
 
  (a)  epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors); 
                        (b)  semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and    
                               behaviors, but no causal links);  
                        (c)   a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but  
                               have maladaptive results; 
                        (d)  a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an  
                               adaptive way [premise]. 
 
(2)  P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & N&E) is low [obvious].
444
 
(3)  P(R/(d) & N&E) is inscrutable [premise].
445
 
(4)  So P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & N&E) is low or inscrutable [1, 2, 3]. 
(5)  P(R/N&E) = P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & N&E) [1, 4]. 
 
(6)  P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable [4, 5]. 
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from those false beliefs looks like it has come from true beliefs.  This is Plantinga’s point about Paul, the 
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      (7)  If P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be  
             high [premise]. 
 
       (8)  A “reflective adherent of N&E” (RA) believes N&E and knows anything that  
                   is soundly deduced in this argument [definition]. 
  
 (9)  RA knows P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8]. 
 
(10)  If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source  




(11)  RA lacks warrant for believing R [9, 10]. 
 
(12)  RA’s holding of the proposition RA lacks warrant for believing R is  
         epistemically inconsistent with RA’s simultaneously holding the proposition   
         R [obvious].  
 
 (13)  For any person S, when some proposition p known by S is epistemically  
                     inconsistent with simultaneously holding q, then S has a defeater d for q  








(15)  If RA knows that she has a defeater d for R because of doubts about the  
         source of R, then RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional     
         evidence, since any such evidence would have to come from the cognitive  
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447
There are different kinds of defeaters (e.g., rationality defeaters, rebutting defeaters, undercutting 
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rationality defeater goes like this:  “D is a purely epistemic [i.e., purely alethic] defeater of B for S at t iff 
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cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the 
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maximization of true belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic structure 
is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger that D, 
would withhold B (or believe it less strongly).”  Plantinga, in Beilby, 209. 
448
 “… you can’t properly assuage that doubt by giving yourself an argument; for you will, or will if you 
are proceeding rationally, have the same doubt about the truth of the premises of the argument, as well as 
your belief that if the premises are true, so is the conclusion.  In the EAAN case then: if you accept 
naturalism and the Probability Thesis and as a result come to doubt or wonder whether R is true, you 




(16)  RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional evidence [10, 11, 14,  




(17)  RA cannot defeat d by way of non-propositional evidence [argued for in  




(18)  d can be defeated only by evidence [premise]. 
 
(19)  d is an undefeated defeater of R for RA [16, 17, 18]. 
 
 (20)  One cannot rationally
451
 believe a proposition for which one has an  
               undefeated defeater [premise]. 
 
 (21)  RA cannot rationally believe R [19, 20]. 
 
  (22)  If one cannot rationally believe R, then one cannot rationally believe  
               anything [premise]. 
 
 (23)  RA cannot rationally believe N [21, 22]. 
 
 
Commentary on the Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form (SUMMARY) 
  
EAAN touches on so many areas that it is often difficult to pinpoint the real 
area(s) of contention.  One of the most helpful aspects of the Extended Summary of 
EAAN in Logical Form (hereafter SUMMARY) is that it helps someone to see precisely 
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where she might have problems with EAAN.  Now that the argument is in the form of the 
SUMMARY, I would like to make some detailed comments. 
The SUMMARY
452
 is a blend of some different versions of EAAN, culminating 
in Plantinga’s presentation in the book Naturalism Defeated?
 453
  However, Plantinga 
later put out a more streamlined version of EAAN in Knowledge of God (KOG).
454
  The 
Probability Thesis (Premise (6) of the SUMMARY) is arrived at differently in KOG than 
in the other versions reflected in the SUMMARY.  However, after SUMMARY Premise 
(6), the argument in KOG runs similarly to the other versions of EAAN.  
 
Premises (1) and (2) of the SUMMARY  
 (1)  Given N&E, there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,  
       regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior: 
 
  (a)  epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors); 
                        (b)  semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and    
                               behaviors, but no causal links);  
                        (c)   a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but  
                               have maladaptive results; 
                        (d)  a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an  
                               adaptive way.   
 
(2)  P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & N&E) is low. 
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 says that, given N&E, there are four main alternatives concerning 
how our beliefs are connected with our behavior.  Maybe it ought to say that these are the 
alternatives given N&E&K, where K represents a set of relevant background beliefs.  
(This seems necessary in order to take into account all of the relevant total evidence.  It 
would be hard to estimate any of the probabilities without this other evidence, because no 
one believes merely N&E.) 
 Whose background evidence would be at issue?  Not just anyone’s, presumably 
(e.g., not a child’s background evidence); maybe it’s the background evidence of a 
rational adult person. But what kind of person is a “rational” adult person?  Plantinga 
states in WPF that “… [w]hile we may not be thinking of a veritable Mozart of 
probabilities, we are not thinking of your average probability duffer, either … When it 
comes to the deliverances of reason, what counts is the best, or nearly the best, that 
human beings can do.”
456
  
Or maybe it’s not the just the background evidence of a rational adult person that 
we need, but some proposition stating that K is the collective background evidence of 
humanity with respect to the current state of human knowledge (i.e., K at tx).  This would 
appear to be consistent with Plantinga’s argument, as E is a proposition about 
contemporary evolutionary theory.   
Background beliefs are, of course, based upon evidence.  In the first of two full 
chapters of WPF where Plantinga discusses conditional probability,
457
 he makes a 
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distinction between first-level evidence and second-level evidence.  First-level evidence 
involves things like memory, perception, etc..
458
  “Propositional evidence is second-level 
evidence”, he says.
459
  Your belief that you are watching a bird fly near your window is 
based upon first-level, non-propositional evidence.  Your belief that the bird that you saw 
was probably a grackle (since it looks like the grackles you learned about in school) 
involves second-level, propositional evidence.   
 The probabilities in EAAN are conditional probabilities involving the relations 
between certain propositions that are informed by numerous background beliefs, which 
themselves contain beliefs based upon a myriad of first-level and second-level evidences.  
Plantinga knows that these first-level and second-level evidences are intimately involved 
with the beliefs N and E.  I think that the reason that something like K does not appear in 
Plantinga’s argument is because Plantinga is assuming that competent readers of EAAN 
know that the needed background evidences (non-propositional and propositional) are 
built-in already into N&E.   
For instance, it should be assumed that whatever background beliefs one must 
have in order to believe N (e.g., I (the reader) exist, naturalism is a philosophical theory, 
etc.), then those beliefs are already crucial parts of N.  Therefore, you don’t need an 
additional component (i.e., K) in proposition N.  Likewise, whatever background beliefs 
one must have to believe E, it should be assumed that those beliefs are already contained 
in E as crucial parts of E. 
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So, given N&E (with K built-in), Premise (1)(a) says that there are four relevant 
scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive, regarding how our beliefs might be connected with 
our behavior.  Premise (2) makes a probability assessment given certain features of 
Premise (1).  What kind of probability is at issue here?  Since it involves relations 
between propositions, it will be one of the types of epistemic probability.  However, there 
are a number of different epistemic probability theories on offer.   
 In WPF, Plantinga writes:  
… The term ‘epistemic probability’ is used variously by various authors.  I shall 
use it to refer to the relationship between a pair of propositions A and B when A is 
evidence, propositional evidence, for B.  More precisely, in those cases I shall say 
that the epistemic conditional probability of B on A is high … Our question is: 
what is the relation between a pair of propositions A and B when the epistemic 
conditional probability of A on B is high?  What kind of account or analysis can 




     Plantinga divides theories of epistemic probability into basically three categories:  
(1) personalist (Bayesian),
461
 (2) logical (à la Keynes, Carnap, and Swinburne), and (3) 
what he calls the “statistical account”, which seeks to “derive epistemic probability from 
the statistical syllogism” (e.g., Kyburg).
462
  The problem, for his purposes, with the first 
of these (the Bayesian understanding) is that under this view probabilities are relative to 
persons (i.e., the probability figures change according to the belief sets of different 
people).  But Plantinga is looking for a conditional probability that is not relative to 
persons.   
                                                 
460
 Plantinga, WPF, 139. 
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 Plantinga, WPF, 142.  He refers the reader to his discussion in WCD, chapter 6 and 7. 
462
 Plantinga, WPF, 142. 
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That fact in itself may not seem to be a good reason for Plantinga to abandon a 
Bayesian take on EAAN.   A Bayesian approach, under the most competent, rational 
judges, may end up (for all practical purposes) with the same conclusion to EAAN as 
Plantinga’s desired logical approach.  There are, however, other reasons that Plantinga 
steers away from the Bayesian approach that have to do with his overall account of 
“warrant”.
463
  He feels that Bayesianism generally cannot provide the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for warrant.
464
  
The third category, which he deems “Kyburgian”, is an effort to “derive epistemic 
probability from known statistics”, and it, too, turns out (for various reasons) to not be fit 
for Plantinga’s purposes in EAAN.
465
 
 Plantinga then considers at length the issues surrounding the middle category of 
epistemic conditional probability, which is logical probability (hereafter LP).  This is the 
category in which Plantinga’s EAAN attempts to work, in spite of the problems of LP 
which are well-known among probability theorists. 
 Plantinga says of LP: 
the heart and soul of the theory would be that for any pair of propositions, there is 
a definite and logically necessary relationship of probability between them, a 
relationship that conforms to the probability calculus … [o]n the logical 
interpretation, a probability statement of the form P(A/B) = n is not first of all an 
epistemic statement about what is or is not sensible or rational or acceptable or 
warranted; it simply records a necessary, objective, quasi-logical fact about A and 
B.  Probability thus construed has nothing to do with partial belief, or uncertainty, 
or lack of knowledge, or observed frequencies.  The truth of a probability 
statement in no way depends upon what anyone knows or believes, or upon any 
                                                 
463
 Again, “warrant” for Plantinga is that “… elusive quality or quantity enough of which, together with 
truth and belief, is sufficient for knowledge …”. Plantinga, WPF, v.  
464
 See chapters 6 and 7 of Plantinga, WCD. 
465
 Plantinga, WPF, 152.  For various problems with the Kyburgian account, see pp. 151-158. 
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other contingent state of affairs.  God may not need probability; nevertheless, he 
knows
[466]
 the value of P(A/B) for any propositions A and B.
467
   
  
LP theory is attractive because, for a great many pairs of propositions, it seems to 
be “the sober truth”.  He writes: 
… [in many cases] there does seem to be a relationship of probability between the 
propositions in question, and it also seems to be necessary that there is the 
relation in question … It seems intuitively obvious that the proposition Feike can 
swim is probable with respect to the proposition 9 out of 10 Frisians can swim 
and Feike is a Frisian.  Furthermore, that this relation obtains between them does 
indeed seem necessarily true; it is at best extremely hard to see how it could be 




Some very important issues concerning logical probabilities include questions 
like: 
(1) are there really, ontologically speaking, these kinds of relations between 
propositions? 
(2) if there are, precisely how are the objective and normative components of 
epistemic probability related?  
(3) since it is unlikely that there are “only finitely many possible worlds”, if 
logical probability is thought of in terms of the proportion of A worlds among 
B worlds (i.e., divide “worlds in which both A and B are true by worlds in 




                                                 
466
 That is, assuming that there is a probability to know. 
467
 He additionally says:  The relationship in question, furthermore, conforms to the calculus of 
probabilities; so if A entails B, then B has a probability of 1 on A and necessary truths have a probability of 
1 on any evidence.  Plantinga, WPF, 144-145. 
468
 Plantinga, WPF, 145. 
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There is a lengthy discussion of these matters in WPF, and going into too much 
detail here will take me too far afield from my purposes.
 470
  But, summarily, Plantinga 
ends up concluding the following, below. 
First of all, concerning the ontological status of the relations proposed by LP, 
Plantinga says: 
According to this idea … for any pair of propositions A and B,
 471
 there is the 
probability of A on B
[472]
 … This relationship is a necessary, objective, quasi 
logical fact about A and B … if we think in terms of possible worlds [and 
entailment], A entails B just if B is true in every world in which A is true.  We can 
also think of P(A/B) as something like the proportion of worlds in which both A 
and B are true among B worlds.  If there were only finitely many possible worlds, 
we could think of P(A/B) as the quotient of the number of A&B worlds [divided] 
by the number of B worlds.  But of course it seems unlikely that there are only 




Some people have denied that such probability relations exist, given various 
problems associated with the idea of logical probability.
474
  Plantinga thinks, however, 
that that would overestimate the state of things:  “There is such a thing as logical 
probability, even if we run into difficulties involving infinite sets of propositions, and 
even if our grasp of this relation among propositions is tenuous in the extreme.”
475
  And 
there are a good number of intuitively clear cases of LP that give it respectability in the 
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 See Plantinga, WPF, 144-151. 
471
 This is qualified later … there may not be a probability for some relations between propositions (e.g., 
there may not be a probability associated with Feike can swim on China is a large country). 
472
 Assuming that the intrinsic probability of B is non-zero. 
473
 Plantinga, KOG, 158. 
474
 Discussed by Plantinga in various chapters of WPF, and also KOG, 158-164. 
475
 Plantinga, KOG, 160. 
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midst of the difficulties (e.g., Feike can swim is obviously probable on 9 out of 10 
Frisians can swim and Feike is a Frisian).
476
   
The logical theorist need not insist that “all pairs of propositions fall within the 
field of logical probability” (e.g., the logical probability theorist need not insist that there 
is a probability figure associated with the pair of propositions Feike can swim on China is 
a large country, although there might be one).
477
   
 About the second concern regarding the normativity issue, Plantinga states that 
there does typically
478
 seem to be a relation between the objective component of logical 
probability and the normative component (i.e., what is the rational, appropriate, right 
thing to think given the objective probability figure), although it is very difficult to say 
exactly what this relation is.
479
  Take the propositions concerning Feike, above.  If it is 
objectively likely that Feike can swim given that Feike is a Frisian and 9 out of 10 
Frisians can swim, then the right thing (the rational thing, the proper thing, the 
appropriate epistemic stance to take) is to believe that it is highly likely that Feike can 
swim.  In situations like these, if we know the objective probability to be high, then the 
                                                 
476
 Plantinga, WPF, 150. 
477
 Plantinga, WPF, 150.  This issue will come up again, below; if there is not a probability for the 
relationship between the propositions in the Probability Thesis, the logical form of the argument will not 
work (at least before Premise (9)). 
478
 But not always.  See Plantinga, WPF, p. 163. 
479
 Plantinga, WPF, 150.  Various subtleties are addressed on pp. 168-175.  Plantinga says that “[t]he rough 
idea, then, is that the normative component of the conditional epistemic probability of A on B is the interval 
containing the degrees of belief a rational person could have in A, provided she believed B and was aware 
that she believed B, considered the evidential bearing of B on A, had no other sources of warrant for B or its 
denial, and had no defeater for the warrant, if any accruing to A or its denial by virtue of being thus 
believed on the basis of B.”  Plantinga, WPF, 167-168.   
158 
 
right propositional attitude one should have in the matter should be one of great 
confidence.
480
   
What is the connecting principle that forms the bridge between the objective and 
normative aspects?  Plantinga knows that this is a difficult question, but says that this 
connection comes by way of something “in the neighborhood of Miller’s Principle”.
481
  
(Plantinga also realizes that judgments of epistemic probability don’t always have tight 
connections between objective and normative aspects.)
482
   
About the third category concerning infinities, Plantinga thinks that problems 
with infinities need not necessarily scrap the whole theory: 
… The probability calculus applies neatly and easily to the finite case, the case of 
proportions in finite classes. It is harder to see how things go in the case of 
infinite magnitudes, and the greater the cardinality, the harder it is to see how 
things go.  But perhaps this is just a reflection of the more general truth that 
infinite magnitudes present real problems of understanding.  Cantor’s Paradise is 
indeed seductive; but that paradise, like others, is not well understood.  If so, the 
fact that infinite magnitudes present problems against the logical theory of 




So, the probability figures that Plantinga aims to attain for EAAN are epistemic, 
in the area of logical probability (qualified), have objective components and normative 
components, and are thought by him to be useful in spite of various problems. 
How precise do the probability figures need to be in EAAN, especially in these 
first six premises of the SUMMARY?  As I see it, Plantinga basically has four options in 
                                                 
480
 Plantinga, WPF, 165ff. 
481
 Plantinga, KOG, 39.  In WPF, 163, Plantinga characterizes Miller’s Principle this way:  “the epistemic 
conditional probability of a proposition A on the supposition that the objective probability of A is x, is x.”  
See Plantinga, WPF, 39, note 7. 
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483
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which to present the probabilities associated with the scenarios in Premise (1).  The 
probabilities can be taken to be numerical, non-numerical, or inscrutable to us (but 
possibly known by other cognizers),
484
 or it may be that there are no probabilities 
associated with the relevant propositions.   
Since Plantinga revises somewhat (in Knowledge of God) the way that he argues 
for the numerical option, I have divided the first option into two sub-options.  The first 
sub-option will consider the numerical argument before KOG, and the second sub-option 
will discuss the numerical argument in KOG. 
 
Numerical Probabilities, Part 1:  the Earlier Versions of EAAN
485
 
 If someone (i.e., a person who is reflectively considering EAAN) wanted to put a 
number on the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given Premise (1)(a), I 
would think that most people would give it an extremely low number.  If 
epiphenomenalism is the case, the likelihood that our cognitive faculties are reliably 
pointed at truth (given that we have been selected on account of adaptive behaviors that 
are not linked in any way to beliefs) would seem extremely low.  Since our beliefs are not 
correlated with our behaviors, the relationship between our beliefs and our behaviors is 
more or less at random.  Given this, we know that there are vastly more ways for beliefs 
to be unreliable
486
 than there are for beliefs to be reliable.  Therefore, under Premise 
(1)(a), it is more likely than not that our beliefs are unreliable. 
                                                 
484
 E.g., angels, or God, traditionally defined. 
485
 See footnote 482. 
486
 I.e., they do not correspond (point to, relate to, link to) most of the time to true states of affairs. 
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 Concerning Premise (1)(b), we have links between beliefs and behaviors, but no 
causal links.  Once again, most people would agree that the probability that our cognitive 
faculties are reliable, given that we have been selected for behavior which is not even 
causally connected to our beliefs, would be a miniscule number (for the same reason as 
(1)(a)). 
 Premise 1(c) describes a situation where there are links between our beliefs and 
our behavior, but with maladaptive results.  Once again, any number that we are seeking 
to put on the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable on this scenario would be 
still very small.  (Remember that Plantinga had, in an early version of EAAN, put a 
figure of .2 to the P(R/N&E) under the scenarios of 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) combined.)
487
 
 This leaves SUMMARY Premise 1(d) to be the only hope for Plantinga’s 
opponent to be able to defend some significantly large number for the relevant 
probability.  Here beliefs and behaviors are causally related, so it would seem (since the 
associations are no longer more or less at random) that one could get a promising figure 
for reliability.  It might even be very high. 
However, regarding this point, Plantinga gave an argument that there are an 
infinite number of belief/behavior pairings where the behaviors are based upon false 
beliefs but are nonetheless adaptive.
488
  If this argument holds, then we seem to be in a 
similar situation as in premises (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c) … there are vastly more possible 
ways for belief/behavior pairings to be based upon false beliefs and still be adaptive than 
                                                 
487
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to be based upon true beliefs.  Looked at this way, if you wanted to put a number on this, 
it should be very low.   
Two paragraphs ago, the figure we were looking for regarding (1)(d) looked like 
it could be high.  If one buys the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairing Argument, though, it 
looks like it would be low.  If one does not accept Plantinga’s Indefinite Belief/Behavior 
Pairing Argument, then one probably would say it would be high.  Since it could be high, 
or it could be low, or it could be anywhere in-between, it looks like the appropriate stance 
then would be inscrutability. 
This leaves one with very low figures for 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) [which is Premise 
(2)] along with an inscrutable number for 1(d) [which is Premise (3)].  Combining all of 
these gives you Premise (4), from which it follows after an identity thesis in (5) that you 
get the Probability Thesis [Premise (6)]. 
That was the manner in which Plantinga argued “numerically” for the first part of 
EAAN in the earlier versions before his book Knowledge of God was published.  
However, in KOG, he offers a simpler, more streamlined numerical case, to which I now 
turn. 
  
Numerical Probabilities, Part 2: the Version of EAAN in KOG 
Here is the way in KOG that Plantinga argues for the terrain of the argument that 
is reflected in the first six premises of the SUMMARY.  He has two arguments:  one 
argument that P(R/N) is low via the Principle of Indifference, and another argument that 
P(R/N) is inscrutable.  These two separate arguments are then combined, and then we 
162 
 
have P(R/N is low or inscrutable), the familiar Probability Thesis.  In terms of my 
SUMMARY, in KOG Plantinga has streamlined things to get quickly to Premise (6), and 
then the rest of the argument runs practically the same way.
489
 
To begin the numerical part of the argument in KOG, Plantinga does not offer the 
four scenarios contained in Premise (1).  Instead, he begins with the thought experiment 
(that we have seen before) about a hypothetical species, cognitively similar to ourselves: 
 … [These creatures] exist in a world in which there is no such person as God or 
 anything like God [i.e., naturalism holds for them].  Our question, then, is this:  
 what is the probability that their cognitive faculties are reliable?  Consider any 
 particular belief … [of the creatures.]  That belief, of course, is a neural structure 
 of a given sort, and one sufficiently complex to generate content.  We may add, if 
 we like, that this structure occurs or takes place in response to something in the 
 environment; perhaps it is a certain pattern of firing of neurons in the optical 
 portion of the brain, and perhaps this pattern arises in response to the appearance 
 of a predator in the middle distance.  And a certain proposition has somehow 
 come to be associated with this structure, so that the structure acquires belief 
 content and is a belief.   





 Plantinga thinks that in order to come up with a probability figure here, we first 
need to ask: what is a belief?  A belief (given naturalism) is (at least) a neuronal event.
491
  
What is the content of the belief?  Where does the content come from, and why is it that 
that content is associated with that particular belief, and that that particular belief is 
associated with that specific neurophysiological state?
492
   
                                                 
489
 There is a minor adjustment in the defeater wording.  In KOG, it now runs like this (adapting a form by 
Michael Rea and adjusted for the inscrutability example): “B is a defeater for A, for S, if (but not only if) 
(1) S sees that P(A/B) is low [or inscrutable], and (2) there is no experience E [that] S has or proposition P 
(distinct from A) S believes such that the epistemic probability of A on B&E or B&P is high.”  Plantinga, 
KOG, 46, 48, note 63. 
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In KOG, Plantinga says that the current two main materialistic options
493
 
regarding this content are that either (1) “content supervenes upon NP 
[neurophysiological] properties”, or that (2) “content is reducible to NP properties.”
494
  
 After a discussion of various considerations, including some differences between 
weaker and stronger forms of supervenience, Plantinga concludes (as in earlier versions 
of EAAN) that there is no necessary correlation between content and NP structures.  
 Now, Plantinga says: 
… [s]houldn’t we suppose that the proposition in question [about the 
hypothetical creatures
495
] is as likely to be false as true?  Shouldn’t we suppose 
that the proposition in question has a  probability of roughly one/half of being 
true?  Shouldn’t we estimate its probability, on the condition in question, as in the 
neighborhood of .5?  That would be the sensible course.  Neither seems more 





This is invoking the Principle of Indifference (PI), which admittedly has fallen 
upon hard times.  The Principle of Indifference (also known as the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason) basically states that “… evidence which gives us no reason to think 
that any one of a number of mutually exclusive possibilities … is more probable than any 
other will give those possibilities equal epistemic probabilities.”
497
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 Actually, what he says is:  “Materialists offer two (or possibly three) main theories here.”  Plantinga, 
KOG, 35.  The first two are obvious enough, but I am at a loss in ascertaining the third one. 
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certain proposition has somehow come to be associated with this structure, so that the structure acquires 
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One of the main criticisms about the Principle of Indifference is that it yields a 
uniform distribution of probabilities without any real reason to accept a uniform 
distribution rather than a non-uniform distribution.  D. H. Mellor writes: 
… The moral of … [examples] that have been used to discredit the indifference 
principle in the last two centuries … is that epistemic probabilities, equal or 
unequal, cannot be derived from mere ignorance.  The general recognition of this 
fact has profoundly affected the way in which probability is used to measure how 




Plantinga anticipated possible criticisms concerning the Principle of 
Indifference.
499
 He concluded that, although the Principle of Indifference has some well-
known problems, it still makes good sense to use it in some circumstances: 
… [some examples] show that certain incautious statements of PI come to grief – 
[j]ust as Goodman’s grue/bleen paradoxes show that incautious statements of a 
principle governing the projection of predicates or properties comes to grief.  But, 
of course, the fact is we project properties all the time, and do so perfectly 
sensibly.  In the same way, I think, we often employ a principle of indifference in 
ordinary reasoning, and do so quite properly.  We also use it in science – for 




In spite of the fact that the Principle of Indifference has been severely criticized, 
Plantinga approvingly quotes Roy Weatherford concerning its occasional use: 
… An astonishing number of extremely complex problems in probability theory 
have been solved, and usefully so, by calculations based entirely on the 
assumption of equiprobable alternatives.
501
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 Roy Weatherford, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1982) p. 35.  Quoted in Plantinga, KOG, 39, note 52.  In a more expanded form, what Weatherford 
wrote was this: “… An astonishing number of extremely complex problems in probability theory have been 
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If we want a numerical probability here,
502
 it looks like we’re going to have to use 
PI.  If that is allowed, Plantinga then asks:  what is the probability that our hypothetical 
creatures have cognitive faculties that are reliable (meaning that, roughly, at least ¾ of 
the beliefs that the creatures have are true)?
503
  Very small, says Plantinga: 
 If I have 1000 independent beliefs, for example, the probability (under these 
 conditions) that three quarters or more of these beliefs are true (certainly a modest 
 enough requirement for reliability) will be less that 10
-58
.  And even if I am 
 running a modest epistemic establishment of only 100 beliefs, the probability that 
 ¾ of them are true, given the probability of any one’s being true is ½, is very 
 low, something like .000001 … The conclusion to be drawn is that it is very 




 This is how things run if content somehow supervenes upon NP properties.  Does 
the situation change if content is reducible to NP properties?  No, and for the same 
reason:   
 The content doesn’t have to be true, of course, for the neuronal structure to cause 
 the appropriate kind of behavior.  It just happens that this particular arrangement 
 of adaptive NP properties also constitutes having content.  But again: it would be 
 a piece of enormous serendipity if this content, this proposition, were true; it 
 could just as well be false.  So the probability that this content is true would have 




 Someone might object that, in both of the above cases, Plantinga is implicitly 
assuming that truth/falsity is randomly distributed among all (adaptive and non-adaptive) 
beliefs.  However, given N plus E and background beliefs (K), this assumption seems 
                                                                                                                                                 
this picture of Smith standing there with an equal chance of throwing a Five [on a die with six faces].”  
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unjustified.  Under E we have strong reasons to believe that our beliefs are adaptive (so 
the argument goes).  Hence to run the kinds of arguments he gives above, Plantinga must 
be assuming that, given N&E, truth/falsity is more-or-less randomly distributed among 
adaptive beliefs.  But among adaptive beliefs, it seems that it would be simpler and hence 
more likely for true beliefs to be involved rather than false ones.  False beliefs can be 
adaptive, to be sure, but they have to be counterbalanced by very specific beliefs in very 
specific situations to make them workable toward survival.
506
 
 In reply, the Plantingian might point again to the argument that there is an 
indefinite number of belief/behavior pairings that are adaptive and false.  Sure, some of 
the counterbalancing beliefs which result in the adaptivity of false beliefs seem unlikely 
to us, as would an interconnected web of such beliefs. But given an infinite amount of 
belief/behavior pairings, there is no way to calculate the appropriate ratio of worlds in 
which adaptive behaviors are based upon false (or true) beliefs to worlds in which 
adaptive behaviors are based upon beliefs.   
      This brings up a matter that we briefly looked at in Chapter Four.
507
  (Here it is 
important to revisit Plantinga’s responses to Richard Otte, et al..
508
)   How far out into 
various sets of possible worlds do we go when considering Plantinga’s indefinite 
belief/behavior pairings?  Obviously we are not looking at all logically possible worlds;  
we’ve already restricted to worlds in which N&E hold.  But what further restrictions 
should be are drawn? Perhaps Plantinga is restricting to worlds in which N&E hold and 
there are creatures that have beliefs.  If that is the proper set of possible worlds, then 
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perhaps it does seem proper to assume that truth/falsity is more-or-less randomly 
distributed among adaptive beliefs, because we have no basis to say whether or not 




 A critic might maintain that we do, however, have a basis to say whether or not 
adaptive beliefs are associated with true beliefs by appealing to the actual world.  Why 
can’t the actual world can’t be one in which adaptive behaviors are based on true beliefs?  
Another way to put it is to ask: “What specific propositions from our background 
evidence from the actual world are we allowed to add to N&E to support R?”   
 The answer for Plantinga is that it might well be the situation that the actual world 
is one in which adaptive behaviors are mostly based upon true beliefs.  But we don’t 
know this to be the case, because what the actual world is is in question, because of the 
Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings Problem.   
Someone might respond that they still don’t see why Plantinga would say that we 
don’t know the situation of the actual world.  It can’t be because we have a defeater for 
R, because we don’t have a defeater until we get to Premise (10).  Ordinary evidence 
suggests very strongly that many of our beliefs are adaptive because they are true, even 
given N&E.  We know, for example, that our belief that apples are good to eat is both 
true and adaptive because it is true.  
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order for translatability to be possible, we must assume that most of the organism’s beliefs are true.  
Plantinga might not be worried concerning an objection like this, though, because a Davidsonian is not, 
presumably, making an ontological case for N&E (i.e., proposing that it is the objective fact-of-the-matter 
that metaphysical naturalism is true), and Plantinga’s argument is only aimed at metaphysical naturalists 




Plantinga might respond that, yes, we can know that it is true that apples are good 
to eat, and that that situation is adaptive because it is true that apples are good to eat.  But 
the evidence for this is E&K.  So, it is not quite right to say that we know this even given 
N&E&K, because the introduction of N might take away the right that the adherent of 
N&E had to hold the apple belief in the same way that the introduction of D to E&K (that 
there is a Cartesian evil demon) might take away the right to know the apple belief.  
Plantinga would agree that, given E in the actual world, many adaptive behaviors 
are based upon true beliefs.  And almost everyone would agree that, given E in the actual 
world, some adaptive behaviors are based upon false beliefs.  But once someone has 
admitted that there is an indefinite number of possible adaptive behaviors based upon 
false beliefs, we can’t assume that there is a preponderance of adaptive behaviors based 
upon true beliefs without begging the question.
510
 
Consider a time when the best ancient science held that it is the sun’s movement, 
not that of the earth, that causes the phenomenon of the sun’s rising and setting.  If 
(anachronistically) we assume that the scientists of those days could use Possible Worlds 
concepts and terminology, we can imagine the following scenario, below. 
Say that one of these scientists says, “I think that there is an indefinite number of 
possible worlds in which the appearance of the rising and setting of the sun is not caused 
by the sun’s movement, but in which the sun is relatively fixed in space.”  We can 
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imagine that his friend, who is also an ancient scientist, might respond, “Yes, but if we 
look at the evidence in the actual world, we can see that it is the case that it is the sun that 
moves, and almost no one in his/her right mind would entertain your wildly speculative 
possible worlds.  Our evidence from the actual world is just too strong.”  
The first scientist would possibly respond, “Don’t you see?  You are assuming 
that you know what the actual world is in order to say what you have said.  But, I am 
maintaining that, because of my alternative scenarios, it is possible that the actual world 
is one of my “wildly speculative (to you)” possible worlds, and that you are begging the 
question.” 
For Plantinga, we might be in a similar situation.  If, because of the above 
reasoning, someone grants Plantinga the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings Problem, his 
next step is to apply the conclusions of the earlier-mentioned hypothetical creatures to us; 
if naturalism is true and there is no God (or similar being), then it seems that we are in an 
analogous situation.  Plantinga, in KOG, abbreviates this situation as P(R/N) is low.  
(Here is another slight change from many earlier versions of EAAN:  he now includes in 
N the proposition “… that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the 
processes proposed in current evolutionary theory.”
511
  He feels justified in so 
simplifying because he thinks current evolutionary theory is the only real game in town 
for most naturalists with regard to our development as organisms.  Since that would 
probably be undisputed by most of his critics, this seems a fair-enough simplification.)    
                                                 
511




 Summing up the KOG changes, so far, which affect Premise (1) through Premise 
(6):  In KOG, Plantinga shortens his argument by maintaining that, since naturalists are 
usually materialists about the mind, then on either of the two main ways of thinking about 
how content is related to NP properties (i.e., supervenience or reduction), P(R/N) turns 
out to be low.  The numerical assignments here involve the Principle of Indifference, but 
that does not necessarily count against it.  Without using the Principle of Indifference, it 
is difficult to see how one could arrive at any reputable numerical figures.  So, if you 
want numbers, you’re going to have to use the Principle of Indifference.  If you don’t like 
that, you are going to have run the argument without numbers somehow.  So, the avenues 




(One additional important consideration that Plantinga addresses in KOG is that 
he anticipates the idea that his argument can be avoided by certain naturalists who are not 
materialists, in the style of, say, Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, etc..  This, Plantinga 
maintains, would not damage his argument, because there isn’t any God in such a picture 
to create the design plan in such a way that our cognitive faculties would be appropriately 
aimed at truth.  We therefore have to proceed as before, figuring the probability that any 
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 This inscrutability can mean either (1) that there is a probability out of our epistemic reach, or (2) that 
there isn’t a probability.  I don’t think that Plantinga means the latter, but if so, there are problems that need 
to be addressed.  I will treat some of these later in this chapter. 
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Non-numerical Probabilities for EAAN 
 Maybe the “probability premises” of EAAN, as formulated in the SUMMARY, 
look so obviously low that it is not necessary to assign any numbers.  One could just say 
that, intuitively speaking, on each scenario, P(R/N&E) looks very low (in the same way 
that one might say that the probability the Chicago Cubs will win the World Series each 
year of the second decade of the 21st century given the proposition 1908 was the last time 
that the Chicago Cubs won the World Series is low.)
514
 
 Looking again at Premises 1(a) through 1(c), it seems obvious that on all three of 
these scenarios that P(R/N&E) would be intuitively very low.  Indeed, I haven’t seen 
anywhere in the literature concerning EAAN a place where someone criticizes Plantinga 
for holding these scenarios to result in a low probability.  Then you only have remaining 
Premise 1(d).  If Plantinga’s argument about an indefinite number of possible 
belief/behavior pairings (involving false beliefs but adaptive behavior) holds, then 
Premise (1)(d) turns out to be inscrutable.  The Probability Thesis has been reached 
without any numerical values. 
 
Taking All the Probabilities to be Inscrutable 
 I don’t know of anywhere in the literature where Plantinga defines inscrutability, 
but from remembering the places where he tends to use the term, “inscrutability” comes 
up when (for various reasons) we just don’t know what to think about a probability in 
question.  We have no real reason to consider the probability to be either low or high.  
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 For the relevant information, see the Official Website of the Chicago Cubs, 
http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/chc/history/timeline12.jsp (accessed March 3, 2010).  See the discussion 
Plantinga has in WPF, p. 160-168. 
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Now, this could be because of our limits as cognizers.  For instance, say there is an 
objective probability, but it is out of our epistemic reach (e.g., presumably God would 
know the probability even if we do not).
515
  Or, a probability we are considering might be 
inscrutable because there really is no probability associated with the proposition under 
consideration (e.g., there may not be a probability associated with Feike can swim on 
China is a large country.)
516
  Either way, the probability is unavailable to us, and 
unavailability is a central thought whenever Plantinga invokes “inscrutability”.  
If inscrutability is the case because there are no probabilities associated with the 
relevant propositions, that would cause a problem for Plantinga as far as the logical form 
of the SUMMARY goes.  That is because Premise (5), the identity statement, does 
involve probability.  Also, in Premise (6), the crucial Probability Thesis, it says that there 
is a probability.  If in fact the situation is that inscrutability holds (because there is no 
probability associated with the various propositions involved), then Premise (5) is either 
false or does not have a truth value, and the argument stops right there.  The argument 
would then have to begin at Premise (9). 
Some critics might say that Plantinga owes us an argument that there even is a 
probability associated with the relevant propositions before he can start talking about 
whether it is low, high, or inscrutable.   
Consider the following two sets of proposition relations: 
Case 1:  P(F/L&S), where F is Feike can swim, L is Feike is a Frisian lifeguard,  
              and S is 9 out of 10 Frisian lifeguards can swim.   
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Case 2:  P(F/H), where F is Feike can swim and H is China is a large country.  
Is P(R/N&E) more like Case 1 or Case 2?  Obviously, it had better be more like 
the first case.  In Case 2 it is reasonable to suspect that there isn’t any probability 
regarding the relation of the propositions involved.  The propositions in Case 2 don’t 
seem at all relevant to one another such that a probability could be obtained, numerical or 
non-numerical. 
Relevance issues can get deep and murky fairly quickly. Not only that, the 
concept of inductive probability generally is admittedly controversial.  Various problems 
and paradoxes (e.g., Bertrand’s paradox) vex the concept.  But, even in light of the 
difficulties and complexities, it does not seem to be the case that the whole concept of 
inductive probability in incoherent.  John Nolt writes: 
Even if … [various arguments] have no precise inductive probability, this does 
not show that the idea of inductive probability is completely incoherent.  It shows 
only that, strictly speaking, this idea is not applicable to certain arguments … at 





  Some propositions do seem relevant to one another (and seem to be in a 
probability relation) even though we can’t explicate exactly how they are so related.  The 
propositions involved in the Probability Thesis, although not statistical as in Case 1, do 
seem to be relevant to one another.   Therefore, they are closer to Case 1 than Case 2.  I 
have not seen any of Plantinga’s critics maintain that the propositions involved in EAAN 
were not at all relevant to one another.  Granted, we did see James Van Cleve ask about 
the probability of it is raining given the Broncos won Super Bowl XXXII;
518
 but he was 
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attacking a general defeater principle that he thought Plantinga was using, not 
maintaining that the propositions in the Probability Thesis were unrelated.
519
  
I think, in fact, that Plantinga thinks that there is a probability associated with 
these propositions, and that if the probability is inscrutable to us it is due to our short 
epistemic reach; it is not inscrutable to God.  However, if he did want to allow that “non-
probability inscrutability” can enter into the argument (i.e., there isn’t any probability for 
anyone to know), then the premises in the SUMMARY before Premise (9) would be 
worthless.  (That is, all except Premise (1), which might still be of some value in 
prompting reflection on the difficulty of stating the relationship between our beliefs and 
our behaviors in light of the many differing naturalistic philosophies of mind.) 
For those probability theorists who doubt that there are probabilities associated 
with propositions of the types as those in the Probability Thesis, the premises before 
Premise (9) will obviously not be persuasive to these critics; they will need to pick up the 
argument in the latter premises. 
If a critic of EAAN held, for various reasons, all of the relevant probabilities to 
exist but to be inscrutable, then that would bring to center stage the thought experiments 
that Plantinga presents as being analogous to the situation (of the reflective adherent of 
N&E who has considered the Probability Thesis).  These analogies will be, primarily, the 
cases of the XX drug, the questionable sphygmomanometer, the mysterious radio device, 
and the irradiated widgets.  The main premise of contention of EAAN now becomes 
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Premise (10), and the whole argument then hinges upon the appropriateness of 
Plantinga’s analogies.   
Plantinga thinks, of course, that inscrutability
520
 doesn’t change the ultimate 
results of the argument.  For Plantinga, the reflective naturalist is still saddled with a 
defeater.  Plantinga’s main weapon here appears to be the now-familiar XX drug analogy:  
the drug that, within two hours, destroys the cognitive reliability of those who take it (i.e., 
they believe mostly false propositions).
521
  In KOG the scenario is changed a bit from 
previous versions; this time Plantinga presents the story in such a way that we have no 
idea what percentage of those who take the drug are unreliable: 
 You learn that your cousin Sam, whose cognitive faculties you have always 
 assumed to be reliable, has ingested XX … You know that some proportion of 
 those who ingest XX become wholly unreliable; but you don’t know what that 
 proportion is; as far as you are concerned, P (Sam’s faculties are reliable/Sam has 
 ingested XX) is inscrutable.  It could be as low as zero; it could be as high as 1; 
 and it could be anything in between.  Under these conditions you have a defeater 
 for your assumption that Sam’s cognitive faculties are reliable. You would also 
 have a defeater for R if you believed you had ingested XX and that P(R/I’ve 




 The XX drug thought experiment is supposed to be analogous to the situation of a 
reflective adherent of N&E who has a Humean defeater.  I will look more into how this is 
supposed to be the case, below.  As a side note, it should be noticed that, in KOG, a 
Humean defeater is given a more precise definition, described as follows: 
 … You have a Humean defeater for a belief B in a given situation if (1) the 
 production of B is governed by a bit of the design plan that is aimed not at the 
 production of true belief, but at some other state of affairs (such as recovery from 
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 disease or the avoidance of cognitive disaster), and (2) if only truth aimed 
 processes were at work in this situation, you would have an ordinary rationality 
 defeater for B.  One who believes she’s taken XX has a Humean defeater for R, as 
 does someone who thinks she has mad cow disease.
523
 
If the RA does indeed have a Humean defeater, then the RA has been put into a place 
where she has an undefeated defeater concerning R, and this will eventuate in a corrosion 
of the basis for all of her beliefs. 
Assessing the Changes to the Argument in KOG 
In KOG, things move much more swiftly as the beginning phases of the argument 
are vastly simplified.  If someone doesn’t object to Plantinga’s use of the Principle of 
Indifference, this may be a better form of the early part of EAAN.  However, the KOG 
version may move too swiftly for some; they might feel that many points have been 
passed over without sufficient detailed argumentation.   
In the pre-KOG formulations, Plantinga was looking very closely at the 
relationship between our beliefs and our behavior.  He grouped the possibilities into four 
scenarios which exhausted the possibilities.  It then turned out that P(R/N&E) was 
obviously low on all but the fourth scenario.  I don’t know of any substantial criticisms of 
EAAN that disputed a low probability for R in each of the first three scenarios (i.e., 
premises 1(a) -1(c) of the SUMMARY).  On that last scenario (i.e., 1(d)), at first it 
seemed that P(R/N&E) would be high.  But, concerning this, we remember, Plantinga 
said that there were an indefinite amount of belief/behavior pairings, where the beliefs 
were false, that could result in adaptive behavior.  That resulted in the claim in Premise 
(3) that the probability associated with (1)(d) is inscrutable.  Has Plantinga indeed 
established Premise (3)?   
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SUMMARY Premise (3) 
A good bit of the criticism that EAAN received (especially early on) arose related 
to Premise (3).  About this, Plantinga maintained that, although at first glance it seems 
like P(R/N&E) would be high under 1(d), it actually is inscrutable.  The reason for this 
inscrutability, once again, is because there are an infinite number of belief/behavior 
pairings that could cause an organism to display adaptive behavior, and on many of these 
pairings the relevant beliefs are false.  Support for this came, in part, from Plantinga’s 
examples of (a) Paul the hominid and (b) of the beings who referred to everything (other 
than God) as a creature.
524
   
These examples are missing from Plantinga’s formulation of EAAN in KOG.  The 
non-inclusion of these examples might make the overall argument less persuasive.  This 
is because, upon first hearing of EAAN, a lot of people are tempted to reject it outright. 
They assume that natural selection would weed out organisms that had significantly false 
beliefs.   (We saw this earlier, typified in the remarks of Popper and Quine.)
525
  My 
Chapter Three was mainly concerned with an analysis of Premise 1(d) and Premise (3).  
Ramsey, Sober, Fitelson, and Fodor were all, in various ways, punching away at Premise 
(3).  However, remember that, toward the end of their critiques, there were these 
important caveats offered by Fodor, Fitelson, and Sober:  
[Fodor] … Since, for all we know, evolution would have chosen false believers if 
it had been given the chance, the fact that evolution chose us isn’t, in and of itself, 
a reason for thinking that we’re true believers.  There is, as far as I can tell, no 
Darwinian reason for thinking that we’re true believers.  Or that we aren’t … 
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Darwin isn’t in the epistemology business, and evolution doesn’t care whether 
most of our beliefs are true.
526
    
 
 [Fitelson & Sober]: 
 Anyhow, if evolutionary theory does say that our ability to theorize about the 
world is apt to be rather unreliable, how are evolutionists to apply this point to 
their own theoretical beliefs, including their belief in evolution? One lesson that 
should be extracted is a certain humility— an admission of fallibility. This will 
not be news to evolutionists who have absorbed the fact that science in general 
is a fallible enterprise. Evolutionary theory just provides an important part of 
the explanation of why our reasoning about theoretical matters is fallible. 
Far from showing that evolutionary theory is self-defeating, this consideration 
should lead those who believe the theory to admit that the best they can 
do in theorizing is to do the best they can. We are stuck with the cognitive 
equipment that we have.
527
  [Fitelson and Sober] 
Can Plantinga combine ideas like these (expressed in the above quotations) with 
his argument concerning indefinite belief/behavior pairings to establish Premise (3)?  
Remember, in Premise (3) Plantinga is not arguing that in the scenario of Premise (1)(d) 
that P(R/N&E) is low; here it is inscrutable.  If he were arguing that is was low, he would 
need an argument to show that the proportion of possible worlds in which R is true 
among the possible worlds in which N&E is true (and our beliefs are adaptively 
connected to our behavior) is low.  Since we have the Indefinite Belief/Behavior Pairings 
Problem there doesn’t seem to be any way to do that, except for perhaps using the 
Principle of Indifference.   
Maybe one helpful way to approach this matter is to think about what happens if 
we do not, at first, include N.  If N is dropped out, what should we think about P(R/E)?
 528
  
The argument would look, in summary form, like this: 
                                                 
526
 Fodor, in Beilby, 42. 
527
 Fitelson and Sober, 127. 
179 
 
(1)  Given E, there are four relevant scenarios, cumulatively exhaustive,  
       regarding how our beliefs might be connected with our behavior: 
 
  (a)  epiphenomenalism (no links between beliefs and behaviors); 
                        (b)  semantic epiphenomenalism (links between beliefs and    
                               behaviors, but no causal links);  
                        (c)   a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked but  
                               have maladaptive results; 
                        (d)  a scenario where beliefs/behaviors are causally linked in an  
                               adaptive way.   
 
(2)  P(R/((a) v (b) v (c)) & E) is low [obvious]. 
(3)  P(R/(d) & E) is inscrutable [premise]. 
(4)  So P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) &E) is low or inscrutable [1, 2, 3]. 
(5)  P(R/N&E) = P(R/((a) v (b) v (c) v (d)) & E) [1, 4]. 
 
(6)  P(R/E) is low or inscrutable [4, 5]. 
 
      (7)  If P(R/E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/E) cannot be known to be  
             high [premise]. 
 
       (8)  A “reflective adherent of E” (RA) believes E and knows anything that  
                   is soundly deduced in this argument [definition]. 
  
 (9)  RA knows P(R/E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8]. 
 
(10)  If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source  
         of R, and thereby lacks warrant for believing R [argued via analogy].  
 
(11)  RA lacks warrant for believing R [9, 10]. 
 
(12)  RA’s holding of the proposition RA lacks warrant for believing R is  
         epistemically inconsistent with RA’s simultaneously holding the proposition   
         R [obvious].  
 
 (13)  For any person S, when some proposition p known by S is epistemically  
                     inconsistent with simultaneously holding q, then S has a defeater d for q  
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 (14)  RA has a defeater d for R [12, 13]. 
 
(15)  If RA knows that she has a defeater d for R because of doubts about the  
         source of R, then RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional     
         evidence, since any such evidence would have to come from the cognitive  
         faculties which are in question [vicious epistemic circularity]. 
 
(16)  RA cannot rationally defeat d by way of propositional evidence [10, 11, 14,  
         15]. 
 
(17)  RA cannot defeat d by way of non-propositional evidence [argued in Ch. 7]. 
 
(18)  d can be defeated only by evidence [premise]. 
 
(19)  d is an undefeated defeater of R for RA [16, 17, 18]. 
 
 (20)  One cannot rationally believe a proposition for which one has an  
               undefeated defeater [premise]. 
 
 (21)  RA cannot rationally believe R [19, 20]. 
 
  (22)  If one cannot rationally believe R, then one cannot rationally believe  
               anything [premise]. 
 
 (23)  RA cannot rationally believe E [21, 22]. 
It appears that the argument runs the same way, with N or without N.  But it 
doesn’t.  The latter premises of the argument are the same; but the difference shows up 
upon reflection on the first premise, especially in the four scenarios (a) through (d).  The 
first thing to notice is that, if N is not in the argument, there may be more or less options 
in (1) than there were previously.  
Without N in the argument, we only have E simpliciter, without any supporting 
metaphysical framework.  Let’s now separate the background beliefs K from E, in order 
to highlight the fact that it is due to K that we think that our cognitive faculties are 
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reliable, not because of E.  Ordinarily, people assume R, and that is not because of E; 
many people believe R and do not believe E.   
So, pre-reflection, it is neither any metaphysical framework (e.g., N or T) nor a 
theory of development like E that we are using to underwrite our ordinary belief that R.  
(It is important to note something like R given K was never in doubt in EAAN.  It is only 
when K is conjoined with certain specific metaphysical commitments that some troubles 
ensue.)  
A critic of EAAN might ask: “why would a proponent of EAAN think that ~R, or 
that P(R/E&K) is low?”  The answer is that the proponent of EAAN does not think that 
~R, nor that P(R/E&K) is low.  The proponent of EAAN could hold P(R/E&K) as high; 
she also could think that P(R/T&E&K) is high.
529
  But, once N is introduced as a 
conjunct with E, she thinks something happens that takes away the right for an adherent 
of N&E&K to still hold R.  Why is this? 
There are many conjuncts that could be added to E&K which would result in such 
a low probability that it would take away one’s right to hold R.  For instance, 
P(R/D&E&K), where D represents a proposition to the effect that there exists a Cartesian 
malevolent demon, would seem to be low or inscrutable for an RA who came to believe 
that she was created by such a being.   So also would P(R/L&E&K) be low or inscrutable 
for an RA who believed she had taken XX (where L stand for a proposition maintaining 
that RA is an adherent of a group that frequently takes XX).   
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Other conjuncts might not yield an extremely low probability figure, but still 
bring in enough complications to make it difficult to know what to think about R given 
that specific scenario.  So, there are many scenarios that could compromise the right one 
has to hold R.  For example, our confidence about the right to hold R could be somewhat 
undermined by the hypothesis that B&E&K (where B represents a Theravada Buddhist 
situation; ultimately, “selves” and “beliefs of individual selves” are illusory), or a host of 
other metaphysical possibilities.  The scenarios in Premise (1) will change depending 
upon the various metaphysical framings, because the options will vary regarding how to 
understand the links between our beliefs and our behavior (if there even are selves who 
can even have beliefs, and if beliefs even are ontologically what we normally take them 
to be given the specific metaphysical framework being asserted). 
 Now think about introducing N as the metaphysical framework being posited to 
be conjoined with E&K, and ask about P(R/N&E&K); at first glance, this probability 
would seem high.  Many people would point to our inductive successes in science, our 
ability to predict states of affairs, our abilities to create new technologies, etc..  (Granted, 
philosophical problems abound concerning induction generally, but still, we get around 
fine, at least with matters that have to do with survival.  Of course, we are probably less 
likely to be right concerning higher level theoretical matters, like theories about quantum 
mechanics, or theories of matter, or philosophies of space, or philosophies of mind, or 
positions like metaphysical naturalism.)   
This inductive evidence for R is coming from K, not N.  So, adding N&E to K 
isn’t presenting any additional evidence for R.  But, might adding N to E&K take 
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something away from the evidence for R (as could the assertion of B&E&K)?
530
  If the 
universe, under a given metaphysical position, is not (at its core, so to speak) a reputably 
rational place, what might that do to P(R/__&E&K)?
531
 
This is mainly the reason that the conjunction of N to E&K results in some 
epistemic trouble in EAAN.  We saw earlier how C. S. Lewis remarked that, even if God 
somehow was produced by Nature, then God would be in the same epistemic muddle that 
the naturalist is now supposedly in (i.e., not knowing whether to ultimately trust 
beliefs).
532
  The reason is because then God would have been produced by non-rational 
causes, and we have a strong intuition that beliefs which trace back to non-rational causes 
are not to be trusted. Whenever we trace beliefs back to non-rational causes (in the 
Cause-Effect sense instead of Ground-Consequent sense), we tend to take that as a basis 
to disbelieve the assertions (e.g., He believes he can fly because he has taken a drug, or 
She believes she is a child again because of a tumor in her brain.)
533
  
Richard Taylor’s argument that mentioned the rocks seemingly arranged to say 
THE BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES was driving toward the 
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The cosmic mind will help us only if we put it at the beginning, if we suppose it to be, not the product of 
the total system, but the basic, original, self-existent Fact which exists in its own right.  But to admit that 
sort of cosmic mind is to admit a God outside Nature, a transcendent and supernatural God.” Lewis (1960) 
46-47.  See also my p.116. 
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  If you decide to believe that the rocks were arranged by only natural 
forces (storms, wind, erosion, gravity, etc.), you lose your right to believe the 
“information” the arrangement portrayed.  It may in fact be true that the British Railways 
has a welcoming attitude toward you and your visit to Wales, and so if you believe that 
you will (in one sense) be correct.  But, if your belief is based solely upon the rock 
arrangement (that you take to have been produced by the blind forces of nature), you 
cannot rationally believe it.  Your belief in the British Railways’ disposition toward you, 
although (via a stroke of luck?) true, has a negative epistemic status.  It is not warranted, 
and therefore cannot count as knowledge.  
Someone might protest that the rock arrangement case is disanalogous, because 
N&E&K involves living beings (not rocks) that are selected over long periods of time, 
and it is the truths of the beliefs of these beings that is under scrutiny.   However, the 
purpose of the Case of the Arranged(?) Rocks was simply to awaken the intuition that 
“information” which traces back to non-rational causes, or blind forces, cannot ultimately 
be trusted as rationally warranted.  Given N&E&K, living beings, as well as rocks, are 
ultimately the products of these blind forces; one need only look far enough back down 
the causal path. 
Given N we ultimately come about by way of non-rational causes, not under any 
design plan such that our cognitive faculties need traffic in propositions that are pointed 
to truth.  Plantinga is not the only one who is worried that that might create a problem.  
We saw, for example, that Darwin himself worried about this near the very end of his 
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life.  We also saw Nietzsche highlighting the difficulties concerning truths absent a God, 
as did Descartes, among many others.
535
   
Nor is Plantinga the first one to point out that we have trouble giving a non-
circular argument for R.  How to account for R without presupposing R has long been a 
philosophical problem.  Given K we trust R, but once we try to give a rational basis for it, 
we run into problems.  Plantinga thinks that, given T, a reasonable story can be told that 
makes sense of why we can’t give a non-circular argument for R:  because we are made 
under a design plan such that that kind of evidence isn’t needed to trust R, nor is that kind 
of evidence needed to trust our basic memory beliefs and basic sensory beliefs.  But, he 
wonders, can someone tell a story under N that makes sense of this?
536
 
I propose what might be a more helpful beginning for the proponent of EAAN: to 
first present an argument for R under E&K, so that readers can be assured that R is not 
being questioned.  The next move is to talk about different metaphysical scenarios which 
might be attached to E&K and assess how these scenarios might affect one’s right to 
believe that R.  Then, specify that EAAN will look at how R might be affected on the 
introduction to E&K of one particular metaphysical view, namely N.  Present the 
Intuition about Non-rational Origins of Beliefs, and then run the argument as before. 
If the argument is presented in this way, it has many advantages.  First, it tells the 
reader that the proponent of EAAN is not a global skeptic about R.  Second, it helps the 
reader to think of E&K, initially at least, divorced of various metaphysical commitments.  
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This is important, because it is likely that some readers will think that N is necessarily 
wedded to E&K, but it isn’t.  Those who hold T and those who hold N could both 
conceivably study and use the regularities presented to us in nature and arrive at E&K, as 
could some of those who hold other metaphysical commitments.  As Bas van Fraassen 
has written: 
… Suppose some scientist wishes to write something to the effect that there is no 
God on the first page of his notebook.   This may of course simply express some 
anti-religious sentiment.  He could however intend it to be a metaphysical thesis 
with which all his scientific theories are to be compatible.  Then he may write 
something like “Matter is all there is; God does not exist” … When the scientist 
comes to the end of that notebook, he’ll find that the thesis made no difference at 
all.  At least, its content – as opposed to its emotive force – played no role.  The 




Thirdly, presenting the argument in this manner focuses the readers’ minds on 
how various scenarios, when conjoined with E, could result in greatly decreased 
confidence in one’s right to hold R, or greatly decreased confidence that a coherent non-
circular case can be made for R given the metaphysical view at issue.  EAAN is not an 
argument that anyone should have decreased confidence in R, but that a RA should give 
up N because, when that specific metaphysical commitment is attached, one loses warrant 
for the truths one thinks one knows
538
 (if there are even truths as we ordinarily think of 
them under N).  In other words (and this point bears continual repeating because it seems 
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to be regularly missed by some of Plantinga’s critics), it is not R that is being questioned 
for a RA, it is the right to rationally hold R that is being questioned.
539
   
Here might be another way to approach the overall issue involved in EAAN.  Say 
that an adherent of N&E&K comes upon the following proposition: 
 Proposition M:  There is a possible world w such that, in w, organisms are 
 sometimes selected for adaptive behaviors which issue from false beliefs. 
 That in itself is not controversial.
540
  Almost everyone seems willing to admit that 
M is true.  Now, take a person who accepts M and believes N&E&K and ask her if she’s 
willing to reflect on Proposition M.  After a little reflection she might well wonder how 
many of her own beliefs could be false but somehow adaptive (especially beliefs that are 
not directly correlated with survival, like higher level theoretical beliefs).   That doesn’t 
seem too controversial, either. 
 How many of her beliefs might be false?  Why can she trust the ones that she 
does?  She knows that the support she is really depending upon for this has to do with K, 
and she knows that N&E isn’t a crucial component of K.    
If she thinks about that for a while, it might not be surprising if it led her to 
wonder in general about the right to trust her cognitive faculties (not to wonder about her 
cognitive faculties).  She has been apprised of the Intuition about Non-rational Origins, 
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and she realizes that it’s hard to see how she can give any non-circular argument for R.  
The Intuition about Non-rational Origins seems to present a problem about her right to 
rationally believe R.  She begins to suspect that it was the introduction of N into her web 
of beliefs that caused the problem. 
Another way (other than reflection about Proposition M) to enter the muddle is to 
be a RA who is reflecting upon SUMMARY premises (1) – (3).   Some critics, however, 
think that merely reflecting upon those premises is not enough.  For instance, we saw that 
Fitelson and Sober thought that Plantinga needed to show (in order to cause trouble for a 
RA) “… that E&N not only defeats R, but also defeats the claim that ‘at least a non-
negligible minority of our beliefs are true.”
541
  Jerry Fodor seemed to think that 
Plantinga’s argument needed to have independent evidence that most of our behavior is 
linked to false belief.
542
  I think that many people might think that Plantinga initially 
needs to show that given N&E we have good reasons to believe that we are organisms 
that have been adapted most of the time by way of false beliefs before they will allow him 
SUMMARY Premise (3).    
I can’t rehearse all that was said in response to these ideas in Chapter Three.  
However, a brief summary might be in order.  First of all, Plantinga doesn’t think that we 
have been adapted most of the time by way of false beliefs.  Plantinga believes R and 
doesn’t think that there is necessarily any problem with a high probability for R/E.  What 
he does think is that, when E is conjoined to N, then you have problems. 
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Secondly, Plantinga thinks someone should give him Premise (3) because of his 
Indefinite Belief-Behavior Pairings argument.  Plantinga thinks it’s fairly easy to form 
conceptions of belief/behavior pairings where the relevant beliefs (upon which the 
adaptive behavior was based) are false.    Thinking up enough of these examples will 
point someone in the direction of a vast number of these pairings, and that leads to 
inscrutability.   
One of these belief/behavior pairings that he used to illustrate this point had to do 
with a thought experiment about people who believed there was a God who was 
uncreated, but that every other thing that existed was created, i.e., a “creature”.  So, every 
proposition about every entity in the universe (other than God) had creaturehood attached 
as a property of every thing.  But, if naturalism is true, then that would involve a massive 
number of false beliefs that those people had, all the while still displaying possibly 
adaptive behavior. 
 For some reason, though, that particular thought experiment (i.e., the 
Creaturehood Predication Scenario) does not seem to satisfy people like Fodor and 
company, nor does the scenario about Paul (the hominid),
543
 nor the one about the group 
of beings, each of whom thinks that everything other than herself is a witch.
544
  Perhaps 
these are too colorful, and their nature tends to make people disinclined to further 
consider Plantinga’s argument.  Are there more persuasive imaginable scenarios 
involving false belief that would look more likely to the minds of those like Fodor, 
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Fitelson, Sobor, and Ramsey?  I will argue that there are, in the following scenarios, 
below.  
Scenario α, Being H 
 In Scenario α, Being H is a being that believes that any organism that she 
perceives to be the color “dusty-white” (say, the color of sheep’s wool) is a predator.  
Therefore, she believes it is good not to go near any dusty-white beings.  Let us say, in 
this scenario, that the belief all dusty-white beings are predators is a false belief.  Let us 
additionally stipulate that, actually, in her mini-environment, there is no organism that is 
dusty-white that is a predator.  In her mini-environment, it so happens that all of the 
beings that are dusty-white are mountain goats that live on precarious rock formations.  
All beings of H’s type which have wandered onto these rock formations have slipped and 
died, never to return to the H-being habitat.  So, this confirms the false Predator Belief in 
the mind of H.  H lives to pass on her characteristics to her descendants, but because of a 
false belief.  
Scenario β, H the Teacher 
 Keep the same story as above, but in Scenario β let us add that Being H teaches 
her (living) descendants about the belief in dusty-white predators, and that these 
descendants acquire (and pass on to their descendants) this same false belief about dusty-
white predators.  As long as they continue to live in the same mini-environment, they are 
continually selected due to the false beliefs.   
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Scenario γ, the New Home 
Now, what if the descendants of Being H wander to another environment 
(Scenario γ)?  Will they now be disabused of the false belief? 
 Not necessarily.  Perhaps all it would take for the false belief to be maintained is 
that there be some other benefit(s) (and presumably there is a very large set of these) that 
would give them some adaptive edge.   For instance, say the dusty-white creatures in the 
new area live near a hole that emits a gas poisonous to beings like H (but not poisonous 
to the dusty-white creatures).  Or, alternatively, say the dusty-white creatures in the new 
micro-environment live near a lake where still other creatures (of some other color) grab 
beings like H and eat them (but they don’t like to eat the off-white creatures).  And so on.  
Avoiding the dusty-white creatures still gives H and her so-taught descendants an 
adaptive edge. 
 Those who lean toward positions epitomized in the Popper and Quine quotes 
which appeared earlier might say that, sooner or later, beings of H’s species will 
eventually die out because of the false belief in the dusty-white “predators”.  But is that 
obvious?  Someone may think that H’s dusty-white belief is just one false belief that H 
has.  The large mass of other beliefs that H maintains could be mostly true beliefs about 
the predators in her micro-environment, and it is these mostly true beliefs that account for 
H’s adaptive behavior.   (This was one of the ways that we saw Ramsey and Fodor 
criticizing Plantinga, earlier.)  Plantinga’s response was that, once the possibilities are 
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brought up in this manner, there’s no way to know, under N&E, how many of one’s 
behaviors are adaptive due to false belief or true belief.   
Remember also what Plantinga had to say about Fodor’s charge that he was 
reasoning from the mere possibility that our behavior could be adaptive while most of our 
beliefs are false to the conclusion that most of our beliefs, then, are false.  Plantinga 
responded that he never said that, but instead maintained that there are indefinitely many 
beliefs/desires that yield adaptive behavior, and among those are indefinitely many where 
the beliefs involved are mostly false.  Therefore, we couldn’t calculate probabilities here, 
and we should consider the probabilities to be inscrutable.
545
 
The upshot of all this is that it seems that Plantinga does not need to give an 
argument that our cognitive faculties are, for the most part, unreliable, as Fodor, et al. say 
that he does.  And that’s not the argument anyway; it is rather that the basis for RA to 
rationally believe R has been taken away.   
So far, Premise (3) is the only one that has been contested in a significant way.  
Given Plantinga’s argument about the indefinite number of possible belief/behavior 
pairings, and combining that with my Prelude to the argument concerning the Intuition 
about Non-rational Origins, perhaps Plantinga’s argument can move on past Premise (3).  
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Since, after Premise (3), there is no significant opposition to Premises (4), (5), and (6),
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An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form:  Discussion of 





Assuming that Plantinga’s argument has established SUMMARY Premise (6),
547
 
(or assuming that at least that his argument is still alive after Premise (6)), I now look into 
the remaining premises of the SUMMARY.  Premise (10) merits special attention.  I will 
conclude that Plantinga establishes Premise (10) for those who share a certain very 
reasonable intuition with him.   
Picking up now with Premises (7) through (9), we have: 
 
(7)  If P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, then P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be  
             high [premise]. 
 
       (8)  A “reflective adherent of N&E” (RA) believes N&E and knows anything that  
                   is soundly deduced in this argument [definition].  
 (9)  RA knows P(R/N&E) cannot be known to be high [6, 7, 8]. 
Premises (7) through (9) seem innocuous enough.  Premise (7) is obvious, 
Premise (8) is definitional, and Premise (9) follows tightly from (6), (7), and (8). 
Therefore, Premise (10) looks to be our next contested proposition.  It states: 
 
(10)  If (9), then (epistemically speaking) RA should have doubts about the source  
         of R, and thereby lacks warrant for believing R [argued via analogy].  
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We have already seen some critics of EAAN protest that one does not necessarily 
have a defeater here.
548
  Why should, if (9), RA have doubts about the source of R?  
Because, Plantinga says, in analogous situations, we can just see that she should.  He 
agrees that one doesn’t always have a defeater for something like this, but in this case he 
thinks one does have a defeater.  This can be seen, he maintains, by looking at what we 
would judge the right epistemic stance to be in similar situations.  This means that these 
analogies must be fairly tight. 
Before we look again at these analogies, it might first be helpful to set them 
before the backdrop of his overall epistemological project.  Plantinga seemed to come 
upon EAAN as almost an afterthought while working on the first two volumes of his 
epistemology trilogy.  In these books he was looking at various accounts of warrant.  In 
the first volume of his epistemology trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga 
surveyed a number of (mainly) internalist accounts and commented upon why they were 
insufficient with regard to warrant.  In the second volume, Warrant and Proper Function, 
Plantinga began to set out his own account of warrant (which was significantly, but not 
exclusively, externalist).  It looks like it is here that Plantinga apparently began to suspect 
that all accounts of warrant which did not ultimately appeal to the notion of proper 
function under a design plan aimed at truth (hereafter PF) would fail.  So, as he was 
developing his own account of warrant, he began to see the absolutely crucial role that 
PF played in epistemic justification.  Then, at the end of the book (WPF), he seemed to 
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notice that, if his account of warrant was true, metaphysical naturalism might be in 
trouble. 
 Plantinga maintains that there is no story that a metaphysical naturalist can tell 
which would satisfactorily explain our basic ideas of proper function.  He did note (in 
WPF, WCB, his responses in Naturalism Defeated?, and KOG) that there were various 
naturalistic attempts at accounts of proper function; the main ones he interacted with 






 and Michael Levin.
552
 
But he maintained that they all failed (and that they all failed for basically the same 
reason).  The best place to see Plantinga’s reasoning for this is the entirety of Chapter 11 
in WPF (entitled “Naturalism versus Proper Function?”), but there is a kind of summary 
in KOG
553
 where he briefly looks at the four naturalistic attempts, above, and finds them 
wanting.   To delve into his support for this in detail is beyond the scope of what I’m 
trying to do here, but at least a quick look at this matter is important.   
 First, an important caveat:  Karen Neander uses the term “proper function” but 
limits her account to an analysis of just a scientific concept of proper function, not the 
ordinary-usage concept.   Likewise, Ruth Millikan has made a similar disclaimer: “Proper 
function is intended as a technical term … used to unravel certain problems, not because 
it does or doesn’t accord with common notions such as ‘purpose’ or the ordinary notion 
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  About Neander’s qualification (and by extension Millikan’s, too) 
Plantinga says: 
 This is an important point, because it is the everyday ordinary concept of proper 
 function that is involved in the notions of warrant, sanity, health, and the like – 
 not some other concept in the neighborhood, no matter how scientifically 
 respectable that other concept may be.  It is proper function (not some other 
 concept) that is entailed by the notion of warrant; and it is proper function, I say, 
 that can’t be given a naturalistically acceptable analysis.  The fact that we can 
 construct other concepts out of naturalistically acceptable elements is perhaps of 





 Still, he thinks that it is instructive to see just why Neander’s account and 
Millikan’s account would fail if they were taken to be accounts of proper function.  He 
suspects that the reason such accounts are qualified the way that they are is because of the 
foreseen difficulties in squaring the accounts with metaphysical naturalism: 
 …Often … when naturalists talk about proper function they give an account not 
 of proper function itself, but of some other notion in the neighborhood … 
 (Perhaps they do this partly because it is clear to them that one can’t give a 




 In order to explain proper function in the context of a naturalistic account of 
warrant, Plantinga maintains that one would need to “give an analysis of proper function 
in terms of properties that are naturalistically acceptable.”
557
  To do this would be to (at 
least) give the necessary and sufficient conditions concerning proper function.  Plantinga 
doesn’t think that the accounts that Neander, Millikan, Wright, or Levin give the 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for proper function (nor does he think that they could, 
given naturalistic constraints; more on this will follow, below). 
 Millikan’s account goes like this: 
… Putting things very roughly, for an item A to have function F as a “proper 
function” it is necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions 
should hold.  (1) A originated as a “reproduction” (to give one example, as a copy, 
or a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of 
the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists 
because (causally historically because) of this or these performances.  (2) A 
originated as the product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had 
performance of F as a proper function and that, given its circumstances, had 
performance of F as a proper function and that, under these circumstances 
normally causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A.  Items 
that fall under condition (2) have “derived proper functions”, functions derived 




 Neander’s account, similar but shorter, is that “… [i]t is the proper function of an 
item X of an organism O to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to the 
inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the 
phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.”
559
  Wright basically says that 
“… an effect F of S is a function of S just in case S exists or persists because it F’s; i.e., a 
thing’s functions are those of its effects that explain it.”
560
  And lastly, Levin states:  “F is 
a function of S if and only if ‘S is explained by its leading to F and the efficient cause of 
S’ of S is explained by its leading to S.”
561
 
A full rendering of Plantinga’s views on all of these accounts would take me too 
far afield.  It would also involve looking in detail at a long and complicated thought 
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experiment that Plantinga offers.  (The short version of it is this: a madman orders his 
scientists to induce a genetic mutation into non-Aryans, but the mutation gets out of 
control and affects Aryans, too.  In the end, the Aryan and non-Aryan mutants are 
“functioning”, (and functioning according to the definitions of proper function that 




Perhaps it will suffice to say that Millikan’s account, as also the accounts of 
Neander, Wright, and Levin, entail that anything that functions properly would need to 
have had ancestors.  But, Plantinga wonders, isn’t it possible that something could be 
functioning properly and also be the first of its kind (a telephone, Adam’s heart, etc.)?
563
  
If so, analyses of proper function which involve a condition of ancestors will be too 
strong (i.e., they involve a condition which is not necessary).
564
   
 Secondly, the conditions offered are not sufficient, either.  For example, Plantinga 
wonders whether his car continues to exist because it wrecked into a ditch before it would 
have been destroyed by an unforeseen train.  Is wrecking into a ditch the car’s function?  
It seems to satisfy one of Levin’s conditions.
565
 
 Additionally, what if something functions for a different reason than the function 
it had for the organism’s ancestors?  It is, of course, possible that “a thing might persist 
because of some feature that wasn’t its function or one of its functions …”.
566
  And what 
if something is malfunctioning (e.g., a equine heart that is only beating 15 beats per 
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minute), but, because of another factor that has nothing to do with its ancestors (e.g., a 
perforated aorta), the explanation of the organism’s continued existence has to do with 
the malfunctioning aspect? 
 There is more to say, of course, and Plantinga analyzed other accounts (especially 
in Warrant and Proper Function), but one may perhaps begin to see why Plantinga 
would be led to conclude: 
 As far as I know, no one has been able to come up with a naturalistic analysis of 
 proper function that is anywhere nearly adequate or accurate, and by now the 
 project is beginning to look uphopeful.  The fundamental reason, I suggest, is that 
 this notion, the notion of function or proper function, essentially involves the aims 
 and intentions of one or more conscious and intelligent designers.  The notion of 
 proper function really implies the idea of design by conscious, intentional, and 
 intelligent designers.  But that means that the organs and parts of plants, animals, 
 and human beings can function properly (or improperly) only if they are designed 
 and cause to be by one or more conscious, intelligent agents.
567
 
 Now it is clear why Plantinga does not think that an adherent of N&E will be 
able to even tell a story that can get a RA out of the Humean dialectical loop once inside 
of it.  With that in hand, let’s take a last look back at some of the analogies that he uses to 
try to establish Premise (10).  Here he perhaps leans most heavily upon the XX drug 
analogy.  However, other analogies that he used to make this point included the cases of 
the Mysterious Radio Device, the Questionable Sphygmomanometer, the Irradiated 
Widgets, and the Dubious Thermometer. 
In the thought-experiment about the radio device, you come upon an instrument 
about which you don’t know the origins.  At first, you think that it is emitting what you 
believe to be true English sentences, but upon reflection you realize that you have no 
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reason to believe that the device is reliable.   This is because you don’t know anything 
about the intentions of the maker(s) of the device.  Therefore, you cannot take for granted 
anymore the idea that the sentences that you hear are true.  You don’t know what to think 
about the truth status of the sentences. 
 Now, it would be great if you could find out about whether the intentions of the 
developer of the radio device (if there even was a developer) were nefarious or not.  In 
such a position, is there any other evidence you could gather, or any other way to find out 
if you should trust any truth claims contained in the sentences emitted by the device?  
Someone might venture that one could select the statements that were supposedly 
empirically testable, test them, and make some conclusions by way of induction.  Of 
course, this procedure might be shortened at the very beginning by making a mistake in 
trusting the device regarding a statement like “that foodstuff is not fatally poisonous … 
you can eat it.”  Also, even though depending upon such an empirical procedure might 
pragmatically work for a while, how could one know that one wasn’t being deviously set 
up to trust the device, only to be devastated later?  And what about all the statements that 
couldn’t be empirically tested (like metaphysical statements about naturalism, etc.)?  So, 
lack of dependable information about the origins of the device does seem to give one 
quiet a problem.  
 Here there do seem to be several relevant ties to EAAN.  It seems imperative to 
know the intentions of the developer; there doesn’t seem to be a way, short of knowing 
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the intentions of the maker(s) of the radio device to determine the dependability of the 
device.  But how could one gain the necessary information? 
Given N&E, one cannot know the intentions of the maker of one’s cognitive 
faculties because there is no volitionally capable maker of one’s cognitive faculties who 
could have intentions.  The origin of one’s cognitive faculties involves a long chain of 
adaptations that aren’t “concerned” that one’s faculties be pointed at the truth, but only 
adaptive behavior. (Here Plantinga is, of course, depending upon arguments made earlier 
outside of the thought experiment.) 
The sphygmomanometer example runs likewise, where something you thought 
you knew (that the device is reliable) gets taken away from you when you are presented 
with a proposition that makes you question your original trust in its reliability (the 
information about the factory owner and his agenda against the medical instrument 
industry). 
 The irradiated widgets story works in the same way. Your original thought is that 
the widgets are red, but someone tells you something that makes you question your 
original belief … you learn that the widgets are being irradiated by a red light.  Or have 
you learned this?  Do you know that you can trust the source of your new information?  
Your original belief is in danger, but so is your later belief. 
 The XX drug story also works similarly, but is probably Plantinga’s closet 
analogous case, because it is about one’s cognitive faculties (rather than an instrument, a 
radio, etc.).  You have an initial belief in the reliability of your cognitive faculties, but 
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this gets put into question when you somehow acquire the belief that you have taken XX.   
And, given that the source of all your beliefs is in question, how is one to restore the 
knowledge of R that you once had? 
 We looked in some detail (in Chapter 7 concerning Michael Bergmann’s 
criticisms) at how this example is supposed to work.
568
 What is it that makes the XX case 
and EAAN analogous?  To repeat what was said earlier, Plantinga thinks that what makes 
the cases analogous is that in both cases we notice that a person has been put in a scenario 
that a rational outside observer can just see that the person has lost warrant for the belief 
in R.  In the XX case, it is the usual effect of the drug that dissipates warrant.  In the case 
of the RA apprised of EAAN, it is in noticing that one has an undefeated defeater because 
of the propositions that are associated with N when conjoined with E. 
 What if someone does not buy Plantinga’s analogies?   Is it possible that some 
other analogies could be developed which are more persuasive?  His analogies trade upon 
intuitions about the rational thing to do in the situations portrayed along with intuitions 
about how rationality and proper function are related.  Perhaps the analogies used to 
establish Premise (10) should revolve around situations involving whether or not one can 
rationally believe something that has a non-rational source.  After all, that was one of the 
reasons used to establish Premise (3), so it is built into the argument to be available as 
support for Premise (10).  That is why, in Chapter Six, I looked in some detail at the 
similar arguments of Lewis and Taylor which seem to traffic in the same types of 
intuitions upon which Plantinga is depending. 
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 See my p. 144ff. 
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 Say that the Radio Device analogy is adjusted to include that you now do know 
that origins of the device, but those origins are (who knows how) non-rational.  Also, say 
the sphygmomanometer analogy is similarly adjusted so that you now know the origins 
of these particular sphygmomanometers to be non-rational.  Perhaps they were being 
made to be dummies, or non-working models, but the machinery malfunctioned in such a 
way that the devices do actually give readings some of the time; so, the origins of these 
units are machine-caused, rather than the end intended by the machine programmers.   
 Given these changes, it seems more intuitively obvious that one’s beliefs that the 
instruments are reliable has been taken away, i.e., are no longer warranted.  That doesn’t 
mean that your beliefs are always wrong (e.g., the readings or utterances of the devices 
could luckily be correct), but still, your right to believe that they are has been 
undermined. 
After Premise (10), there are other premises which could be controversial.  But, to 
my mind, there really does not seem to be too much compelling criticism about the 
remaining premises, save Premise (17).  However, Plantinga’s responses to Bergmann’s 
concerns
569
 seemed enough to give him Premise (17).   Therefore, I conclude that 
Plantinga’s argument revolves mainly around the intuitions involved in Premise (10).  
And now, it seems as though the analogies used by Plantinga to establish Premise (10) 
can be strengthened to include the Intuition about Non-rational Origins.   
The whole argument seems to come down mainly to this one intuition … the 
Intuition about Non-rational Origins.  It seems like a very reasonable intuition to grant, 
especially as we use it heavily in discrediting information that comes to us via non-
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 See my Chapter Seven. 
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rational sources in everyday life.   As long as there are people who share Plantinga’s 
intuitions in those matters, I expect the basics of his argument to continue to survive in 
some form (as long as the concepts and categories involved in the formulation of the 
premises stay substantially the same). 
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